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Editor’s Introduction
When I was growing up in the 1950s and 1960s (chronological point of
reference: I celebrated my bar mitzvah in January 1959), I was regular and
punctual in my attendance at Junior Congregation on Saturday mornings
and religious school on Sunday mornings and twice during the weekday. (Yes!
They worked us hard in those days.) I attended Beth El, the Conservative
synagogue in Richmond, Virginia.
I remember a lot of what I heard (well, that’s undoubtedly something of
an exaggeration), mostly about Israel and the Holocaust. Later on, I found out
that my experience in this regard was typical. What I do not remember hearing
about was olam ha-ba, the world to come.
Fast forward to the mid-1990s. I was still attending Congregation Beth
El, but now in Omaha, Nebraska. It was a Saturday morning, and our younger
daughter was attending services along with her teenaged friends. At some
point in the D’var Torah [sermon], the rabbi mentioned hell.
Immediately after the service (or was it mid-sermon?), my daughter and
her friends rushed over to me: “Jews don’t believe in hell, do we?” By then, she
surely knew that she was not likely to get a quick yes/no answer from me. (If
that was true when she wanted to borrow the car, how much more so in this
instance?)
In all fairness to everyone involved, there is almost never a simple answer
to a question that begins with “[All] Jews” and continues with “believe [and/
or practice].” And so it was on this occasion. Her question was followed by
several of my own: “Which Jews?” “When? “What do you/they mean by hell?”
And so on.
The theoretical goal of such queries on my part was to point to the
chronological, historical, and theological nuances of defining or describing
beliefs and practices of “Jews.” I suspect that the practical consequence of my
strategy was to lead my daughter, along with her cohorts, to Google.
In some sense, then, we can view the present volume as an extended
answer—or, more properly, partial answer—to my daughter’s question of
almost twenty years ago. But the present volume is also an extended answer to
a query (or set of queries) that goes back well beyond two decades, to at least
two millennia: How do beliefs about the afterlife, or world to come, affect the
way we lead our lives in this world?
Beliefs have consequences. As a general observation, I know this to be
true. Beliefs about the world to come have this worldly consequences. If I
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didn’t know that before hearing and later editing the papers in this volume, I
know this now, as will those who read the chapters in this collection.
As is true with earlier volumes in the Studies in Jewish Civilization Series,
the goal here is not comprehensive coverage of a given field. If it were, we
would determine which topics or subtopics were essential and seek out experts
in each. But we operate in reverse order. First, we seek out experts in a general
field or area of study and then allow them to determine what topic they wish
to address in their oral and written presentations.
So, for example, it is axiomatic among almost all mainstream Jewish
thinkers that those who are rewarded in the afterlife neither eat nor drink.
In this volume we have three papers that are based on the continuation
(with important variations) of prandial and oenological activities after death.
Whether correct or incorrect (and who really knows for sure?), these beliefs
have had an impact in this world on those who accept them.
Don’t like the way things are going in this world? Be patient (sometimes,
very patient): it will all work out for the best, or better for perfection, in the
world to come. Throughout history there have been those who have staked
their lives, their very lives, on the bedrock truth of this proposition. Indeed,
beliefs do have consequences.
The essays in this volume, all of which have their origins in the 28th
Annual Symposium on Jewish Civilization, are arranged in roughly chronological order, beginning with accounts in the Hebrew Bible and continuing up
to philosophical-theological thought of the twentieth century. That said, I hasten to add that this organization through chronology is inexact, inasmuch as
many of our primary sources gather together material far older than the time
of their publication. Further, several chapters range widely through hundreds
if not thousands of years of thought and practice. Even so, I have confidence
that this structure will prove valuable in situating the varied contents of this
volume for careful readers. (Do we have any other kind?)
The first chapter is by Dereck Daschke, Truman State University. It is
titled “‘The End of the World and the World to Come’: What Apocalyptic
Literature Says about the Time After the End-Time.” While Jewish speculation about olam ha-ba, either in the sense of personal eschatology (afterlife)
or in the sense of the messianic age (cosmic eschatology), has largely been
restrained, Daschke begins, in one area of theological imagination, such
speculation has been persistent and insistent: apocalyptic literature. Almost all
works in this literary genre, which encompasses works from roughly 400 b.c.e.
to the second century c.e., give some indication as to what kind of existence
xii

shall follow. Frequently global and personal eschatology are linked together.
Themes of individual sickness and healing underscore the healing of a corrupt
world in the messianic age; individual fealty to Jewish law not only redeems
the people but also restores the earth. Among the apocalypses he highlights
are the books of Enoch, Daniel, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and Revelation (a work
composed well within the Jewish literary tradition).
Nicolae Roddy, Creighton University, is the author of the second chapter, “Warriors, Wives, and Wisdom: This World and the World to Come in
the (So-Called) Apocrypha.” He observes that the vast array of Jewish late Second Temple Period religious texts written under the pressures of imperial and
Hasmonean domination presents almost as diverse an assembly of responses
to the political as to the cultural challenges of the times. For some groups, the
perceived hostilities of the Hellenistic world could not help but provoke the
question of what it might mean ultimately to be a Jew. In this study, Roddy
examines Jewish texts abandoned by the rabbis after the destruction of the
Temple, while retaining quasi-canonical status in the Roman Catholic Church
and remaining fully canonical throughout the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental
Orthodox traditions. Although no longer part of the Jewish canon, the real
value of these texts lies with the insight they provide into the minds of late
Second Temple period Jews regarding the world in which they lived—as well
as any world to come.
The third chapter, by Leonard Greenspoon, is titled “The Afterlife in the
Septuagint.” Greenspoon’s survey of the relevant literature reveals that many
claims have been made about the Septuagint’s view of, or attitude toward, the
afterlife, which is often seen as different from the Masoretic Text and reflective
of distinctive beliefs among Hellenistic Jews. To counter such global descriptions, Greenspoon points out the diverse nature of the books that make up
the Septuagint, the varying ways in which the translators reflected the Hebrew
they were rendering, and the need to perform the hard work of textual criticism before asserting theological exegesis on their part. Only then can scholars make informed determinations about what the translators themselves (as
opposed to later interpreters) intended.
The fourth chapter is titled “Rabbi Akiva, Other Martyrs, and Socrates:
On Life, Death, and Life After Life.” It was written by Naftali Rothenberg,
Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. He begins by pointing to the transition between
life and death as a major focus for discussion about life in this world and the
next in talmudic literature. Here the focus for Rothenberg is a comparison
of the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and his students during his execution
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and Socrates’s discourse with his friends as the time approached for him to
drink the cup of hemlock—in connection with the immortality of the soul.
The equanimity with which both men accept their deaths stands in sharp
contrast to the agitation of those around them. The similarity between the
two stories ends, however, at the composure with which the protagonists
accept their deaths. The two discussions regarding the meaning of death and
the source of comfort are fundamentally different. Akiva cherishes the most
terrible moments of his life, refusing to cease pursuing his moral objective in
this world for even a single instant. For Socrates, immortality of the soul is
the source of meaning; for Rabbi Akiva there exists only the moral dimension.
Christine Hayes, Yale University, was the keynote speaker at the 28th
Annual Symposium on Jewish Civilization. Her chapter, titled “Heaven on
Earth: The World to Come and Its (Dis)locations,” is far-reaching. As she
notes, ancient Jewish sources from the Bible to the Talmud contain a dizzying
array of ideas about a better world to come (be it a messianic era in historical time, an eschatological end of days, or an afterlife). Some of these sources
imagine such a deep disjunction between this world and the world to come
that entry into the latter requires an escape from the former. But other sources
imagine a conjunction between the two and apply themselves to the task of
attaining a foretaste of the world to come in this world. Hayes explores the
radically diverse strategies employed by ancient Jews to bridge this world and
the world to come so as to locate “heaven on earth.”
Dov Weiss, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, is the author
of the next chapter, titled “Olam Ha-ba in Rabbinic Literature: A Functional
Reading.” In his analysis, the rabbis sometimes express their moral discomfort
with a biblical idea or received tradition by declaring it inoperative for the
“future world.” Whether it refers to the Messianic Era or a soul’s existence
after death (or both), eschatology provided the rabbis with a moral safe haven:
although a troubling law or theology might not be eradicated in this world,
it could be branded as such in the next. This ethical response does not solve
the moral problem, but it does minimize it. Weiss presents three examples to
highlight this rabbinic ethical hermeneutic. The first revolves around the biblical concept of the evil inclination; the second around the biblical doctrine of
inherited punishment (Exod 20:5); and the third example, the case of mamzer,
deals with a “bastard” child that is the product of incest or an extramarital
affair. In each of these cases, the exegetical grounding is forced, highlighting
the rabbinic agenda to minimize the theological irritant by distinguishing this
world from the next.
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Following Weiss is Jordan D. Rosenblum, University of Wisconsin–
Madison, whose essay is titled “Dining In(to) the World to Come.” Entrance
into the world to come requires a proper rabbinic diet, he observes. Unlike this
world, however, the world to come features a smorgasbord that would put the
fanciest Las Vegas buffet to shame, including such mythical creatures as the
famous Leviathan and Behemoth, as well as the lesser-known Ziz. Rosenblum
examines classical rabbinic discussion about the diet that merits entrance into
the world to come and about the menu that awaits therein. He concludes that
such discussions are used to justify rabbinic dietary practices in this world.
Included in this conversation are topics such as why non-Jews need not keep
kosher and why nonkosher foods are prohibited for Jews only in this world
(but not in the world to come).
Food continues to be on the table in the next chapter: “What’s for Dinner in Olam Ha-ba? Why Do We Care in Olam Ha-zeh? Medieval Jewish
Ideas about Meals in the World to Come in R. Bahya ben Asher’s Shulhan
Shel Arba” by Jonathan Brumberg-Kraus, Wheaton College (MA). He begins
by pointing to the fact that rabbinic traditions about meals for the righteous
in the world to come are contradictory. On the one hand, the righteous are
promised a banquet of Leviathan, Bar Yochnai. But Rav says, “In the world to
come, there is no eating and drinking.” Rabbenu Bahya ben Asher, the fourteenth century Spanish biblical exegete and kabbalist, devotes the final “Gate”
of his short treatise on Jewish eating practices, Shulhan Shel Arba [Table of
Four], to address this apparent contradiction about meals prepared for the
righteous in the world to come. Since R. Bahya wrote Shulhan Shel Arba as
a guide for meals in this world, the question arises: how does talking about,
imagining, and knowing about meals in the next world affect our practice and
enjoyment of meals in this world? In Brumberg-Kraus’s analysis, such talk
about body- and soul-rewarding meals in the world to come while at meals in
this world is intended to cultivate the transformation of our physical hunger
for food from “Fressen to Essen . . . to sanctified eating.”
Morris M. Faierstein, University of Maryland, is the author of the next
chapter, titled “The Dybbuk: The Origins and History of a Concept.” The
concept of the dybbuk in contemporary Jewish culture is identified with
S. Ansky’s play, which has nothing to do with the historical concept of the
dybbuk. As Faierstein explains, this has its roots in the concept of transmigration [gilgul] that is first mentioned in the Sefer Bahir and expanded in the
Zohar. The first locus for an appearance and exorcism of a dybbuk is Safed
and its kabbalistic circles. All later manifestations are built on these earliest
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models. In the eighteenth century, the motif of the dybbuk and exorcism
becomes a literary genre that is not based on factual events, but is created
as “folktales.” Ansky took these folktales and wrote a play based on the style
of late nineteenth century Russian literature (the so-called Silver Age). So,
Faierstein determines, very little of Ansky’s play is based on historical or
cultural realities.
The next chapter is by Vadim Putzu, Missouri State University. It is titled
“Tasting Heaven: Wine and the World to Come from the Talmud to Safed.”
Here Putzu investigates wine as it is represented and employed in relation to
the world to come in rabbinic and kabbalistic literature. His analysis of the
ways in which the rabbis and certain kabbalists pictured and/or used wine
gives us an intoxicating taste of their perspectives on the present world and
the hereafter alike. On the one hand, the rabbis’ discussions of wine mirror
their perspectives on olam ha-zeh. On the other hand, the wine of olam ha-ba
is deprived of all of its negative aspects: it is easy to make, abundant, and gladdens without ever leading to sinful drunkenness—thus coming to represent the
very delights that characterize existence in the world to come. Further, Joseph
Karo’s insistence on the importance of abstention and the Zoharic author’s
recommendation to imbibe the symbolic wine of Torah signal their negative
perception of this world. Moses ben Jacob Cordovero’s strategic emphasis on
the significance of preserving wine from gentile contact for the sake of reaching olam ha-ba reveals much about his overall plan for olam ha-zeh.
Elias Sacks, University of Colorado at Boulder, is the author of the
chapter titled “Worlds to Come Between East and West: Immortality and
the Rise of Modern Jewish Thought.” Sacks has determined that the concept
of olam ha-ba is not generally taken to be central to modern Jewish thought.
Here he challenges that view through exploring the neglected Hebrew works
of two foundational figures: the German-Jewish thinker Moses Mendelssohn
(1729–1786) and the Eastern European philosopher Nachman Krochmal
(1785–1840). Krochmal casts belief in an afterlife as a product of fierce debates
among ancient Jews who disagreed about whether the soul is immortal. This
position is best read as a covert critique of Mendelssohn, whose Hebrew writings cast the doctrine of an immortal soul as a belief affirmed by the Hebrew
Bible. This dispute is, in part, a dispute about the nature of Jewish tradition:
whereas Mendelssohn’s position implies that Judaism is a vehicle of timeless
truths affirmed by the Bible, Krochmal’s position entails that Judaism is a
historically developing phenomenon whose content emerges through clashes
among human beings. For these foundational philosophical voices, then, olam
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ha-ba becomes a crucial terrain for formulating—and contesting—theories of
Jewish existence.
The last chapter in the volume is by Federico Dal Bo, Marie Curie
Postdoctoral Fellow at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It is titled
“Emmanuel Levinas’s Messianism and the World to Come: A Gnostic-Philosophical Reading of Tractate Sanhedrin 96b–99a.” According to traditional
Jewish terminology, several pages from the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin
96b–99a) specifically treat the notion of “messianism” and amplify the contrast between “this world” and “the world to come.” As analyzed by Dal Bo,
influential Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas read these talmudic pages
not according to, but rather in contrast with, the traditional notion of “religion.” Levinas does not consider religion as a specific “belief ” in a deity. Rather,
he interprets religion fundamentally as a form of “ethical-moral association”
between human beings. With respect to this, Levinas recasts the notion of
“messianism” as well as its two correlated notions: “this word” and “the world
to come.” Yet these are not accounted for in their traditional religious sense,
but rather under a different perspective: in an ethical-philosophical sense. This
kind of “hyperphilosophy” actually neutralizes the cultural specificity of these
notions with consequences, especially for so-called interreligious relationships.
As someone who is partial to eating and drinking in this world, I relish the thought of continuing these pursuits in the world to come—with or
without condiments. I also like the idea of everyone getting his or her due.
For sure, this is not happening in this world. It is reassuring to picture the
proper allocation of reward and punishment in the world to come. In addition, I have come to understand that my beliefs about the afterlife are largely
conditioned on what I have experienced and learned. More broadly, this has
been true for Jews, as individuals and as members of a community, for at least
two thousand years.
I invite all readers of this volume to interpret and interact with its contents in a variety of ways. And to recognize the inextricable bonds that unite
beliefs about the afterlife with practices in this one.
Leonard J. Greenspoon
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“The End of the World and the World to Come”:
What Apocalyptic Literature Says
about the Time After the End-Time
Dereck Daschke
Olam ha-ba originated as a term designating the messianic age, the time after
the end of time, but eventually it became more closely associated with one’s
personal disposition in the afterlife. While the term is likely first recorded in
the early apocalyptic book of 1 Enoch, later the rabbinic sages would highlight
the meanings for personal eschatology that were originally bound up with
biblical conceptualizations of cosmic eschatology, especially as found in the
anticipation for the Day of the Lord and the messianic age. This tension and
confusion between the two meanings of the concept is in large part at the heart
of apocalyptic literature’s presentation of the events of the end-time.1
Without a doubt, the eschatological framework within which Jewish
apocalypse works derives directly from the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures, in particular some of the passages that Paul Hansen termed “proto-
apocalyptic” in his classic study The Dawn of Apocalyptic.2 Taken as a whole,
the picture of the time after the end of time is the quintessential dream of
restoration, healing, and rebirth in the individual, social, and even global
realms. The individual experience of the restoration at the end of days is where
personal and cosmic eschatologies intertwine, and this study will address this
complex subject shortly. First, though, it is important to sketch the key ways
in which the biblical sources anticipate the restoration of the people of Israel,
individually and collectively, and even of the planet itself.
THE TIME AFTER THE END IN THE HEBREW BIBLE
The concept of the Day of the Lord in Hebrew prophecy, the anticipated end
of history and time of judgment, establishes an apocalyptic scenario that foregrounds essentially all of the events prophesied for God’s people.3 God may
chastise and pour out his wrath upon his beloved chosen (against Israel: virtually all of Amos and Hosea; against Judah: Isa 1:1–20, Mic 3:12, Jer 5:14–17)
but there will come a day when He will turn his anger to the enemies of Israel
(Zech 12:9, Isa 60:12). Once their foes are vanquished, the Jews shall be gathered back to the Land of Israel (Isa 11:11–12, Jer 23:8). Isaiah 4:2–4 describes
1
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how perfected the survivors already in Israel and Jerusalem will be: “In that
day, the radiance of the Lord will lend beauty and glory, and the splendor of
the land will give dignity and majesty, to the survivors in Israel. And those
who remain in Zion and are left in Jerusalem—all who are inscribed for life
in Jerusalem—shall be called holy.” The Lord will wash away “the filth of the
daughters of Zion, and from Jerusalem’s midst [will rinse] out her infamy—in
a spirit of judgment and in a spirit of purging.”4
While the prophets Amos, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, Joel, and Malachi
anticipated God returning the people to the land without reference to a
human figure to do so, the expectation of “an ideal human leader possessed
of lofty spiritual and ethical qualities” who will restore sovereignty to Israel
and righteousness to the office of the king, as depicted by the prophets Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and Zechariah, certainly became emblematic of Jewish
hopes for the triumph of the future over the past, “based in part on visions of
a past Golden Age.”5 The period that follows the return of the Davidic king
concomitant with the restoration of the people to the land is known, of course,
as the messianic age.6
To say that a full exploration of the roots and impact of the ancient Jewish
belief in a messiah could—and do—fill volumes of critical study and theological exegesis is, even so, naught but an understatement. The meaning of “the
messiah” is, perhaps, the question upon which Western history of the last two
millennia hinges. That said, in order to anchor the appearance of this figure
in association with olam ha-ba in the Jewish apocalyptic literature, it is worth
very briefly establishing the biblical roots of this expectation. The prophets
Isaiah (ch. 11) and Jeremiah (ch. 23) establish that he will be a devout and
reverent king from the line of David who will reign wisely by the spirit of the
Lord and will embody righteousness in his judgments.7 Therefore, Jeremiah
says, “In his days Judah shall be delivered and Israel shall dwell secure. And this
is the name by which he shall be called: The Lord is our Vindicator” (Jer 23:6).
The ingathering of the Jews under the divine leadership of the Messiah
culminates in the reuniting of Israel and Judah as one nation. This is depicted
in Ezekiel’s famous prophecy of Ephraim’s hand and Judah’s stick: “I am going
to take the Israelite people from among the nations they have gone to, and
gather them from every quarter, and bring them to their own land. I will make
them a single nation in the land, on the hills of Israel, and one king shall be
king of them all. Never again shall they be two nations, and never again shall
they be divided into two kingdoms” (Ezek 37:21–22, see also Zech 11:12–14).
This expectation is elaborated in Hosea 3:4–5: “For the Israelites shall go a
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long time without king and without officials, without sacrifice and without
cult pillars, and without ephod or teraphim. Afterward, the Israelites will turn
back and will seek the Lord their God and David their king—and they will
thrill over the Lord and over His bounty in the days to come.”
With the return of the people and their king to their land, the resumption of traditional Yahwistic worship must necessarily follow, which means the
restoration of one essential thing: the Temple. The book of Isaiah throughout
promotes the image of Jerusalem and its Temple “in days to come” as the cosmic center of the world, through which both Jew and Gentile will be enlightened and transformed.8 It will be so glorious, it will become a beacon for the
other nations: “In the days to come, the Mount of the Lord’s house shall stand
firm above the mountains. . . . [A]ll the nations shall gaze on it with joy. . . .
For instruction shall come forth from Zion, the word of the Lord from Jerusalem” (Isa 2:2–3). The promise of the new Temple is most fully realized in the
final chapters of the book of Ezekiel, which is detailed not only in its construction plans but also in its reestablishment of the roles and duties of individuals
and tribes (Ezek 47:13).
Furthermore, this being an ideal “golden age,” moral conditions that had
not existed since the height of the United Kingdom, if ever, would remake the
Jewish people: “My servant David shall be king, they shall faithfully obey my
laws,” promises Ezekiel 37:24. And Zephaniah 3:13 states that “[t]he remnant
of Israel shall do no wrong and speak no falsehood; a deceitful tongue shall not
be in their mouths,” implying that finally all Israel will achieve the ideal state
of religious practice and personal ethics that God has expected from them all
along.9 The transformation will not be limited to Israel, either. As the passage
above from Isaiah indicates, all nations and peoples will recognize the true
God and the religion of the Jews as the true religion—and this realization will
bring about peace not only with Israel, but among the other nations as well
(Isa 2:3–4, 17; 11:10; Mic 4:2–3; Zech 14:9, Zeph 3:18–20).
Even the very nature of the earth itself will be remade in the image of
peace and prosperity (Isa 51:3: “He has made her wilderness like Eden, her
desert like the Garden of the Lord”; see also Isa 6–8, Ezek 36:29–30, and
Amos 9:13–15); and ultimately God will even end the threat of death once
and for all: “He will destroy on this mount the shroud that is drawn over the
faces of all the peoples and the covering that is spread over all the nations:
He will destroy death forever. My Lord God will wipe the tears away from
all faces and will put an end to the reproach of His people over all the earth”
(Isa 25:7–8).
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RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD
AND FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE BIBLE
At this point, two major concepts associated with the biblical understanding of
the messianic age and the end of days need to be addressed, but they are also
the root source of the confusion between personal and cosmic eschatology in
the apocalyptic literature (and indeed in the later rabbinic and even Christian
traditions): the bodily resurrection of the dead and the final judgment. Simcha
Paull Raphael writes in Jewish Views of the Afterlife:
The notion of a divine postmortem judgment, which is central
in rabbinic Judaism’s teachings on life after death, has its roots in
the collective eschatology of the biblical period. . . . In early prophetic literature, divine judgment is spoken of in national-political
terms. . . . There is no sense of individual judgment; all the people
of the nation [whether Israelite or Gentile] merit the punishment or
reward collectively. [But an] important development . . . takes place
in the Book of Zephaniah (1:2, 9) . . . [where] YHVH’s judgment
is universal.” 10

But the book of Ezekiel is where the eschatological picture gets really interesting—and complicated. Raphael writes:
In Ezekiel, judgment is conceived of in a dual sense. . . . For the
nations, judgment will be collective (Ezek 25:8ff ). For Israel, however, judgment will be based on the merit of each individual. The
sinful wicked will be annihilated by God’s wrathful vengeance. The
righteous Israelite will be saved, and thereby selected to participate
in the coming kingdom of YHVH. (Ezek 11:17–21; 36:25–32
[the “new heart” passage]). With Ezekiel, an important and subtle
philosophical transformation takes place: individual and collective
conceptions of divine judgment merge for the first time. . . . The
righteous individual Israelite will be awarded a share in YHVH’s
messianic collective. . . . Judgment takes place in the human realm
and through the unfolding of history, not in an afterworld.11

Furthermore, the very next chapter in Ezekiel provides one of the most
powerful images of bodily resurrection in the prophecy of the valley of dry
bones, though in the context it is clearly a spiritual metaphor for the restoration of the political collective of the people of Israel. Yet the image itself seems
deliberately intended to blur the line between the personal and the political,
especially following from the “new heart” rhetoric of personal renewal and
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restoration—all but resurrection. Still, what can a new heart mean but a new
life? It lies between the symbolic and the literal, between the prophetic (in
the national-moral sense) and the apocalyptic (in the sense of future cosmic
transformation).
However, it is in the next chapters, from 38 to 48, that Ezekiel is firmly in
apocalyptic territory, and it is in these that readers get the first strong glimpse
of the postapocalyptic olam ha-ba. Chapters 40–48 refer to the blueprint for
the new temple-city, named “YWVH is there.” But 38 and 39 depict the great
eschatological war, which we might today call by its Judean place name: Armageddon. The aftermath of the defeat of the nations, represented by Magog, is
depicted with relish: “Then the inhabitants of the cities of Israel will go out
and make fires and feed them with the weapons—shields and bucklers, bows
and arrows, clubs and spears; they shall use them as fuel for seven years. . . .
They will despoil those who despoiled them and plunder those who plundered
them” (Ezek 39:9–10). The chapter continues on in stark, bloody detail, leaving no doubt about how the fortunes of the people of Israel and the nations
who oppressed them have turned.
THE TIME AFTER THE END IN THE APOCALYPSES
This theme of eschatological war is picked up in the one true canonical apocalypse of the Hebrew Scriptures, the book of Daniel. As it happens, Daniel is
better known not for its depiction of the lives of those who prevail in this conflict but rather for those faithful who have died, in it and previously—namely,
in the introduction of the idea of the resurrection of the dead at the end of
times in chapter 12. Daniel is also very explicit that this resurrection is part
and parcel of the final judgment: “At that time, the great prince, Michael, who
stands beside the sons of your people, will appear. It will be a time of trouble,
the like of which has never since the nation came into being. At that time,
your people will be rescued, all who are found inscribed in the book [of
life]. Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth will awake, some to
eternal life, others to reproaches, to everlasting abhorrence” (Dan 12:1–2).12
This passage, as short as it is, is foundational for the understandings of olam
ha-ba in Judaism—and Christianity—that will emerge in the centuries thereafter, and even until today.
Scholarly consensus holds that “the many” who awake from the dust
does not refer to a universal resurrection, but only of the faithful Jews, likely
specifically those who died in the second century b.c.e. resisting the forces of
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Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes, which gave rise to the book and the ex
eventu prophecies of chapters 7–11.13 These multitudes of the dead will arise
from their graves and face judgment on an individual basis, presumably due to
their moral disposition toward or away from righteousness during their lives,
and those who find favor with God will enjoy a new life without end. Those
who do not apparently face eternal shame and contempt.
There is no specific indication what the moral measure that divides the
one group from the other is. However, the overall presentation of resurrection in Daniel asserts a divine, cosmic morality by underscoring God’s justice:
“Resurrection becomes the means whereby God’s justice will ultimately triumph. A new, revisionist, individualized eschatology is introduced to resolve
the challenge of theodicy, the attempt to vindicate God’s justice. The new
doctrine of resurrection vindicates God.”14
In the centuries that followed the exile, resurrection rapidly became
part of mainstream Jewish thought and distinguished Pharisees from Sadducees, who rejected it for its lack of Torah support.15 (In fact, the idea may
originate in Persian Zoroastrianism, imported in the wake of the Persians’
reign in the region after the exile.)16 And it plays a particularly prominent
role in 1 Enoch, perhaps the most important extracanonical apocalypse and a
text that reflected a great deal of theological speculation and creativity of the
Second Temple period. Leila Leah Bronner states, “As a work of eschatology,
[1 Enoch] ties together the notions of the soul’s journey after death with an
end-point in time, a day of judgment, and a spiritual messiah who presides
over human destiny.”17
As noted from the outset, 1 Enoch, which R. H. Charles dates to between
105 and 64 b.c.e., appears to be the earliest textual source of the term olam
ha-ba.18 Genesis 5 tells us that Enoch was the great-grandfather of Noah and
is one of two figures in the Hebrew Scriptures who do not die, the other being
the messianic predecessor Elijah. Genesis 5:22–24 reports, “After the birth of
Methuselah, Enoch walked with God 300 years. . . . All the days of Enoch
came to 365 years. Enoch walked with God; then he was no more, for God
took him.” It is in this span of sixty-five years when Enoch “walks with God”
that the accounts of the book of 1 Enoch take place. These include a stunning
variety of revelations of the nature of the heavens, history, the origin of sin,
and, most significant for the purposes of this study, the final dispositions of the
good and the wicked after the judgment. It is in one of these tours of heaven
that the phrase meaning “eschatological world of the messianic age,” equivalent to the Hebrew olam ha-ba, is first encountered in a Jewish text:
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With them is the Antecedent of Time: His head is white and pure
like wool and his garment is indescribable. . . . Then an Angel came
to me and greeted me and said to me, “You, the Son of Man, who art
born in righteousness and upon whom righteousness has dwelt, and
the righteousness of the Antecedent of Time will not forsake you.”
He added and said to me: “He shall proclaim peace to you in the
name of the world that is to become. For from here proceeds peace
since the creation of the world, and so it shall be unto you forever
and ever and ever” (1 En 71:10, 14–15).19

The Son of Man here is the Messiah, elsewhere called “the Elect One” in
the translation from the Ge’ez language of the Ethiopic Church, which preserved the book and consider it canonical.20 In clear contrast with the biblical
Messiah, this one represents a supernatural, eternally anointed figure of perfect
righteousness (1 En 48:2–7) who “would remove the kings and the mighty
ones from their comfortable seats and the strong ones from their thrones”
(1 En 46:4). Thereupon he will render judgment upon all mortals at the end
of time: “Thenceforth nothing corruptible shall be found; for that Son of Man
has appeared and has seated himself on the throne of his glory; and all evil shall
disappear from before his face” (1 En 69:28–29).
Thus 1 Enoch is clearly a critical source for the idea that the messianic
age culminates a divine plan set into motion at the time of creation (as well
as one source for the understanding of messianism that Christians would
come to attribute to Jesus of Nazareth). This plan will rid the world of evil
and restore the realm of perfect peace lost with the fall in the Garden of
Eden.21 Yet Enoch’s tours of the heavens also reveal a complex system of personal eschatology at work, one that appears to elaborate on the postjudgment
fates described in Daniel, wherein the souls of the dead are collected into
hollow places in a heavenly mountain, with separate places for the righteous
and the sinners, until the time of judgment. The angel Raphael tells Enoch,
“[U]ntil the great day of judgment . . . to those who curse [there will be]
plague and pain forever, and the retribution of their spirits. They will bind
them there forever—even if from the beginning of the world” (1 En 22:11).22
But regarding the righteous and elect among humanity, at the time of the
great judgment:
In those days, Sheol will return all the deposits which she had
received and hell will give back all that which it owes. And he shall
choose the righteous and the holy ones from among (the risen dead),
for the day when they shall be selected and saved has arrived. In
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those days, [the Elect One] shall sit on my throne, and from the
conscience of his mouth shall come out all the secrets of wisdom, for
the Lord of the Spirits has given them to him and glorified him. In
those days, mountains shall dance like rams; and the hills shall leap
like kids satiated with milk. And the faces of all the angels in heaven
shall glow with joy, because on that day the Elect One has arisen.
And the earth shall rejoice; and the righteous ones shall dwell upon
her and the elect ones shall walk upon her. (1 En 51)

In both of these accounts of the fates of the righteous and the wicked, their
personal dispositions are also rendered as part and parcel of the events of the
end-times, and the righteous anticipate as part of their reward continued existence on earth but in a time of perfect peace and cosmic joy.23
Of course, the national sovereignty and security—let alone perfect peace
and cosmic joy—of the messianic age continued to elude the Jewish people
even during the Second Temple period, and the destruction of that temple
by the Romans in 70 c.e. underscored for many Jews both how far off the
promise of the messianic age was in the current era and, at the same time, how
necessary divine intervention would be to put things right. Two apocalypses,
4 Ezra and 2 Baruch, written in the wake of the Temple’s destruction and the
Jewish Diaspora, capture the mingling of dread of history and hope for cosmic redemption in the future that the messianic promise in the aftermath of
another such disaster surely evoked.
With an apparent reference in chapter 12 to the Flavian emperors of
Rome, scholars generally believe that 4 Ezra (2 Esdras 3–14 in the Apocrypha)
reflects the situation in Palestine circa 100 c.e.24 However, the narrative is
set in the aftermath of the Babylonian destruction of the first Temple, some
seven centuries earlier, and consists mainly of the figure of Ezra, that great
hero of the restoration of Jewish society after the exile, interrogating a divine
interlocutor regarding the meaning of the devastation to which he was now
witness. The tension in this line of questioning is broken by a spectacular
vision of a woman in mourning who becomes the New Jerusalem on Earth.
Unlike Ezekiel’s vision, however, the reader is not permitted to tour the divine
city with the seer. Still, following this revelatory encounter, the focus of the
dialogues with the angel shifts from past and present to future, and there are
extensive presentations of what the surviving Jews may expect of the end-times
and thereafter.
4 Ezra 6 contains this spooky glimpse of the time just before the
judgment:
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Infants a year old shall speak with their voices, and women with child
shall give birth to premature children at three and four months, and
these shall live and dance. . . . At that time friends shall make war
on friends like enemies, and the earth and those who inhabit it shall
be terrified, and the springs of the fountains shall stand still, so that
for three hours they shall not flow. (6:21, 24)

Those who are alive to witness these events will also bear witness to God’s
salvation and the return of “those who did not die,” presumably Enoch and
Elijah but possibly including other apocalyptic seers such as Baruch and Ezra
himself.25 As a result, their hearts will be fundamentally transformed away
from evil (6:25–28).
4 Ezra 7:26–44 lays out a timeline of the world to come; the length of
the messianic age, after which the return to primeval creation both mirrors
and presages the final judgment (the common apocalyptic trope of Urzeit
wird Endzeit, “the beginning time becomes the end-time”). Specifically, the
Messiah will be revealed, and he will live for four hundred years, bringing joy
to those who live among him. Then the Messiah will die, as will all humanity.
The world will be returned to primeval silence, as at the time prior to creation;
and after seven days will be reawakened, and “that which is corruptible shall
perish” (7:31). The dust shall yield the dead, God will then begin His judgment without mercy, and the places of reward and torment will appear. And
God will speak to the nations on the day of judgment, and his determination
of their fates “will last for about a week of years” (v. 43). 4 Ezra 13:39–50 also
indicates that in the last days, the lost tribes of Israel shall return from the land
of Arzareth, where they had hidden themselves since the Assyrian conquest. In
all, 4 Ezra gives the most complete account of the events, timeframe, and disposition of the events of olam ha-ba of any apocalypse, and it appears equally
focused on the personal and collective eschatology of the Jews.
The final major Jewish apocalyptic text to address the nature of the
end-times is 2 Baruch. Also known as the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch, its seer
is the faithful scribe of the prophet Jeremiah. It is likely of Palestinian provenance from the early second century, roughly contemporaneous with 4 Ezra.
Like Ezra in 4 Ezra, Baruch begins the narrative amid the ruins of the first
Temple, lamenting all that has beset his people. And while a dialogue ensues
with an angelus interpres [interpreting angel] that echoes that of 4 Ezra, the
emotional tenor is not as palpable. In fact, relatively quickly, a very clear idea
emerges of what a future without a Temple looks like for the Jews: in a word,
the law. Bronner states, “The author of the book appears to be an expert on
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both apocalyptic imagery and rabbinic law, someone who could find a way
to continue studying the Law after the catastrophe of national destruction
in 70 c.e., and therefore someone who could help the Jewish people face the
challenges of the post-Temple era.”26 Baruch, more insistently than the other
apocalypticians, envisions the future not just as a time of great difficulties to
be overcome before an ideal age, but also as one with qualities that will define
the Jews who enter into it as the “true Israel.” The Temple and its restoration
is of secondary importance to the revitalization of the law in people’s lives and
the establishing of moral fortitude among his followers to survive the transition between the ages.27
2 Baruch 43–44 addresses the consolation of both Baruch the seer and
of Zion in idealized or eschatological contexts. Baruch will understand his
revelations as a result of many “consolations which will last forever” (43:1–2),
while in the future, “the time again will take a turn for the better” for those
who persevere in the law, and they will participate in the consolation of Zion
(44:7).28 “For that which is now is nothing. But that which is in the future will
be very great. For everything will pass away which is corruptible, and everything that dies will go away” (2 Bar 44:9). As with Daniel 12:2–3 and Ezekiel
37, part of the culmination of these utopian fantasies of the future includes a
highly idealized notion of the recovery of the body from death. Three verses in
particular address the disposition of the resurrected and the heights that their
new lives will endow to them:
2 Baruch 50:2: For the earth will surely give back the dead at that
time; it receives them now in order to keep them, not changing
anything in their form.
2 Baruch 51:3: Also, as for the glory of those who proved to be
righteous on account of my law, those who possessed intelligence
in their life, and those who planted the root of wisdom in their
heart—their splendor will then be glorified by transformations and
the shape of their face will be changed into the light of their beauty
so that they may acquire and receive the undying world which is
promised to them.
2 Baruch 51:10: For they will live in the heights of that world and
they will be like the angels and be equal to the stars.29

This is to say, in death the earth will preserve the righteous as they
were, but they will be transformed in olam ha-ba, first into a radiantly beautiful countenance and ultimately into beings equal to the angels and the
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stars—“while those who were evil will be changed into ‘startling visions and
horrible shapes.’”30 Finally, as with so many apocalyptic visions, the ultimate
hope of olam ha-ba pictures an end to illness and death. 2 Baruch 73:2–3 thus
fuses the perfection of personal eschatology with its cosmic counterpart: “And
then health will descend in dew, and illness will vanish, and fear and tribulation and lamentation will pass away from among men, and joy will encompass
the earth. And nobody will again die untimely, nor will any adversity take
place suddenly.”
THE JEWISH END-TIME IN CHRISTIANITY
This exact theme of the end of bodily frailty and death is evident in another
apocalyptic text, the Christian book of Revelation, which in many ways is a
quintessentially Jewish apocalypse, being informed by several of the traditions
described thus far. But besides the statement in Revelation 21:4 about the end
of death and mourning, it is relatively curt on the picture of the world after
the judgment. Of the New Jerusalem, it states, “And the city has no need of
sun or moon to shine on it, for the glory of God is its light, and its lamp is the
Lamb. The nations will walk by its light, and the kings of the earth will bring
their glory into it” (Rev 22:23–24 nrsv). But these are about the only clues it
offers concerning life on the new earth.
The development of the Christian notion of the world to come would
be the subject of an entirely different study. Still, one particularly apocalyptic
strand of Christianity is worth examining for the centrality of the Jewish view
of olam ha-ba to its extremely rich and detailed rendering of the messianic age:
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The Jehovah’s Witnesses are the product of Charles Taze Russell’s
struggles with the legitimacy of religious and governmental institutions in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. As a result, he sought a form of
Christianity that reflected “true” and original biblical traditions and authority. By necessity, then, much of his theology reflected the original Jewish
sources as articulated by the prophets of the Christian Old Testament. What
Russell was most concerned with was alerting the world to the coming judgment by Jesus Christ and the subsequent supplanting of the current order
with God’s Kingdom. He predicted this event first for 1914, then 1918. His
successors later set the date at 1925, and lastly at 1975, before abandoning
date-setting in favor of a generalized, but diffused, anticipation of the coming of the “New World Society.”31
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If we look at how the Witnesses actually represent this New World Society, we see all of the themes that had been developed in the biblical prophets,
which they quote (that is, “proof-text”) extensively. But we also find much of
the same subsequent elaboration and refinement as on display in the Jewish
apocalypses examined in the present study. For example, the tract titled “A
Peaceful New World—Will It Come?” features an idyllic scene that depicts
people and animals—predators and prey—joyously comingling in an abundant, green landscape.32 The tract asks:
When you look at the scene in this tract, what feelings do you have?
Does not your heart yearn for the peace, happiness, and prosperity
seen here? Surely it does. But is it just a dream, or fantasy, to believe
these conditions will ever exist on Earth?
Most people probably think so. Today’s realities are war, crime,
hunger, sickness, aging—to mention just a few. Yet there is reason
for hope. The Hebrew Scriptures foretell that God will create a
“new heavens and a new earth” and that “the former things will
not be called to mind, neither will they come up into the heart.”
—Isaiah 65:17

It then proceeds to check off the essential promises of the Jewish messianic age:
a “righteous society of people living on earth,” a “perfect heavenly kingdom, or
government, that will rule over this earthly society of people,” “earthly benefits
beyond compare,” “[h]atreds and prejudices will cease to exist, and eventually
everyone on earth will be a true friend of everyone else.” The renewal of the
earth, as in the time of Eden, is referenced, and never again “will people feel
hunger because the ‘earth itself will certainly give its produce.’” Even sickness
and death will end. The tract cites Psalms, Isaiah, and Hosea as evidence,
putting into practice Russell’s principle that an authentic form of Christianity must adhere as closely as possible to its original Jewish roots in Scripture.
Perhaps because the traditional Jewish resistance to producing divine imagery
is absent, this Christian sect has been able to imagine and illustrate this Jewish
view in a lush and vibrant way.
CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT
This overview of the Jewish expectations regarding what the world will look
like after its end and divine judgment reveals, if nothing else, that while there
was no shortage of ideas and beliefs on this matter in circulation in the centuries prior to the era of the talmudic sages, nothing resembling a cohesive,
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systematic, or consensus doctrine ever existed. In fairness, expressing anything
concrete about what will replace everything that currently exists is understandably a tricky affair. It is a paradox, the ultimate end that is not the ultimate end,
and paradoxes are notoriously hard to reduce to direct language. At best, these
texts articulate deeply held hopes that somehow the next world will compensate
for the flaws and failures of this world. But as always, the devil is in the details,
and who is rewarded and punished, why, and in what ways, are worked out differently in different texts under different cultural and historical circumstances.
With the decline of apocalyptic speculation in the centuries following
the destruction of the second Temple and the emergence of rabbinic Judaism
in the Diaspora, Jews more or less definitively put to rest the cosmic, world-
historical speculation of apocalypticism. The term olam ha-ba, in this new
context, shed its original roots in cosmic eschatology and brought to the fore
the other half of the tradition that emphasized morality and one’s personal
postmortem state, the signification it has more or less retained through the
millennia to this day.
Still, the former meaning is never that far removed. Death is always the
end of the world for somebody.
NOTES
1. Simcha Paull Raphael, Jewish Views of the Afterlife (2nd ed.; Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2009), 68–69, 125–28. The Enochic provenance of the phrase from the equivalent
construction in Ethiopic Ge’ez was first suggested by R. H. Charles, The Ethiopic Version
of the Book of Enoch: Edited from Twenty–Three MSS. together with the Fragmentary Greek
and Latin Versions (Anecdota Oxoniensia, Semitic Series 11; Oxford: Clarendon, 1906),
145; see also George W. E. Nickelsburg and James C. Vandercam, 1 Enoch 2: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch Chapters 37–82 (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012),
329 n24. While scholarly consensus supports this origin, Leila Leah Bronner cautions
that the actual connection to the Enoch literature may be far more complicated and less
clear: “Olam ha-ba, ‘the World to Come,’ was a favorite expression of the rabbis, but it
is unclear where the term comes from. Although there is a similar expression in 1 Enoch
71:15 (‘He will proclaim peace to you in the name of the world that is to become’), the
rabbis . . . apparently did not approve of the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha, so they
may not have found the term in Enoch. It may never be known for certain whether the
term was borrowed and, if so, by whom.” Leila Leah Browner, Journey to Heaven: Exploring Jewish Views of the Afterlife (Brooklyn: Urim, 2011), 70–71.
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Warriors, Wives, and Wisdom:
This World and the World to Come
in the (So-Called) Apocrypha
Nicolae Roddy
The vast assembly of late Second Temple period religious texts written under
the pressures of imperial domination and Hasmonean self-rule offer the modern scholar a window open toward the tumultuous world of Judea of the Second Temple period, testifying to various responses to the political and cultural
challenges of the times. To be sure, the real and perceived hostilities of the
Hellenistic world could not help but provoke real concerns for the inhabitants
of Judea, raising existential questions about what it might mean ultimately to
be a Jew.
Most of these writings witness to courses of thought and action arising
within a range of accommodation in the faces of structures of power, suspended
between extremes of resistance on the one hand and complete assimilation on
the other. Taken together, the literature witnesses to the complete absence of
any dogmatic orthodoxy among Jews living in the four centuries following
Alexander the Great (333 b.c.e.) and culminating in the destruction of the
Temple (70 c.e.). Their scenarios often testify to distressing, even precarious
social contexts, which is why one finds among these writings a variety of perspectives regarding the world at hand [olam ha-zeh] and the world to come
[olam ha-ba], sometimes vying together within a single book. These perspectives challenge biblical scholars to bring these ancient texts into dialogue with
their troubled worlds, while offering theologians an opportunity to explore the
processes involved in the production and development of theodicies. Speculation about the relationship between this world and the world to come is more
than a passing fancy for these authors. It arises out of dire concerns for making
sense of the world in light of threatening challenges to it.
The present study will focus on identifying a few among several distinct
present world/coming world scenarios contained within the deuterocanonical
corpus, highlighting points of contrast that demonstrate the wide range of
speculation entertained by their respective authors. Although the deuterocanonicals are Jewish texts that were officially abandoned by the rabbis shortly
after the destruction of the Second Temple, they remain authoritative for the
Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Oriental Orthodox biblical and
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liturgical traditions.1 Having circulated with the Septuagint (LXX) they are
regarded as canonical by the Western Church, however only secondarily so
(hence, deutero-). Their canonicity has never been in question among the
churches of the East.2 It is often necessary to remind Christians that, like the
Older Testament itself, these texts are inherited from Judaism—that is, written
by Jews for Jews living throughout the Greco-Roman world. Eventually marginalized by both rabbinic and Protestant traditions, they have been of modest
significance for biblical scholars until recent times.
Given the number of texts at hand, only a representative sampling of
models of Jewish speculation about present and future worlds can be presented
here—models ranging from a traditional biblical worldview maintained by the
privileged conservative elite (most notably the ruling Sadducee party), to the
radically apocalyptic scenarios of the resistance, as well as other groups perceiving themselves to be under siege. Christians, who frequently hear excerpts of
these texts read aloud in liturgical contexts, might gain a deeper understanding
of the beginnings of their own tradition, rooted as it is in the seedbed of Second
Temple period Judaism. Although no longer part of the Jewish canon, their
value derives from the insight they provide into the diversity of Jewish speculation about the world in which they lived, as well as any world to come. Because
many of these texts contain theological elements that were attractive to Christians, they also serve to reacquaint Christianity with its own (Jewish) roots.
CORPORATE (NATIONAL) PRESENT WORLD RESOLUTION
The first category includes present world scenarios that posit divine deliverance through the agency of righteous human warriors, whose personal bravery
and zeal for Israel and for the Torah overcome the nation’s enemies. Standing in the tradition of Ezekiel 37’s vision of the dry bones, which speaks to
a future revitalization of the nation and the rebuilding of Solomon’s temple,
and Isaiah’s famous “swords to plowshares/spears to pruning hooks” oracle
(Isa 2:1–5), some deuterocanonical texts affirm the restoration of justice in
this world in a collective, nonindividualized way. As in the prophetic books
[Nevi’im], divine justice is meted out in the fearsome age of empires, looking
forward toward full resolution in the near future of a present world characterized by peace and well-being [shalom].
In the deuterocanonical texts in this category, powerful earthly forces
threaten Israel’s security and national well-being, bringing about the need for
an agent of divine deliverance to arise and set the world aright. Resolution
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(salvation) is corporate and national, not personal. For example, in 1 Maccabees, the deaths of Judah, Jonathan, and Simon are presented in a matter-of-
fact way as necessary sacrifices for the greater cause, rather than as martyrdoms
or personal tragedies. For this reason, the theodicy of this worldview remains
traditionally biblical. There are no references to an afterlife, including any sort
of individualized resurrection, bodily or otherwise, which despite its centrality
to the Christian tradition is a notion that appeared relatively late in the Second
Temple period.3
1 Maccabees

The book of 1 Maccabees is a late second century text that recounts the events
from the death of Alexander the Great to the installation of John Hyrcanus,
self-proclaimed king and high priest of Judea, almost exactly two centuries
later. Its author interprets current events in a way that supports the legitimacy
of the early Hasmonean high priestly dynasty, whose founders, the heroic
Maccabees, brought Antiochene persecutions to an eventual end, established
national independence, and reinstituted the rule of the Torah. In contrast to
the many texts that arose out of the crucible of suffering and persecution, here
the righteous celebrate victory through the Maccabean triumph, most notably
on the part of Judah, warrior par excellence, whose brave deeds are heralded as
too numerous to record (9:22).
It is noteworthy that the author of this celebratory text does not record
the violence and self-serving corruption that would ensue under the leadership of the Hasmoneans. Although the text witnesses to what was for many a
troubled time, it appears the author was not adversely affected by these events
and was likely a supporter of the ruling family.4 In any event, the theodicy
remains earthbound and rooted in the present, consonant with the worldview
of the Hebrew Bible, in which human action plays out on the face of the earth,
with God and his heavenly hosts in the heavens and the shadowy realm of the
dead below (Sheol).5
Judith

The book of Judith tells the story of a pious and beautiful widow who delivers
her village from an Assyrian siege. Although the characters, time, and plot lines
are radically different and influenced by Hellenistic gender-specific roles and
language, some scholars suggest that Judith’s character may have been inspired
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by the warrior exploits of Judah the Maccabee; thus one might expect similar
themes and outlooks.6 Still others have suggested that the book of Judith was
composed by a member of the Pharisee party and that the book, full of rich
irony, is cryptically anti-Hasmonean. If these scholars are correct, then—as I
have suggested elsewhere7—the whole point of this ironic tale almost certainly
rests upon its implication that Judah and his brothers should have emulated
Judith by returning to private life following the liberation of their people,
instead of wresting power for themselves and eventually becoming corrupt.
Thus, the book of Judith projects an alternative history in which the cruel
tyranny of Hasmonean rule would never have come about.
Judith’s story of seduction, deception, and assassination unfolds in a cleverly reconfigured, conflated historical past, one in which the Assyrian conquest
is led by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar who conquered Judah in the
early sixth century b.c.e. Such seeming historical inaccuracies are not mistakes,
for they signal the reader to pay attention to the details, which hearken to a
present world situation in which things are set aright by a mortal agent of divine
deliverance. Although there is no indication that the residents of Bethulia are
particularly righteous folk, they are nevertheless delivered by the God-fearing
Judith’s formidable beauty and warrior fierceness: she actively embodies God’s
justice on the earth. Thus again, deliverance comes at the hands of a warrior-
type human agent who brings corporate deliverance to the nation.8
PERSONAL PRESENT WORLD RESOLUTION
Like the previous texts, these narratives reflect a worldview consonant with
that of the Tanach generally, namely, one in which human activity from
birth to death takes place in an arena sandwiched between the heavens [ha-
shammaim] and the grave (Sheol). Whatever plays out on the face of the earth,
the Most High watches and resolves upon the earth before the eyes of everyone
involved—especially the righteous—but also for their sake, sometimes also the
punishment-deserving wicked. This perspective is rooted in the traditional
deuteronomistic worldview, explicitly laid out in Deuteronomy 28, which
asserts that God’s justice in relation to covenantal fidelity is meted out in the
present life.
Although this worldview is rooted in a corporate view of deliverance, one
cannot help but notice the implications for personal life as well. Living one’s
life according to the Torah brings personal health, wealth, and abundant life,
while forsaking the Torah results in disease, misfortune, and death. Thus for
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some deuterocanonical texts, the righteous enjoy divine favor in the present
world even though they experience great distress. Such favor includes being able
to behold the ruin of their oppressors, who in turn see the reestablishment of
justice in the vindication of the righteous. These texts rest on the underlying
conviction that the divine will for human existence is the default mode for ultimate reality, seen only by the wise righteous ones. Given that biblical wisdom
is defined as “fear of the LORD,” such stories are rightly called wisdom tales.9
Susannah

The story of Susannah came to circulate with the book of Daniel. Read during
the fifth week of Lent in the Latin tradition, it concerns a pious woman who is
sexually compromised by two elders of her own community. The elders spy on
the God-fearing Susannah as she bathes and then threaten to publically accuse
her of adultery with a stranger—an action punishable by death—should she
refuse to acquiesce to their salacious advances. The righteous Susannah has
no choice but to call upon God for deliverance, who immediately stirs up
the spirit of the young prophet Daniel. In what some have called the world’s
first courtroom drama, Daniel interrogates the elders; but this is not the usual
cross-examination, for Daniel as prophet (and master of wordplay, one should
add) is able to convict first one elder and then the other on the basis of their
individual testimonies alone.
The story of Susannah’s persecution and vindication calls to mind stories
about Daniel standing before the Babylonian king in chapters 3 and 6, but
here Susannah is simply an ordinary God-fearing person. Furthermore, her
enemy is not some wicked emperor, but putatively respected leaders of her
own community. Unlike other deuteroncanonical tales, the narrative is set in
a village that does not appear to be troubled by outsiders; however, one could
argue that the actions of these devious elders, antithetical to the life of the
Torah, pose a threat to the interior life of the community equal to or greater
than that of any foreign despot. In any event, swift to deliver the righteous,
the Most High rescues Susannah from certain death and vindicates her in the
present world.
Tobit

The book of Tobit, from which large portions are read in the church’s lectionary, offers another present world, present life resolution, only here the agent
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of divine justice is not a human agent like the prophet Daniel, but an angelic
being named Raphael. Set in the Assyrian exile in the late eighth century
b.c.e., the book of Tobit is a wisdom novella focusing on the struggles of the
righteous in the face of powerful human and supernatural forces. Full of rich
irony and humor, the story resolves all its righteous characters’ struggles in a
happy ending in the present world.
Tobit, the eponymous protagonist, is persecuted by the Assyrian king
Sennacherib for burying the exposed corpses of fellow Israelites—a death mitzvah [met mitzvah] that brings him into repeated contact with what rabbinic
sources call the “mother of all impurities,” raising the need for repeated repurification rituals. At one point, Tobit’s sufferings are compounded when he
sleeps outside the house during the repurification process. While he is asleep,
sparrows defecate upon his eyes and render him blind. Meanwhile, in faraway
Ecbatana, a distant cousin named Sarah is suffering at the hands of the demon
Asmodeus, whose jealous desire for her leads him to kill seven husbands in
succession before any of her marriages could be consummated.
Both Tobit and Sarah are righteous Israelites who suffer hardship at the
hands of malevolent powers, human and superhuman; both suffer reproach
from the people around them, and both resort to prayer in the midst of their
despair. Their parallel plights are brought together and resolved in a third cycle,
in which God sends the angel Raphael—disguised as a distant kinsman—to
accompany Tobias, Tobit’s son, on a journey to reclaim some money held in
trust. During the journey they stop at the Tigris River to refresh themselves,
when suddenly a large fish jumps out. The angel instructs Tobias to take hold
of the fish and secure its gall, heart, and liver, organs that will later become
the means by which the demon is driven off and Tobit’s eyes healed (6:1–8),
bringing about a happy ending.
The narrative world of the book of Tobit is full of hardships, and the
righteous seem to suffer by dint of their righteousness. However, the righteous are never out of sight of the Most High, who bestows upon them the
rewards of their faithful perseverance in the present life. Tobit becomes highly
respected in his community. He dies peacefully at the age of 112 and is buried
in Nineveh with great honor (14:2). Tobit’s son Tobias enjoys even greater
wealth and honor and lives to the ripe old age of 117, three years short of
the divinely appointed limit for mortals (Gen 6:3). Shortly before his death,
Tobias receives news of Nineveh’s destruction, for which he rejoices. Praising
God for the restoration of justice for which his father had prayed, Tobias now
goes to his grave in peace, a blessed ending to righteous life.
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The Instruction of Ben Sira

Moving now from wisdom tale to wisdom discourse, “The Instruction of
[Joshua] ben Sira” (known to Christians as Ecclesiasticus or the Book of Jesus,
son of Sirach) affirms that a life devoted to wisdom is a reward in itself. Such a
life is characterized by prudent speech, unwavering uprightness, and an honorable reputation. At the end of life, both sage and sinner inescapably meet up
with maggots, worms, and decay (10:11, 38:21); however, the former, whose
life is lived in the fear of God (i.e., awesome reverence), enjoys a happy and
prosperous end (1:13, 2:3), while his or her virtue and acts of righteousness
live on. In contrast to the books of Susannah and Tobit, ben Sira asserts that
even a happy, prosperous end is not necessarily without pain and suffering; but
even in the midst of persecution leading to death, the life of wisdom brings
reward and satisfaction to dimming eyes: “The prayer of the humble pierces
the clouds, and will not rest until it reaches the goal; it will not desist until
the Most High responds and does justice for the righteous, and executes judgment. Indeed, the Lord will not delay” (35:21–22).
PERSONAL OTHER WORLD RESOLUTIONS
Some deuterocanonical texts imagine a world that is irredeemably broken and
wholly unsalvageable, necessitating some kind of cosmic reset. For some writers, Trito-Isaiah’s vision of a new heaven and a new earth (Isa 65:17) inspired
an apocalyptic hope among groups that perceived the world in this way.
Likely influenced by Orphic pessimism, this view inspires the hope for a new
creation—a new heaven and earth—set apart from a world no longer worth
saving. Augmented by Daniel 12:2, the persecuted righteous ones find hope
for transformed existence delivering them from the time and place of present
anguish:
Your people shall be delivered, everyone who is found written in
the book. Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting
contempt. Those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the
sky, and those who lead many to righteousness, like the stars forever
and ever (Dan 12: 1–3).10

Other raw materials for the belief in a resurrection from the dead [teh∫ >îyat
hamētîm]11 were drawn from Ezekiel 37:1–14 and Isaiah 26:19. Thus, one sees
that apocalyptic beliefs emerge from a radical intensification of convictions
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voiced in prophetic literature.12 What is new is that the belief in a resurrection
of the dead, once a hope for the rebirth of the nation, now becomes personal.
2 Maccabees 7

The deuterocanonical texts offer a variety of present and future world theodicies; however, 2 Maccabees manages to offer several aspects of divine deliverance within a single text. The narrative is set in a world dominated by the
wicked Seleucid king Antiochus IV, who in chapter 7 presides over the gruesome torture of a family of Torah-abiding Jews. The story calls to mind the
story of Taxo and his seven sons in Testament of Moses 9, both of which stand
in the tradition of persecution and vindication in Daniel 3 and 6. But for the
mother and her sons—quite unlike the stories of Susannah and Tobit—deliverance follows an agonizing, torturous death. In one sense, the imagery calls
to mind Isaiah 65:17–25, in which the righteous are promised a long life in
a new heaven and earth, while God judges and kills the wicked, leaving their
corpses exposed (66:15–17); however, here it is the corpses of the suffering
righteous that remain exposed. Nevertheless, vindication occurs in the form
of resurrection to new life.
This martyrology of the pious woman and her seven sons presents a situation in which imminent and inescapable death arises from living a life according to the Torah, for it is the family’s faithfulness to the Torah that incurs the
anger of the king and fuels his primary motivation for ordering their torture
and death. Their choice is clear, but antithetical to any previous understanding of how the world is supposed to operate. Despite their horrendous agony,
several hopeful convictions are voiced:
•
•
•
•
•
•

God sees their plight and has compassion upon them. (v. 6)
God will raise up the righteous to an everlasting life. (v. 9)
Severed body parts will be restored. (v. 11; see also Razis, 14:30 ff )
There will be no resurrection for the wicked king. (v. 14)
God will torture the wicked king and his descendants. (vv. 16–17)
The calamity ultimately is not in the king’s power to carry out, but is
the result of Israel’s sins against God. (v. 18)

Their situation sets up a kind of cognitive dissonance in which the
inherent conviction that fidelity to the Torah brings life comes to be challenged by the reality that clinging to the Torah now brings certain torture
and death. Underscored by the conviction that the Most High is omnipotent,
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omniscient, compassionate, and just, suddenly all evidence has shifted to the
contrary. Something has to give. The displacement activity forced by the
cognitive dissonance in this clash of realities reaffirms that God’s justice is
certain; therefore, if justice is not being realized in the present world, then
it must be taking place somewhere else. Thus traditional notions concerning
the finality of death are rewritten to accommodate the conviction that the
end is not the end.
Wisdom of Solomon

A somewhat similar situation obtains in the Wisdom of Solomon, namely,
that fidelity to the Torah leads to persecution and death; only here the classic distinction between immortality and bodily resurrection seems confused.
In words that clearly affirm the preexistence of souls, the author writes, “As
a child I was naturally gifted, and a good soul fell to my lot; or rather, being
good, I entered an undefiled body” (8:20); however, vindication of the righteous protagonist clearly involves resurrection [anastasis] from the dead.
Like ben Sira, the author of Wisdom of Solomon acknowledges the reality of death and asserts that righteousness is immortal. He insists that God
did not make death (1:13), but that death is brought into being through the
actions of the wicked (v. 16). The speech attributed to the wicked reflects an
Epicurean worldview that denies the existence of any personal afterlife. The
wicked lie in wait to murder the righteous ones, but when they do, the righteous ones only appear to have died. Their souls are in the hand of God, he
asserts, where torments of the present world will never touch them (3:1–2).
In contrast to the deuteronomistic notion that righteousness brings long
life and prosperity, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon accounts for the
untimely deaths of the righteous by asserting that their perfected souls were
pleasing to God, thus he snatched them from the midst of earthly wickedness
(4:14). By contrast, the wicked may enjoy a long and profitable life, which
is contrary to the deuteronomic view, but after death they will be raised just
long enough to see the error of their ways and be judged by the righteous
ones they had condemned. Ironically, the distorted worldview they held in the
present world becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, for the paradoxical reversal
of fortunes on the Day of Judgment forces them to behold the righteous ones
whom they killed standing at the right hand of God to convict them. As a
result, the wicked endure acute pangs of fear and anguish before fading into
oblivion, unremembered as though they were never born.13
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CONCLUSION
Despite a wide range of outlooks and outcomes, the deuterocanonical texts all
share one fundamental conviction: that the Most High is unique (Deut 6:4),
omnipotent, omniscient, and providentially just—a unique and powerful
God of steadfast lovingkindness [hesed] willing and able to act in establishing and maintaining justice and righteousness [mishpat ve-zedekah] in ruling
the universe. Even a cursory reading of these texts shows a broad spectrum of
speculation concerning how the Deity might act in vindicating righteous ones
and righting earthly wrongs. Particular convictions about the world to come
are predicated on the situation of the present world, as the oppressed look
desperately to the divine for help.14
They arise out of particular social contexts and at no point do they presume to be dogmatic or universal in scope. As such, one cannot expect these texts
to have the clarity and resolution of systematic theology, so they often remain
ambiguously raw and undeveloped and distinct from the corpus as a whole.
Nevertheless a thorough comparison of these texts brings great appreciation
for the colorfully rich spectrum of light refracted through the prism of a shared
conviction about divine steadfast lovingkindness [hesed] manifested through the
cosmic administration of justice and righteousness [mishpat vezedekah].
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12. Paul D. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic: The Historical and Sociological Roots of Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 35–36.
13. Note that the fate of the wicked stands in contrast to the classical conception of eternal hellfire rooted in the book of Enoch and implied in the Gospels.
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The Afterlife in the Septuagint
Leonard Greenspoon
INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
It may seem odd or perhaps even off-putting to begin an analysis of the Septuagint and eschatology with a series of caveats. Nonetheless, as we shall see,
these “warnings” form the necessary prelude to any responsible discussion of
this topic. If, as turns out to be the case, there is no single perspective on this
fascinating topic, then it is far better for readers to recognize this earlier, rather
than later, in the process.1
First, it is necessary to remind readers that the Septuagint is for the most
part a translation, in fact the first translation of the Bible, in this case the Old
Testament or Hebrew Bible. There is little reason to doubt that the process
that resulted in this Greek text, which can be abbreviated as LXX, began in
Alexandria, Egypt, sometime in the first third of the third century b.c.e. It is
probable that the translation resulted both from the Alexandrian Jewish community’s rapid loss of fluency in Hebrew and from the reigning monarch’s
(Ptolemy II) desire to have a copy of the Jewish law in his ever-expanding
Library.2
Thus it makes eminently good sense, historically and theologically, that
the Five Books of Moses or Pentateuch were the first books tackled by the
translators (numbering 72 or 70 according to ancient sources) assembled at
Alexandria. There are sufficient similarities between the translations of the
first five books of the Hebrew Bible to posit some connection between their
translators. On the other hand, there are enough demonstrable differences in
translation technique to insist on the relative independence of those responsible for each of the books of the Pentateuch.
As we move to the books beyond the Pentateuch, there are no sure signs
of the relative (to say nothing of the absolute) chronology in which they were
translated, nor are we even close to certainty about the location(s) in which
later translators worked. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that many LXX
books appear to be rather literal renderings of the Hebrew being translated
[also called Vorlage], while other books almost certainly reflect a far freer, even
periphrastic, approach to the Hebrew text. And then there are a considerable
number of books that occupy more moderate (or median) places in the continuum that separates (but also joins) literal and free.
29
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It must be immediately acknowledged that our judgment on a given LXX
translator’s handling of his Vorlage remains somewhat speculative, inasmuch
as we do not know precisely what consonantal Hebrew text (vocalization was
a much later development) lay before those rendering the Bible into Greek.
Undoubtedly, a consonantal text very much like (in fact, sometimes identical
to) the traditional Hebrew or Masoretic Text (MT) underlies much of the
LXX. LXX translators, we can readily imagine, typically followed that Hebrew
text, but may have consciously changed it for any number of reasons. A consonantal Hebrew text at variance, to a lesser or greater degree, with the MT
lay before other LXX translators. Again, there is good reason to posit that they
often followed this Hebrew text, while parting company with it on occasion.
Thus, we have to imagine that the collection of individual or group
efforts that we designate by the term “Septuagint” was always somewhat
uneven in the approach of its translators toward their Hebrew Vorlage. In the
absence of any overall effort at editorial standardization or redaction, it would
be difficult to imagine that there are a large number of grammatical, lexicographical, or ideological elements that are found throughout the Septuagint or
even in most of its books.
What I have been speaking of in the previous paragraphs could more
properly be called the Old Greek, that is, the form of the text as it appeared
when the translators completed their task. Unfortunately, no autographs (that
is, originals) or any book or block of books of the LXX are extent. In the
absence of such autographs, it might be hoped that textual criticism would
allow for the reconstruction of the original formulations of the LXX translators. Although such a procedure might well work on a limited amount of
text, we are far from being able to determine the Old Greek for an extended
amount of LXX text.
Even under the best of circumstances, when scribes carefully copied the
Old Greek over several centuries, we could expect a plethora of new readings
to be introduced by chance or by design. This is simply the result of the fact
that scribes, even the most careful scribes, were after all fallible humans.
But more than a few years passed between the creation of the Septuagint
and extant manuscripts that contain all (or most) of the books that came to
constitute the LXX canon. The Septuagint was probably completed in the late
second century b.c.e.; the great uncial codices (Alexandrinus, Sinaiticus, and
Vaticanus) that constitute our earliest extant evidence for the LXX as a collection of books date to the third and fourth centuries c.e. During the extended
intervening period that separates these two events, the Old Greek of some
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books was completely or partially lost, and later revisions were substituted. In
other instances, there is good reason to think that conscious efforts on the part
of scribes or tradents introduced extensive changes that were perhaps originally
intended as commentary on a passage of the LXX, but ultimately took the
place of the older Greek.
All of these factors introduce even more heterogeneity to the Septuagint
as a collection of varied texts stemming from different time periods and locales.
Further, these factors serve to reinforce the observation made above about the
difficulty of locating and defining LXX characteristics on what we might call
a global basis. It may be possible, for example, to discern a marked interest in
eschatology on the part of the translator responsible for LXX Psalms or LXX
Isaiah, but it would be sloppy methodology to seek to apply such interest to
other books or blocks of material without careful, one might say painstaking,
analysis of the work of each translator.
The cautionary flags thrown down above are admittedly formidable, but
they do point in the direction that any serious study of the LXX and eschatology must take. But they are not the only cautionary flags. Recognition that
any statement beginning “The LXX says . . .” must be heavily nuanced, if not
abandoned outright, is necessary. But how are we to deal with assertions that
are limited to a given book or group of books in the Septuagint? In short, what
are we looking for?
Typically, in searches such as this (that is, how is eschatology handled by
specific LXX translators) greatest importance is attached to readings that veer
from the supposed Hebrew Vorlage with which the translator worked. Sometimes, as with quantitative changes (that is, those that involve differences in
length between the Hebrew and Greek texts), it is fairly easy to detect differences and perhaps even to explain or account for them. However, in general,
qualitative differences (where the number of words is about the same, but the
meanings appear to be distinct) are more difficult to determine.
Nonetheless, it would not be appropriate to discount the value of the
Greek text where it essentially follows the Hebrew that underlies it. In such
instances, we may well envision that the translator’s viewpoint is identical (or
nearly so) to the stance presented in his Hebrew Vorlage.
Upon further reflection, almost each of the statements in the two paragraphs just above require further analysis. For example, even if we posit that
the LXX translator made use of a Hebrew text that was identical to the consonants of the MT, we have no way of knowing whether he vocalized it in exactly
the same way that the Masoretes did. Although differences in vocalization are
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often minor and make little or no difference in meaning, that is certainly not
always the case.
At some point, we will need to ascertain whether, in our best judgment
(and in the judgment of others who have studied the material) a given LXX
translator generally followed closely his Hebrew Vorlage or whether he was
given to frequent insertions and omissions, such that we cannot know whether
a possibly significant passage was due to a Hebrew text different from the MT
or is the result of the translator’s own conscious intervention.
Beyond these considerations are two others. First, the LXX is after all a
translation and thus not necessarily the optimal medium to express views even
(especially?) on topics of current interest. It is clear that those responsible for
the LXX had differing views on the best way to render the Hebrew wording
into intelligible Greek. Nonetheless, it does seem methodologically sound to
assume that the translator followed his text, unless there is some reason to
think otherwise. And this would be true, at least in general, whether or not
the translator agreed with the text. Therefore, unless we have evidence to the
contrary, we cannot make too much of any instance where the Greek translation agrees with its reputed Hebrew Vorlage. Emphatically stated, agreement
between texts does not necessarily indicate that the translator agreed with a
given sentiment expressed in that text.
The second consideration is especially apt when considering eschatology
and related issues. As is well known, the Septuagint, in origin a Jewish document for a Jewish audience, became the Bible (specifically the Old Testament)
for Christians. In this guise, Christian theologians routinely mined the text
for support of what were to become characteristic beliefs. An eschatological
focus was one area that saw particularly rich development in early Christianity.
Thus, many LXX passages came to be understood as bearing an eschatological meaning, whether or not such was the intention (or likely to have been
the intention) of the Old Greek translators themselves. In short, we must be
ever cautious not to read back into the Septuagint meanings that pertain to a
chronologically later and religiously different culture.
The afterlife, as a means to reward and punish individuals (or perhaps
groups of individuals), is clearly a part, but only a part, of the constellation of
beliefs centered on the term “eschatology.” With its focus on the end of time
(at least, time as we know and experience it), eschatology has both global, even
universal, significance as well as importance in terms of the fate of individuals.
Often, but not always related to the end of times is the figure of the Messiah
(or, for some Second Temple Jews, messiahs). That is, biblical passages that
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highlight the role of the Messiah may be directly relevant to a larger eschatological vision, or they may not be. Much, but not all eschatology envisions
a fiery end to our world, brought about by God and his angelic host, often
aided by those humans allied with him against the forces of cosmic evil. This
is apocalypticism, which, as I see it, adds a sense of urgency to eschatological
speculation that might otherwise seem to pertain only to the distant future.
On the one hand, careful delineation of different strands of eschatological and messianic thought is essential in order to plot what can be conceived
of as parallel, but nonetheless divers developments. On the other hand, it is
not likely that any individual or likeminded group of individuals delved very
deeply into differences of definition or emphasis in their eschatological considerations. That is to say, for the sake of analysis we as observers of an earlier
period might well wish to differentiate beliefs that those who maintained them
would have held in common. With this in mind, I will discuss below a number
of passages that might have been understood as eschatological, whether or not
a claim could be made that they relate specifically to the afterlife.
THE PSALTER
We will start with the book of Psalms (or the Psalter) since this has been the
starting point for much of the most spirited discussion and analysis in past
discussions. Psalm 1, the initial and in many ways introductory composition
to the entire collection, begins by contrasting the fate of the righteous with
that of the wicked. A fairly literal translation of Psalm 1:5 in the Hebrew text
is provided by the New American Standard Bible (NASB): “Therefore the
wicked will not stand in the judgment, Nor sinners in the assembly of the righteous.” Within the context of the Hebrew of this Psalm, this clearly refers to
God’s actions, within this world, to separate and reward those who are faithful
to him, while punishing those who turn from him. This is a common theme
of Wisdom Literature, of which Psalm 1 is an exemplar.
According to Joachim Schaper, “the Greek, on the other hand, has
altered the psalm’s nature as a whole by reinterpreting a single word. The use of
anisthmi as an intransitive verb referring to the future state of a group of individuals clearly confers the idea of ‘rising from the dead,’ ‘be resurrected’. . . .
The idea of a last judgment is implied in the Greek of Ps 1:5,” which Schaper
translates: “Therefore unbelievers will not rise [from death] in judgment nor
will sinners [rise] in the counsel of righteous men.” Schaper supports this
interpretation with reference to other Jewish literature (e.g., 2 Maccabees) that
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also dates to the second century b.c.e., when, he believes, the Greek Psalter
was produced.3
It is noteworthy, especially in the view of those who oppose Schaper’s
interpretation (here and, as we shall see, in other passages) that he does not
cite any other uses of this Greek verb in the Psalter. Focusing on this point,
Karen Jobes and Moises Silva observe: “Although Schaper’s interpretation may
seem at first attractive, there is evidence to diminish its force. For example, the
material in Hatch-Redpath shows the same Greek root translating the same
Hebrew root even in contexts where the sense of resurrection is impossible.
One such instance is in the Psalter itself at Psalm 93:16. With this in mind, we
can characterize Schaper’s interpretation at best as ‘ambiguous.’”4 Given our
introductory remarks above, it does not seem that Jobes and Silva have set too
high an interpretive bar for efforts such as Schaper’s.
We will now look at a selection of Schaper’s other examples from the first
third of the Psalter. The first passage adduced by Schaper is Psalm 16 (15 in
the LXX):9–10. In the Hebrew the text reads (so NASB): “Therefore my heart
is glad, and my glory rejoices; My flesh also will dwell securely. For Thou wilt
not abandon my soul to Sheol; Neither wilt Thou allow Thy Holy One to
undergo decay.” Schaper, along with others, suggests that the word translated
“my glory” should instead be read “my liver.” This does not entail any change
in consonants. Schaper renders the Septuagint for these two verses as: “There
my heart was glad//and my tongue gave praise;//also, my flesh will rest upon
hope//because you will not abandon my soul to Hades//nor let your righteous
see corruption.”
For Schaper, the eschatologically significant differences between the
Hebrew and the Greek are two in number: the change from “securely” to
“upon hope” and from “pit” (NASB “decay”) to “destruction,” “physical corruption.” As Schaper argues: “These changes indicate the introduction of the
notion of physical resurrection (again only of the righteous) into the sacred
text. . . . The Hebrew text does not confer this idea. It just stresses that God
will not let the righteous die an untimely death.”5
In this instance, Schaper’s second point is obscured by the NASB rendering, which here is not literal. For its “Neither wilt Thou allow Thy Holy
One to undergo decay,” the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) has: “or
let your faithful one see the Pit.” It is as if the translators of the NASB introduced their later, Christian interpretation of the Hebrew into their translation—never, in my view, a wise decision. But, can we say, with Schaper, that
“the Greek version puts forward the promise of personal, physical resurrection.

The Afterlife in the Septuagint

35

We have here one of the first, if not the first, instance of this hope”?6 On the
basis of the further evidence Schaper uses for support; namely, a midrash on
Psalm 16, I cannot follow his argumentation, especially in the absence of any
collaborating evidence from elsewhere in Greek Psalms, to say nothing of the
corpus of the full Septuagint.
It is Schaper’s judgment that the last three verses of Psalm 22 (21 in the
LXX), that is, verses 30–32, provide “an illustration of the traditional Hebrew
concept of divine justice with regard to human life and death.” This is an especially difficult passage in the Hebrew, especially in its first verse. NASB (where
the verses are numbered 29–31) renders this passage as follows: “All the prosperous of the earth will eat and worship, All those who go down to the dust will bow
before Him, Even he who cannot keep his soul alive. Posterity will serve Him;
It will be told of the LORD to the coming generation. They will come and will
declare His righteousness To a people who will be born, that He has performed
it.” Whatever ambiguities reside in the Hebrew, the Greek is, in Schaper’s view,
unambiguous. In his translation, it reads: “And the rich (‘fat ones’) of the earth
ate and bowed low,//all those going down to earth will fall down before him.//
But my soul lives for him//and my seed will serve him://the coming generation
will be proclaimed to the Lord,//and they will proclaim his righteousness//to the
people which will be born, [all the things] which the Lord did.”
Of the three differences Schaper discerns between the Hebrew and the
Greek, only one is of interest in matters eschatological. For the Hebrew NRSV
rendered “Even he who cannot keep his soul alive,” LXX has “But my soul lives
for him.” In Schaper’s analysis, the Greek reading could be an interpretation
of the same Hebrew or one that varied, but only slightly, from this Hebrew.
The significance of this is, for Schaper, clear: “my soul lives for him” means
“lives for him in eternity,” as is suggested by the use of the future tense in the
immediate context.7 For those who follow Schaper’s eschatologically oriented
interpretation of other psalms, this understanding of Psalm 21 (LXX enumeration) surely carries considerably more weight than it does for those who
remain skeptical of Schaper’s overall approach to the Psalter.
Psalm 46 (45 in the LXX) provides the next example within Schaper’s
listing of psalms with a noticeable eschatological reworking on the part of
the Greek translator. In the Hebrew text of this psalm, v. 9 reads (again, as
rendered in the NASB, where it is v. 8): “Come, behold the works of the
LORD, Who has wrought desolations in the earth.” At this point, the LXX
has (in Schaper’s translation): “Come, see the works of the Lord//which he has
set upon the earth as portents.” As understood by Schaper, “the change from
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‘devastation’ [NASB: ‘desolations’] to ‘portents’ obviously expresses the need to
adjust the text to reflect a modified concept of the inception of the messianic
age. . . . The shift probably also served to alter the idea itself, to make it more
‘humane.’ The stress was no longer laid on the destruction wrought by God
but rather on the hope (for the coming of the Messiah?) itself.” There is certainly reason for even an impartial observer to doubt whether this LXX reading is in fact “an interpretative translation” of the sort Schaper extrapolates.
Even if it is, there is no clear connection between this reading and the others
Schaper develops in his section on eschatology.8
The situation in Psalm 48 (LXX 47) is quite interesting. The last verse of
this Psalm, as rendered in NASB, (where it is verse 14) reads: “For such is God,
Our God forever and ever; He will guide us until death.” For the Septuagint,
Schaper translates: “Because this is God, our God,//in all eternity and forever
and ever,//he himself will shepherd us forever.” As Schaper sees it, the Greek
equivalent for Hebrew “guide” is exact. However, the Hebrew expression “until
death” has led in the Septuagint to “a theologically tendentious interpretation. . . . The Hebrew text . . . simply alludes to an inner-wordly guidance
given to the righteous. . . . The Hebrew of Ps 48 does not confer any ideas
about personal eschatology.” The Greek expression eis tous aiwnon (variants of
this are found three times in the preceding line), which Schaper renders “forever,” is in his analysis a term that has been “democratized,” such that “it could
be employed to lay out the prospects of personal salvation. The flock tended
by the eternal shepherd could now hope to participate in his eternity.” This
is, at first glance, a more impressive example than some of the others Schaper
adduced. However, given the fact that a similar form shows up three (other)
times in this verse, we cannot overlook the seemingly simpler explanation of
textual corruption at the stage of translation and/or transmission.9
The very next composition, Psalm 49 (LXX 48), is more complex and
provides Schaper with the context for one of his more lengthy analyses.10
Verse 12 (v. 11 in the NASB) reads as following: “Their inner thought is, that
their houses are forever, And their dwelling places to all generations; They
have called their lands after their own names.” This difficult text is often
emended at its beginning, such that the Hebrew word for “grave” or “graves”
appears rather than “inner thought.” Such a change, which would involve the
rearrangement of two of the consonants, is by no means impossible, but it is
sharply rejected by Schaper. Thus, he argues, the LXX of this verse is another
“theological innovation” on the part of the translators: “And their graves are
their houses forever,//their dwellings for many generations [=forever].” This
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“theological exegesis,” in Schaper’s words, “serves to stress the eternal death
of the wicked . . . over against the eternal salvation of the righteous. . . . [In
other words,] there will be neither judgment nor resurrection for the wicked.”
From Schaper’s perspective this interpretation is strengthened by the
LXX rendering at v. 15 (v. 16 in the LXX), where a notoriously difficult
Hebrew text is rendered in Greek as: “They put [them] into Hades like sheep,
Death tends them://and the righteous will rule over them in the morning,//
and their help will wither away from their glory [once they are] in Hades.”
This Greek is similar, in Schaper’s view, to what is implied in the Hebrew text,
“but it further stresses an already prominent feature, i.e. the existence of the
wicked in Hades. Whereas the Hebrew text tells us that their ‘form will vanish,’ the Greek claims that there will be no ‘help’ for them in the nether world.”
As is so often the case with the passages Schaper chooses to highlight, there are
both textual and interpretative difficulties in this psalm. This makes it difficult
to offer complete support for the positions in favor of which Schaper makes
his definitive claims.
Another “striking instance of reinterpretation” occurs in Psalm 56
(LXX 55), according to Schaper. The NASB renders this difficult verse (v. 8 in
the NASB; v. 9 in the LXX) as: “Thou hast taken account of my wanderings;
Put my tears in Thy bottle; Are they not in Thy book?” Schaper would exclude
the last line of this verse (“Are they not in Thy book?”) as a likely gloss. How
then are we to deal with what is apparently the Greek rendering of the first
two lines of this verse: “I have told you my life,//[and] you have put my tears
before yourself, just like in your promise”?
Most important, for Schaper, is the question of which “promise” is being
alluded to in this interpretative Greek rendering. For Schaper, as for some
other researchers, it is to Isaiah 25:8 that this allusion draws us. Within “the
description of the great eschatological banquet drawing together the nations
in Jerusalem it is announced that God ‘has wiped away the tears from every
cheek’” (so the New Jerusalem Bible). Schaper also constructs the argument
that the Greek word for “promise” used here, epaggelia, was intended “to mean
the holy scriptures of Judaism qua embodiment of God’s promise to Israel.” The
use of such technical terminology serves, to use a colloquial expression, to seal
the deal. Here, as elsewhere, I would prefer a far more cautious evaluation of
LXX Psalms that stresses possibility, rather than likelihood or even certainty.11
Psalm 59 (LXX 58) provides the next example for Schaper. The key
verses, 12–13 in the Hebrew and 13–14 in the LXX, are translated in this
way by NASB: “On account of the sin of their mouth and the words of their
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lips, Let them even be caught in their pride, And on account of curses and
lies which they utter. Destroy them in wrath, destroy them, that they may be
no more; That men may know that God rules in Jacob, To the ends of the
earth.” For this, LXX has, in Schaper’s rendering: “With regard to the sin of
their mouth, to the word of their lips,//let them be taken in their pride.//And
because of their curses and their lies, acts of judgement will be pronounced//
on the day of consummation, and they will be no more.//And they will know
that God rules over Jacob, until the ends of the earth.”
The key lexical item here is the Greek term sunteleiai. In general, this term
refers to “destruction” in any number of possible contexts. In this instance, so
Schaper submits, it is to be understood specifically as “an apocalyptical terminus technicus.” Schaper cites passages from LXX Daniel in support of his
rendering “consummation” or “final judgement.” Schaper also references the
New Testament’s frequent resort to “this particular usage . . . in many of its
copious references to the last judgment.” We cannot but wonder if this later,
Christian understanding of the term has influenced Schaper’s analysis of its
signification in this LXX passage.12
The last of Schaper’s eschatologically significant passages from LXX
Psalms derives from Psalm 73 (LXX 72). In his view, this psalm is a counterpart
to Psalm 1: “Whereas in the former we find the idea that only the righteous will
rise from the dead, the latter demonstrates another aspect of this fundamental
belief, i.e. the concept that the wicked will forever be confined to the nether
world.” The key verse here is v. 4 in the Hebrew (v. 5 in the LXX), rendered in
NASB as: “For there are no pains in their death; And their body is fat.” For this
verse in the Hebrew, Schaper prefers a different interpretation, as embodied in
the RSV: “For they have no pangs; their bodies are sound and sleek.”
In any case, so Schaper, the LXX translator understood the Hebrew in
a way that comes closer to the literal translation of the NASB. So, “they [i.e.,
the sinners] will see no return from death//nor find steadfastness in their
affliction.” Schaper also offers an alternative rendering for the decidedly difficult second part of this verse in the Septuagint, “and there is steadfastness in
their scourge (i.e. their punishment is perpetual).”13 Whichever approach of
Schaper finds favor, it definitely supports his overall picture, pieced together
from the LXX Psalms passages he discusses, of eternal damnation, ceaseless
punishment, and misery as the postmortem fate of the wicked. For them, there
will be no resurrection and no reward.
I hope this presentation of Schaper’s analysis of eschatologically significant LXX renderings in Psalms has been both fair to him and clear to readers.
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It is possible to make a similar presentation of his discussion of passages where
an enhanced sense of messianism has reputedly been introduced by the translator of LXX Psalms. However, it seems as if it would be more productive at
this point to look at some of the reviews that Schaper’s book garnered. In this
instance, we are especially interested in reviewers’ judgments as to the soundness (or lack thereof ) in Schaper’s methodology, for it is appropriate, as I see
it, to be doubtful that unsound methodology will produce sound results.
Melvin K. H. Peters is critical of Schaper’s lack of concern with “the
history of the transmission of the Greek text on the one hand . . . [and] of
the immediate context of a passage in question on the other. . . . Rather, he
is more interested in tracing connections (echoes) in other parts of the Greek
Bible, the Talmud, the Apocrypha, or Pseudepigrapha. For those enamored by
that sort of midrash-like ‘eclecticism,’ this monograph will prove quite engaging; for those accustomed to more thoroughgoing, context-sensitive interpretive techniques, it will be disappointing.” His summary judgment, to which
I am sympathetic if not entirely in agreement with, is as follows: “Some may
be convinced that a collection of weak examples makes a strong case, or that
similarity indicates dependence, but such views are not everywhere held and
certainly not in this quarter.”14
In an article centering on LXX 49:15 (see above for Schaper’s interpretation), but ranging far beyond this particular passage, Staffan Olofsson makes
numerous observations about Schaper’s methodology, not many of them positive in tone. While acknowledging that an LXX “translator [was] influenced
by the interpretation prevalent in his lifetime and by his cultural and religious
environment,” Olofsson rejects the idea that this entitles a modern scholar
“to suggest from differences between the meaning of the MT and the Greek
translation and the use of certain Greek terms in Jewish interpretations of
the Hebrew Bible that the translator is engaged in theological exegesis.”15 He
quotes with approval Albert Pietersma’s observation, in a review of Schaper,
that it is “not acceptable methodologically, that one (or several) instances be
given special treatment and be elevated to a higher level of interpretation . . .
in distinction from the more mundane text-criticism.”16
In outlining his own approach, Oloffson forthrightly states: “My methodological proposals do not presuppose that the theological convictions of the
Septuagint translator . . . have not affected his translation in any way. They
only suggest that in order to make that proposition probable one has first to
take a look at more obvious possibilities of interpretation, since theological
exegesis is not the primary aim of [the] translator [of LXX Psalms].”17 Put
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succinctly, “the burden of proof is thus on the scholar who suggests that an
interpretation of the [Greek] translator of the Hebrew text is at variance with
the translation of the same or a similar Hebrew text in a modern translation
is based on the theological Tendenz of the [Greek] translator.”18 The upshot of
this criticism is, if I may put it this way, that Schaper has put the cart before
the horse, the presupposition before the evidence, the conclusion before the
hard work of textual criticism. Overall, if not at each particular point, I am in
agreement with this assessment.
In one of his numerous articles on the LXX, Pietersma invites us to
consider this issue from a larger perspective, even as we remain focused on the
Greek Psalter. Here Pietersma constructs “a continuum for the field of Septuagint hermeneutics with minimalism at the one extreme and maximalism at the
other.” At the farthest reaches of the realm of the “minimalist,” “the translator
[is seen and understands himself or herself ] as a mere medium (a conduit) of
the source text. Such a translator, prototypically, does not add to nor subtract
from the text being transmitted, nor are alterations made to it.”19 A “maximalist” understanding, with which Pietersma identifies Schaper, effectively
elevates the Greek translator “to the status of an author, whose work becomes a
substitute or replacement for the source text.”20 And, Pietersma adds, “Schaper
is evidently not speaking of exegetical potential inadvertently created by the
Greek translator, but about actual exegesis, consciously breathed into his text
in the process of translating his source.”21
This distinction, between actual and potential, is of utmost importance,
as Pietersma effectively displays later in this same article through his analysis
of several examples, also from LXX Psalms, on the part of Martin Rösel. After
carefully examining these examples, he concludes: “All of [this] is not to say
that the phrase in question cannot possibly be read in the way that Rösel seeks
to read it. That the church Fathers often read [the Greek terms under investigation] as having to do with eschatological revelation is certainly true. . . .
What I would suggest, however, is that here we are no longer in the domain
of the original Septuagint, but at a certain stage in its reception history.”22 I
yield to none in my almost unquenchable interest in the reception history of
the Bible; however, I hope that I keep that interest separate from a focused
concern on the meaning that a given word or passage held in its initial context.
As I have observed at several points earlier in this article, it is not so clear that
Schaper has consciously acknowledged these different stages and maintained
the requisite distance between them.
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This is not quite, however, the last word on eschatology in the LXX
Psalter. In his monograph on the “translational technique” in LXX Psalter
3–41 for Hebrew verbs and participles, John Sailhamer subjects Psalm 37
to an extended study.23 He determines that “the LXX translator was guided
in his choice of equivalences by a social and religious interpretation of the
psalm. The interest . . . is eschatological. This interest, the expectation of
the coming age, had a significant impact on the choice of tenses in the LXX
psalm. . . . In this area there was a measure of freedom to translate according
to the understanding of the psalm by the translator, and thus the religious
concerns of the translator show through.”24 Thus, it would be inappropriate
to discount a heightened emphasis in eschatology in LXX Psalms simply by
raising red flags at possible methodological shortcomings on the part of an
individual scholar, in this case Schaper. The Greek Psalter undoubtedly merits
further research.
THE BOOK OF JOB
Given the extensive length of the Psalter and its varied subject matter, we
are not surprised that it has been the focus of numerous hypotheses, such as
those related to eschatology and messianism. Another biblical book to which
we might imagine researchers would turn is Job. It is an extraordinarily difficult book in almost all respects: its language, its structure, its probable (or
possible) meanings. The Greek version of the book of Job is shorter than the
traditional Hebrew or Masoretic text and exhibits a number of renderings that
are demonstrably not literal.
In an article in the mid-1950s, Donald Gard discussed what he viewed
as major components of the concept of the future life as constructed by the
LXX translator of this book. He listed his examples in three categories: “one
in which the future life is stated as a fact in G, one in which an afterlife is
implied in G, and one in which the Greek translator describes conditions in
the future life.”25
For Gard, the prime example for category 1 (the future life is stated as
a fact) is found in the Greek rendering of Job 14:14 (according to the verse
numbering in the Hebrew). In Gard’s translation, the Hebrew reads, “If a man
die, will he live (again)?//All the days of my service I wait,//Until my relief
should come.” For this, the LXX has (again, in the rendering of Gard): “For if
a man dies, he will live,//Having completed the days of his life;//I will abide
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until I be born again.” “In other words,” concludes Gard, “the Hebrew text
merely raises the question concerning life after death, while G states it as a fact
with the further assertion of a new existence for Job.”26
In introducing examples from category 2, Gard writes: “It is the Greek
translator’s theology of the future life which governs his treatment of passages
in the Hebrew in such a way as to imply a future life.”27 As his first example
in this category, he cites Job 4:20b in the MT, where “Eliphaz stresses the
ephemeral existence of human kings” with these words (as translated by Gard):
“Without anyone’s heeding they perish forever.” By not providing a translation
for the Hebrew word for “forever,” “the rendering by the [Greek] translator
does not exclude future life”: “Because they were not able to help themselves,
they perished” (in Gard’s translation).28
Gard begins his discussion of examples in category 3 by asserting: “Since
the translator does accept a life after death, it should not be surprising to note
that he also indicates conditions in the afterlife.”29 The Greek rendering of the
difficult Hebrew at 6:10, especially in its third line, “suggests a reason for Job’s
joy at the prospect of death—he has a claim to vindication in afterlife.” Thus,
the LXX reads (in Gard’s translation): “So may my city be a grave,//Upon
which, upon whose walls I used to leap, I will//not spare (i.e., refrain from,
forbear);//For I have not falsified the holy words of my God.”30 “The kind of
punishment which the Greek translator sees for the wicked in the future life is
seen,” for example, in his rendering of MT 40:13: “Hide (them) in the earth
outside together;//But fill their faces with dishonor.”31
Gard clearly set out his overall conclusions: “For the book of Job,
the writer [Gard] concludes that differences between [the MT] and [LXX]
in passages relating the afterlife are not due to a completely different Vorlage. The differences are due rather to a tendency on the part of the Greek
translator to introduce a theological point of view.”32 Not surprisingly,
Gard’s methodology and conclusions have not stood unchallenged. In his
criticism of a different but similarly situated book, Harry M. Orlinsky states
forthrightly: the true nature of both the Hebrew and the Greek texts of Job
“would be clear to anyone who would allow the Jewish translator and the
author of the Hebrew text to speak for themselves where their texts are not
obscure.”33 Orlinsky is surely not alone in judging that Gard is among those
who have carried on a one-sided dialogue rather than an interactive discussion with the texts of Job. Nonetheless, we cannot exclude the possibility or
even the probability that an enhanced interest in the afterlife does show up,
if only very rarely, in LXX Job.
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THE BOOK OF ISAIAH
The next examples are taken from the book of Isaiah. As is well known, it is
this book that provided New Testament authors with their richest source of
“scriptural” quotations and citations. Many factors led to this frequent use on
their part, among them a number of passages that they read as predictive of the
coming of Jesus and of the life, including the afterlife, that this momentous
event (or, better, series of events) brought forth. However, as we saw earlier,
especially in connection with the Psalter, we must try, even if we cannot always
succeed, to distinguish the initial meaning of a Greek text from the way(s) it
was later received.
Rodrigo de Sousa published an important monograph on eschatology
and messianism in the Greek Isaiah chapters 1–12.34 The first passage that
he subjects to extended analysis is LXX Isaiah 2:2–4. This well-known passage, which in the Hebrew begins with “in the days to come” and concludes
with the nations “never again know war,” is obviously set in an eschatological
context. Does the LXX rendering add to, subtract from, or simply maintain
the contours of this context? The same question arises with reference to Isaiah 4:2–6, which in the Hebrew commences with a significant phrase, “in
that day.”
De Sousa concludes:
A measure of contextual awareness would inform translational decisions in these sections. . . . It was noted that several of the eschatological ideas identifiable in the rendering are in common with other
LXX texts, in both Isaiah and the larger LXX corpus. . . . It was
also observed that . . . linguistic and co-textual considerations often
impeded the identification of a particular “eschatological” rendering
of a passage. . . . In this regard, I point to the fact that all the echoes
of eschatological traditions supposedly identifiable can find some
explanation in the translator’s rendering of the Vorlage.35

In other words, the translator of Greek Isaiah was not engaged in the
rewriting of some admittedly difficult Hebrew phrases, but instead sought to
understand the text as best he could and to convey this understanding to his
audience. Such nuanced conclusions lack the pyrotechnics of some others’
pronouncements, but at the same time they inspire more confidence on the
part of those seeking to determine the stance of a given LXX translator.
Let us conclude this section by looking at LXX 7:14–16, a passage
that often forms a centerpiece in discussions of eschatology and messianism.
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In de Sousa’s rendering of the Greek, the LXX reads: “Therefore the Lord
himself will give you a sign://See, the virgin will be pregnant and bear a son,//
and you will call his name Immanuel.//He will eat butter and honey,// Before
his either knowing or preferring evil// he will choose the good. For before the
boy knows good or evil,//he refuses evil in order to choose the good;//and the
land will be deserted//that you fear//because of its two kings.”36
In spite of its later use, de Sousa maintains “that the rendering of LXX Isa
7:14–16 does not give sufficiently strong evidence of a conscious, systematic
messianic reading of the passage. . . . The choice of parthenon does not seem
to have any special significance. . . . The important points to note are that the
translator of LXX Isa 7:16 understood the promised child of Isa 7 as having a
proper name . . . and that he sought to safeguard his extraordinary moral character. In so doing, he inserted elements that belonged to wider streams of Jewish
thought.”37 In reaching these conclusions, de Sousa is in basic agreement with
Johan Lust, who writes: “Our reading . . . does not deny that the LXX facilitates
a Christological-Messianic interpretation, especially with respect to its choice of
words, in particular the use of the term parthenon ‘virgin’ and the future tense of
the verbal expression ‘she shall become pregnant.’ On the other hand, it would
seem that such a messianic accentuation was not intended by the translator.”38
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It would be possible to draw further examples from passages here or there
in other books of the Greek Bible. However, at this point such an approach,
which would necessarily ignore larger contextual issues within the book or
books selected, does not exemplify the careful methodology that was presented
at the beginning of this paper and promoted in the following sections.
For some readers, the results of my analysis will be disappointing and
largely negative. We cannot, for example, make any general statement about
the Septuagint’s stance toward major eschatological issues. Or, put another
way, we simply cannot assert that the LXX translators consciously and deliberately changed their Hebrew Vorlage to reflect a heightened interest in the
afterlife, even if that heightened interest was a growing influence within their
Jewish community.
These “negative” judgments result from the make-up of the Septuagint as
we now have it; namely, it is a heterogeneous collection of texts from different
centuries, different cultural and religious milieus, different translators making use of diverse techniques to present the Hebrew to their Greek-speaking
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audience. While at the lexical level, there were some efforts to standardize the
Greek representation of key Hebrew terms across the Septuagint, we can detect
no such efforts in the realm of theology or ideology.
In the face of claims to the contrary, that is, claims that certain books of
the LXX Bible do indeed reflect efforts by their translators to introduce eschatological concepts that go beyond the Hebrew Vorlage, only careful analysis, often
word-by-word analysis, can determine the validity (or lack of validity) of such
viewpoints. Most important with respect to methodology, the hard work of textual criticism must precede any claim of theological exegesis on the part of any
translator of the Septuagint. It is, then, the responsibility of those who claim to
detect such theological exegesis to prove their point. Setting the bar this high,
which is an impediment to facile reasoning, is essential if we indeed seek to
determine, to the best of our ability, what the translators themselves intended.
And, as noted above, this is decidedly not the same thing as how these texts
were interpreted later in very different religious and cultural contexts.
Beyond these considerations, we should remember this important observation: “In fact, it is not clear that the LXX translators would have viewed their
task as compatible with giving expression to their (own) views of the afterlife.
Other types of works, including (speculatively) commentaries and midrashim
on the LXX, would have provided more likely vehicles for the presentation
and reflection of their authors’ views on eschatology.”39 We don’t have ancient
commentaries on the LXX composed by the translators themselves. But we do
have many documents from the Jewish communities of the last centuries b.c.e.
and first centuries c.e. It is to these that scholars turn to determine what Jews
of this period were thinking about the afterlife and the postmortem vindication of the righteous and punishment of the evil. And that is as it should be.
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Rabbi Akiva, Other Martyrs, and Socrates:
On Life, Death, and Life After Life
Naftali Rothenberg
The passing of sages in general and the execution of the Ten Martyrs in particular feature prominently in talmudic and midrashic legend. Rabbi Akiva’s
death, however, would seem to have left a greater impression in rabbinic
literature than the deaths of all of the other Tannaim and Amoraim. The
legends about Rabbi Akiva’s death contend with two main dilemmas. First,
horror at his cruel end and the manner in which this very old man (120
years old, according to legend) was executed. The dilemma here pertains to
the issue of theodicy, in the case of one who lived a long and full life and
came to such a terrible end. The second dilemma concerns the meaning of
the death of someone who strove so hard to give meaning to his life, and
especially to the suffering and misfortune that befell him throughout it. Life
is the ground upon which meaning is built, and when it comes to a close, is
death meaningless?
Is this the Torah and this its reward?!
The talmudic and midrashic legends tell how Rabbi Akiva captured the attention of figures such as Adam and Moses. These legends further enhanced the
status of Rabbi Akiva in cultural consciousness—by comparing him to the
fathers of the world and the nation and placing him on a par with them.
As recounted in the Talmud, the first to be struck by the unreasonableness
of Rabbi Akiva’s death was Adam, who, “when he reached the generation of
Rabbi Akiva, rejoiced in his Torah and was saddened by his death.”1 Another
well-known legend, which tells of Moses’s discovery of Rabbi Akiva, heightens
the dilemma associated with the latter’s death:
Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav: When Moses ascended to
heaven, he found God sitting and tying crowns to the letters. He said
to Him: “Master of the Universe, who requires this of you?” He said
to him: “There is a man who will live in a few generations and Akiva
ben Joseph is his name, who will learn mounds and mounds of laws
from each cusp. . . .” He [Moses] said to Him: “Master of the Universe, You have shown me the Torah; show me its reward!” He said
49
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to him: “Look behind you.’ He looked behind him and saw them
weighing his [Rabbi Akiva’s] flesh in the market. He said to Him:
“Master of the Universe, is this the Torah and this its reward?” He
said to him: “Silence! That is how I conceived it.” (BT, Menahot 29b)

There is no attempt whatsoever, in this text, to justify the fact of Rabbi
Akiva’s brutal murder, merely arbitrary and unquestioning acceptance of
God’s decree. The bluntness of God’s answer to Moses, as formulated by the
author of this legend, heightens the pointlessness of theodicy and strengthens
the sense of injustice at the death of Rabbi Akiva. Consequently, it is not
God’s reply—unequivocal, absolute, and so hard for the human mind to
accept—that has remained in the minds of readers and scholars, but rather
Moses’s resounding cry: “Master of the universe, is this the Torah and this its
reward?!”
Although some explain God’s answer to mean that one must not question
His ways and deeds2 or “investigate that which is beyond one’s understanding,”3 and although the reply was ultimately intended for ordinary readers and
students, we cannot overlook the fact that, in the context of the legend itself,
it was not given to just any prophet or sage, but to Moses our teacher, greatest of all the prophets past and future. It would not be the way of readers of
the Aggadah to be satisfied with a simple a fortiori deduction (“If even Moses
received such an answer, who are we to expect anything more?”). As noted,
what has remained most impressed upon the minds of these readers is in fact
Moses’s anguished cry: “Is this the Torah and this its reward?!”
Indeed this cry has reverberated throughout Jewish history, from the days
of the Talmud to the present, and lies at the heart of discussion of injustice
in the world, divine providence, reward and punishment, the suffering of the
righteous, and the prosperity of the wicked. The cry is echoed in the words
of the rabbis concerning the Ten Martyrs,4 brutally executed by the Romans.
According to the midrash of the Ten Martyrs, the first to be executed was
Simeon ben Gamaliel, president [nasi] of the Sanhedrin, who was beheaded.
Rabbi Ishmael the High Priest is said to have held Rabbi Simeon’s head in
his hands, bitterly crying, “Where is the Torah and where is its reward! How
the tongue that explained the Torah in seventy tongues now licks the dust!”5
Rabbi Ishmael justifies his outburst, explaining that Simeon ben Gamaliel
had been greater than him in Torah and wisdom, and his death was thus a
great loss to him personally and to the entire generation. Death itself is meaningless. The consequences of Simeon ben Gamaliel’s absence, however, were
considerable: for himself, as he was no longer able to engage in in his lifetime
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pursuit—explaining the Torah in every tongue—for Rabbi Ishmael and for the
entire Jewish people.
In a number of midrashim, the cry is attributed to the angels, remonstrating against God. When Rabbi Ishmael was killed, the executioner removed the
skin of his face. When he reached the place where the phylacteries are laid,
Rabbi Ishmael uttered a terrible cry that shook the divine throne. “The ministering angels [then] said to the Holy One, blessed be He: ‘That a righteous
man such as he, to whom You revealed all of the mysteries of the upper realms
and the secrets of the lower realms, should be killed so horribly by this wicked
man. Is this the Torah and this its reward?’”6 In attributing shock to the upper
realms, to the divine throne, and to the angels—whose entire existence is
marked by immutable order—the author seeks to ascribe to the deaths of the
Martyrs the power to disrupt the very foundations of the universe. At Rabbi
Akiva’s death, the angels too7—not only Moses, as in the source cited above—
cry out to God: “Is this the Torah and this its reward?!”
The story of Rabbi Ishmael’s death stresses the preferability of observance
of the precepts in this world to everlasting life in the world to come. As we will
see below, the story of Rabbi Akiva’s death highlights the same principle. There
is a certain similarity between the modes of execution: Rabbi Akiva’s flesh is
scored with iron combs, and Rabbi Ishmael’s face is skinned. Their behavior
is also similar, in the self-restraint they show as they are put to death. Rabbi
Akiva fulfils the commandment of reciting the Shema, and Rabbi Ishmael
cries out only when the executioner reaches the place where the phylacteries
are laid—causing the Roman emperor to ask: “Until now, you neither wept
nor cried out, yet now you cry out?” Rabbi Ishmael replied: “I do not cry out
for my soul but for the commandment of the phylacteries that has been taken
from me.” To their dying breaths, Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva dedicated
every human effort to doing what is right in this world. Their entire interpretive focus, according to the aggadic texts, is on life, not on what happens to
the soul after death.
When Rabbi Hanina ben Teradion is burned alive,8 wrapped in a Torah
scroll, his daughter cries: “Is this the Torah and this its reward?!” A dialogue
ensues between them, in which Rabbi Hanina rejects her words—perhaps also
to comfort her and to give her strength—asserting that such a cry is misplaced:
“If it is for me that you cry, I accept my suffering with love, and would rather
atone for my sins and be consumed by flames fanned by man in this world
than by flames that are not fanned—the flames of Gehenna.”9 He considers
the possibility, however, that her shock may be due not to his execution, but
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to the burning of the Torah scroll, adding: “And if it is for the Torah scroll
that you weep, the Torah is fire and cannot be consumed by fire. Its words
fly in the air, and the fire merely consumes the parchment.”10 According to
this approach, the shock at Hanina ben Teradion’s execution by fire and the
burning of the Torah scroll was the result of the limited vision of those who,
like Hanina’s daughter, witnessed the terrible event, but were unable to detach
themselves from the horror and interpret it on a deeper level. Extreme suffering was a privilege, purifying him of his sins—perhaps even granted to him as
a reward for his devotion, rather than inflicted as a punishment.
One must also transcend the barbaric act of burning a holy book. The
holiness of the Torah is not a function of its physical components. The comparison to fire is apt, as fire cannot consume fire. “Its words fly in the air,” as
the Torah, according to Rabbi Hanina, is its content, not ink on parchment.
There is thus no reason to cry out in remonstration or in pain. The human
oppressor and the visible horror must be transcended, and the event perceived
as one of purification, the significance of which bears no relation to destruction and death, but rather to a fire that cannot be consumed and to words
that fly in the air.
Rabbi Akiva’s death may also be seen in the context of the eternity of the
Torah or the bond to the eternal enjoyed by its students—particularly in light
of his exchange with Pappus ben Judah.11 Although Rabbi Akiva disapproved
of some of Pappus’s teachings,12 the following, well-known exchange pertains
directly to Torah study at a time when it was prohibited by the authorities
and to the punishment incurred by those who violate the interdiction. The
exchange takes place on two separate occasions: when Rabbi Akiva teaches
Torah in public, in violation of the ban against Torah study, and when the two
men find themselves together in a Roman prison:
The Rabbis taught: Once, the wicked government decreed that the
Jews should not engage in Torah study. Pappus ben Judah came
upon Rabbi Akiva, who was gathering crowds together and publicly
engaging in Torah study. He said to him: “Akiva, are you not afraid
of the government?” He replied: “I will give you a parable. It is like
a fox who was walking along the river bank, and he saw fish moving
together from place to place. He said to them: ‘What are you fleeing
from?’ They replied: ‘From the nets that men cast over us.’ He said
to them: ‘Why don’t you come up to the land, and you and I will
dwell together, as my ancestors dwelled with yours?’ They replied:
‘Are you the one they call the cleverest of animals? You are not clever,
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but a fool! If we are afraid in our vital element, how much more so
in an element in which we would die!’ So too are we. If this is the
way things are now that we sit and engage in the Torah, of which it
is written ‘for that it is your life and the length of your days,’ how
much worse they would be if we were to abstain from it.”
It is told that not long passed before Rabbi Akiva was caught
and thrown in prison, and Pappus ben Judah was caught and imprisoned with him. He said to him: “Pappus! Who has brought you
here?” He responded: “Fortunate are you, Rabbi Akiva, for having
been arrested for Torah study; woe to Pappus who was arrested for
idle words” (BT Berakhot 61b).

At their first encounter, Pappus sounds responsible and rational.13 At a
time of such decrees, it would have been prudent to study Torah in secret and
certainly not to provoke the authorities by gathering large crowds. To Rabbi
Akiva, however, the suspension of public instruction, which lies at the heart
of national, cultural life, would have constituted a kind of collective, spiritual-
cultural suicide. There was little doubt that they would be caught in the
Roman nets, but suspending communal study would have been even worse.
Was Pappus convinced by Rabbi Akiva’s explanation? We don’t know, because
the talmudic legend cites no reply on his part.
The exchange continues in prison, and this time the final word is given
to Pappus, who makes a clear distinction between the cruel regime that
imprisons and executes at will and the actions of the condemned. It is the
latter that define the significance of the punishment. For Pappus, who was
arrested for idle words, the punishment was indeed a punishment. He was
seized, like so many others under Roman rule, without having done anything
wrong—merely for having asked Rabbi Akiva a question, received an answer,
and remained silent. It was enough for the authorities that he did not dispute
Rabbi Akiva’s statement, and so they arrested him for his silence. Rabbi Akiva,
on the other hand, was arrested for having flagrantly violated a government
decree: gathering crowds and publicly teaching Torah. For Rabbi Akiva, the
punishment was, in fact, a reward: “This is the Torah and this is its reward!”—
in the most literal sense, not as a remonstration against heaven or a cry of pain.
The cry “Is this is the Torah” is generally understood as referring specifically to Torah study—to the diligence, knowledge, and scholarship of the
Ten Martyrs.
An unusual use of “This is the Torah and this its reward” can be found in
the case of Elisha ben Abuyah (“Aher”), who witnessed the martyrs’ deaths and
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drew very different conclusions from those drawn by most of his friends and
colleagues. The sight of the severed tongue of Rabbi Judah the baker in the
mouth of a dog is said to have been one of the things that led Ben Abuyah to
abandon his faith and deny its tenets. If “this is the Torah and this its reward,”
concluded Elisha, it is pointless to study Torah and observe the precepts, and
there is no reward and punishment in the world.14
“Is this the Torah and this its reward?” (or in the affirmative: “This is the
Torah and this its reward”) has been used to convey various meanings and has
been variously interpreted: as an expression of deep shock; a remonstration
against heaven, voiced by human beings or angels; an introduction to a discussion of reward and punishment; an introduction to a discussion of theodicy; a
reaffirmation of the rewards enjoyed by the righteous in this world and especially in the world to come; or a rejection of divine providence and retribution.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the talmudic text that recounts
Moses’s shock at Rabbi Akiva’s “reward” does not address the issue of theodicy at all. There is one source, not a central one, that attests to Rabbi Akiva’s
theodicy,15 capable of shaping interpretations of Rabbi Akiva’s death—based,
rather, on a broad range of relevant texts. It does not appear among the talmudic and midrashic legends that seek to tell the story of Rabbi Akiva, but derives
from a later source, dedicated primarily to the issue of theodicy with regard to
the deaths of the Ten Martyrs. Thus, even if we were to claim that the author
of this legend had found an appropriate answer to Moses’s resounding question, “Is this the Torah and this its reward?” (assuming that it does, indeed,
explain the brutal killing itself from a theodicy perspective), the question of
meaning would still remain. It is meaning—so central to Rabbi Akiva in his
lifetime and at the heart of the earlier midrashim that deal with his philosophy
and life story—that is the primary concern of the legends that describe his
behavior and words at the time of his execution.
A Final Lesson in the Philosophy of Love
The meaning of Rabbi Akiva’s death is in fact discussed in a number of places.
Some, like the following text, pertain directly to his image as the sage of love:
When they took Rabbi Akiva to be executed, it was the appointed
hour for reciting the Shema. As they were scoring his flesh with iron
combs, he accepted the yoke of heaven, and his students said to him:
“Rabbi, even now?!” He said to them: “All my days I grieved at the
words ‘with all your soul’ (Deuteronomy 6:5)—even when your soul
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is taken from you. I said: when will I have the opportunity to fulfil
this? And now that the opportunity presents itself, will I not fulfil
it?” He drew out [the word] “one” [ehad] until his soul departed
with “one.” (BT, Berakhot 61a)

The final lesson on the philosophy of love was given by the sage of love at the
moment of his execution. His students, who had learned from him, during
the years of their studies, that suffering is beloved and must be accepted and
even embraced, were unable to come to terms with his death. Those who had
been at his side at the time of his son’s death, and even then wondered at his
behavior, find it difficult to maintain their composure, but faced with their
rabbi’s equanimity, make an effort to control themselves. Had they wanted to
cry or shout, they could not have done so in the presence of this man who,
even as he was being tortured to death, accepted the yoke of heaven by reciting
the Shema—with serenity, composure, and focus.
These circumstances were unlike anything they had experienced or
learned with Rabbi Akiva before. Even when a person suffers terrible anguish
and great misfortunes befall him, he is still a living, breathing human being,
beyond the suffering and the misfortune. The meaning of suffering lies in
life itself and is afforded by the living. We can thus understand and accept,
albeit with great difficulty, theodicy and the acceptance of suffering, based
on the distinction between the afflicted and the affliction and based on the
hope that redemption may be attained through suffering and from suffering.
As witnesses to the execution of Rabbi Akiva, what they experienced was the
absolute, the point of no return—a situation in which one can no longer distinguish between the man and his fate, to cease to exist. All they had learned
from their teacher up to this point about theodicy and the meaning of suffering was no longer applicable, because it pertained only to those who live in
this world—capable, in their imaginations, in their mind’s eye, of envisioning
themselves alive after having been delivered from their misfortunes. Meaning
is manifested in moral behavior, in observing the commandments and in living up to one’s obligations in a given situation. As unbearable as it may be, it
is still existence as opposed to nonexistence or to the nullification of existence
that is the result of death.
They watch him as he is executed, with admiration, profound grief,
shock at the violence of the event and the cruelty of the executioners, and
anxiety at the imminent separation and their approaching orphanhood.
Among all of these raging emotions, however, their greatest fear is that
his loss will lack meaning. As faithful students who have internalized his
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philosophy of meaning that affords value and significance to every situation and event, they turn to him with a question-cry: “Rabbi, even now?!”
Here and now, as you are being executed and are a hairsbreadth from certain
death, have you not reached the point at which all meaning is lost? Do you
even now hold fast to your principles? Do you even now accept God’s judgement? Until when?
And Rabbi Akiva, clearly, precisely, and simply, explains to his students
the meaning of his death: love. Love to the last breath! The Torah is the Torah
of love and it commands us to love God—a commandment that, under ordinary circumstances, can never be fully observed. “All my days I grieved at the
words ‘with all thy soul.’” As the sage of love, Rabbi Akiva was keenly aware of
the fact that one of the most important of the precepts of love—“And you shall
love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul and with
all your might” (Deut 6:5)—cannot be fulfilled in its entirety. Most people
will never have the chance to observe the commandment to love God “with all
your soul,” even at the time of their death. Throughout his life, he mourned
the almost certain incompleteness of his observance of the commandment to
love God. “And now that the opportunity presents itself will I not fulfil it?”
What could possibly afford more meaning, at that moment in time, his last,
the point of no return that is death? “‘With all your soul’ (Deut 6:5)—even
when your soul is taken from you!”
As the legionnaires score his flesh with iron combs to end his life in terrible agony, he accepts the yoke of heaven and teaches those around him—in
word and deed—the meaning of his death. Something is missing, however,
in this incredible exchange between Rabbi Akiva and his students, something
very basic. Rabbi Akiva chooses not to answer their question—“Even now?”—
in the simplest, most obvious way: life after death. He could have told them
that there is no question of loss of meaning because the body is merely a vessel,
and the soul returns to its source. At the most appropriate time imaginable,
he does not discuss belief in the world to come, eschewing the relatively easy
solution to the problem of meaning in his death. His emphasis is on what one
can still do in this world: to complete the commandment to love God. To his
mind, meaning must be sought in life itself and not beyond it.
Rabbi Akiva’s avoidance of the subject of life after death at such an obvious juncture becomes even more pronounced upon examining the concepts
he employs in his brief words to his students: “He said to them: ‘All my days
I grieved at the words “with all your soul [nafshekha]” (Deut 6:5)—even
when your soul [nishmatkha] is taken from you. I said: when will I have the
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opportunity to fulfil this? And now that the opportunity presents itself will I
not fulfil it?’”
The meanings associated with the words nefesh and neshamah (both
translated “soul” here) are many and varied. The following is presented as an
interpretative suggestion that need not address each and every use or inflection of these two concepts in the Bible and rabbinic literature. The basis for
the discussion will be the primary meaning of these words in the first part
of the book of Genesis and elsewhere in the Pentateuch. Genesis 2:7 reads:
“And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into
his nostrils the breath of life [nishmat hayyim]; and man became a living soul
[nefesh hayyah].” The word nefesh is used in a similar fashion with regard to
the prohibition against eating consuming blood: “Only be strong not to eat
the blood, for the blood is the life [nefesh], and you shall not eat the life with
the flesh” (Deut 12:23).
Before addressing the various homiletic interpretations of these words,
I would like to note that the term hisha’arut hanefesh [life after death; literally “remaining of the soul”] is a borrowed one, which first appears in Jewish
sources in the early Middle Ages. Earlier rabbinic sources use the term hayyei
ha’olam haba, sometimes in the sense of life after death and sometimes in other
senses. For the purposes of the present discussion, emphasis will be placed on
fulfilment of the commandment to love God “with all your soul [nafsheka],”
until the moment at which one no longer has a nefesh because it has been taken
away. The only question that interests Rabbi Akiva is “Will I fulfil it?”—What
commandment has reality presented him with that he might fulfil? And what
of the soul [neshamah] and the world to come [or hisha’arut hanefesh]? Rabbi
Akiva is wholly absorbed by “with all your soul” [bekhol nafsheka]. According to the talmudic and midrashic legends, he devotes neither thought nor
speech to the matter and conveys nothing regarding the fate of the soul that
is about to be taken from him. His immense effort focuses entirely on that
which he can do as long as he has the “breath of life” [nishmat hayyim] within
him—as long as he is a living soul [nefesh hayyah].16 With his body, he can
fully observe the commandment of love. The question of the soul and its fate
is not broached at all.
This is not the first time that Rabbi Akiva’s students are exposed to
this view, which is in fact part of a consistent method revealed on various
occasions. The most striking of these concerns Rabbi Akiva’s behavior at the
bedside of his teacher, Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, who lay dying in agony.17
His friends, Rabbi Joshua, Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, also
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present at their teacher’s bedside, rose above the moment, the pain and the
suffering, to speak of eternal life and the immortal soul: “and my master is
in this world and the next.”18 Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, frankly and
determinedly returned Rabbi Elazar to reality, with all its difficulties, as the
only place in which man can find meaning—preventing him from escaping
for even a single moment to the world of eternity and immortality. “Beloved is
suffering” here and now because of the moral opportunity it provides for true
introspection and for accepting it with love. Even at the time of his own death,
he does not want to escape the final terrible moments to reassuring descriptions of the hereafter. He finds his peace in these very moments and in the
moral challenge they present—a challenge that only life in this world can offer.
The circumstances intensify the moral dimension of fulfilling the commandment to love God. The Roman legionnaires score his flesh with iron
combs, as they torture him to death. There is of course a kind of connection—
physical contact—between the executioners and the condemned prisoner. In
their every movement, in every piece of flesh they tear from his body, they
represent the greatest possible moral depravity—their own and that of the
regime that ordered them to do such things on a mission of hatred. (My use
of the expression “mission of hatred” here, with regard to the executioners, is
meant to create a parallel to the executed sage’s mission of love and makes no
claims regarding the actual presence of hatred.) It would have been perfectly
understandable had the condemned man cursed his executioners as they tormented him, but that would have transformed the forced physical contact
into a kind of dialogue on the same plane of hatred. Rabbi Akiva manages to
isolate himself completely from the executioners, whose hold on his body is
one-sided.19 The text gives eloquent expression to the fact that the two sides
acted entirely independently: “As they were scoring his flesh with iron combs,
he accepted the yoke of heaven.”
Not only does he not curse them; he does not respond to their actions
at all—not even to cry out at the terrible pain they are inflicting on him.
There is no dialogue whatsoever between the executioners and the prisoner,
who utters neither curses nor cries nor moans. High above their low plane of
moral depravity, opposite executioners and rulers who have lost their humanity, Rabbi Akiva presents another, separate plane of moral behavior, through
which—in observing the commandment of loving God to the fullest at a time
of suffering and in the face of death—he teaches his students and future generations the connection between morality and love. This is Rabbi Akiva’s final
lesson in the philosophy of love.
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Socrates and His Companions Compared
to Rabbi Akiva and His Students
It is interesting to compare the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and his students during his execution and the conversation between Socrates and his
companions as the time approached for him to drink the cup of hemlock—
particularly with regard to the question of the immortality of the soul.20 Both
accounts stress the equanimity with which the two men accept their deaths,
in sharp contrast to the agitation of those around them. Rabbi Akiva, who
is subjected to terrible torments, accepts the yoke of heaven with composure
and devotion. His students cannot allow themselves to cry out or weep in
the face of their rabbi’s composure. Socrates’s companions burst into tears,
and he rebukes them. There too it seems as if the circumstances weigh more
heavily upon those who will be left behind than upon Socrates himself, who
remains calm until the very end. The similarity between the two stories ends,
however, at the composure with which the protagonists accept their deaths and
the behavior of those around them. The discussion of the meaning of death
and the source of Socrates’s comfort could not be more different from that of
Rabbi Akiva.
Socrates’s companions come to visit him in prison on the day of his
execution by poison. They try to convince him to escape and save his soul or
at least to ask his judges for a pardon or a reprieve. A discussion ensues, during
the course of which Socrates rejects their proposals. The event and Socrates’s
arguments are described at length in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo.
The basis of the Socratic-Platonic discussion is the dichotomy between
the mortal body and the immortal soul, whereby the body hinders the development of the soul as it sways human actions toward the satisfaction of
physical desires. Life is thus a struggle between the desires of the body and
the aspirations of the soul to join the forms—something that is possible only
after death, once the soul has departed the body. Therefore, every person, and
especially philosophers who have devoted their lives to approaching the forms
(“ideas”) and have lived the good life in practice and pursuit of knowledge,
should welcome death. One may not commit suicide, that is, separate the soul
from the body, or precipitate death, but death should not be feared when it
comes, as the world of meaning, the world of forms, lies beyond death. Those
who have nurtured their souls while still attached to their bodies—and none
more than the philosopher—will attain their ultimate goal after death. This
idea, expressed in the Phaedo and in Plato’s theory of the soul in general, laid
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the foundations for the theology of the body and the soul found in important
religious currents, particularly in the monotheistic faiths.21
The comparison between Socrates and Rabbi Akiva is important, due to
the absence of theological discourse concerning the immortality of the soul
and its significance in the description of the latter’s death. Rabbi Akiva identifies the realm of human action from birth to death as the locus of meaning.
Although Socrates ascribes great importance to human action and behavior in
this life, he finds the locus of meaning in the world beyond death, where the
soul can finally unite with the intelligible forms.
The Platonic dialogue also addresses political questions of government
and law that have no parallel in the story of Rabbi Akiva’s execution. Socrates,
a respectable Athenian citizen, is sentenced to death by a particularly large
jury, comprising five hundred and one of his city’s most prominent citizens.
He believes they were wrong to accept the accusations against him and to
reject his own defense. Nevertheless, he recognizes the legitimacy of the Athenian political and legal systems, including eventual errors in judgement, as in
his case. Rabbi Akiva’s execution, on the other hand, is carried out by a foreign
regime, illegitimate in his eyes and in the eyes of most of his countrymen,22
and his behavior intensifies and highlights the immorality of his executioners.
We are thus left with the comparison to Socrates, who chooses to comfort his companions, telling them that they should not grieve at his death
because death is not the end for the essence of man, which is the soul. The
conclusion he draws from this is a moral one:
[I]f the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her,
not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of
eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view
does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all,
the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would
have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil
together with their souls. But now . . . there is no release or salvation
from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.
(Plato, Phaedo 106–7, trans. Benjamin Jowett)

In the crux of the discussion, he seeks to prove the immortality of the
soul as compared to the body’s ephemerality and finite existence after death.
Socrates (according to Plato) presents theological/metaphysical arguments,
from which he draws moral conclusions. As noted, Rabbi Akiva could easily
have made the very same argument, yet he does not turn to theology, choosing
rather to focus entirely on the moral argument. The moral import of Socrates’s
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words pertains to the way in which one should approach death but make no
claims regarding the continued effort to hold onto life and to continue to act
in a moral fashion. The main thrust of his parting discourse is the assertion
that death is merely a passage to immortality:
[I]nasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal . . . let a man be
of good cheer about his soul, who hast cast away the pleasures and
ornaments of the body . . . and has followed after the pleasures of
knowledge in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own proper
jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility,
and truth—in these arrayed she is ready to go on her journey to the
world below, when her time comes.

Although Plato does not preach abstinence and those who satisfy the
needs of the body are not considered sinners, such actions are ultimately
meaningless—a consequence of physical existence, for as long as the soul is
attached to the body, that is, for as long as one lives. After death, the soul of
one who has lived a worthy life—of a philosopher who has nurtured his soul
by studying, helping others, and fulfilling his duties to society as a soldier or
a law-abiding citizen; of one who has told the truth and pursued justice—will
attain its rightful place in the world of forms. Such a person has nothing to
fear from death and should be prepared for it. It is these thoughts that Socrates
shares with his companions, as his own death approaches.
On the basis of these claims regarding the body, the soul, and the different meaning death holds for each of them, he comforts his companions, telling
them that that they should not grieve at the burial of his body:
[W]hen I have drunk the poison I shall leave you . . . and then he
[Crito] will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees
my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at
my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or Thus
we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only
evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil.

Socrates does not cling to life or delay drinking the poison until the last possible minute—further emphasizing the fact that his death derives its meaning
not from life itself, but from the immortality of the soul. From the moment he
comes to terms with his death, Socrates no longer values life: what is another
hour of life as compared to eternity?
It is in these few minutes that the difference between Socrates and Rabbi
Akiva lies. Rabbi Akiva refuses to cease pursuing his moral objective in this
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world for even a single instant and thus clings to the most terrible moments
of his life as if they were the greatest of treasures. Socrates believes that man
enters this world unwillingly and must strive to live in a good and fitting manner, but there is no point in clinging to life when eternity is just around the
corner. When man is about to coalesce with ultimate meaning, he can only
laugh at himself for trying to give meaning to another few moments of life.
The differences between these two positions can be summed up in the
words of Rabbi Jacob Kurshai,23 teacher of Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi—without
attempting, as he does, to resolve the dilemma that arises from the juxtaposition of the two positions or claiming that there is no problem at all: “One hour
spent in repentance and good deeds in this world is better than the whole of
life in the world to come; and one hour of satisfaction in the world to come
is better than the whole of life in this world” (Mishnah, Avot 4, 17). In the
previous Mishnah (Avot 4,16), Rabbi Jacob stresses the importance of action in
this world: “This world is like an antechamber before the next world. Prepare
yourself in the antechamber, that you might enter the banquet hall.” These
words correspond to the Socratic-Platonic view. In this Mishnah (4,17), Rabbi
Jacob maintains the distinction between this world—the world of action, in
which one must aspire to perfection through repentance and good deeds—and
the next world—the world of reward and spiritual enjoyment. There is no
equivalence between “repentance and good deeds,” which are moral objectives,
and “satisfaction,” which is spiritual fulfilment because they belong to different
worlds. Some have suggested another reading of the Mishnah: “One hour spent
in repentance and good deeds in this world is like life in the world to come.”24
It is thus up to man to choose: Rabbi Akiva decided in favor of one
hour spent in repentance and good deeds in this world, and the proposed
reading of the Mishnah concords with his view; while Socrates decided in
favor of an hour of satisfaction in the world to come. In his final words,
however, Socrates momentarily returns the moral argument to the fore,
albeit in a rather ludicrous fashion, as if the author (Plato) did not wish to
eclipse his earlier message:
[A]nd the servant went in, and remained for some time, and then
returned with the jailer carrying a cup of poison. Socrates said:
“You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall
give me directions how I am to proceed.” The man answered: “You
have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie
down, and the poison will act.” At the same time he handed the
cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without
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the least fear or change of color or feature, looking at the man with
all his eyes . . . and said: “What do you say about making a libation
out of this cup to any god? May I, or not?” The man answered:
“We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough.”
“I understand,” he said: “yet I may and must pray to the gods to
prosper my journey from this to that other world—may this, then,
which is my prayer, be granted to me.” Then holding the cup to his
lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. . . . He
was beginning to grow cold . . . when he uncovered his face, for he
had covered himself up, and said (they were his last words)—he
said: “Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay
the debt?” (Plato, Phaedo 117–18)

Three statements link Socrates’s death and the departure of his soul to
the divine. The first—his enquiry (whether serious, humorous, or ironic)
about poring a libation to the gods from his cup of poison. They are immortal,
so the poison would not harm them. It would provoke the death of his body
but, at the same time, would link his soul to the eternal, that is, to the gods.
This is perhaps the serious dimension of Socrates’s question: is it fitting to
pour a libation to the gods from the cup of poison that will cause the death
of his body and the passage of his soul to the realm of eternity? The representative of the authorities, the jailer responsible for carrying out the sentence,
does not allow himself to be dragged into philosophical/theological questions,
but responds matter-of-factly that the cup contains just enough poison to kill
the condemned. Socrates therefore makes do with a prayer for the felicitous
departure of his soul from this world to the realm of the souls. This is his second statement. Both the attempt to pour a libation and the prayer are meant
to propitiate the gods and receive their blessing and assistance for a successful
passage of the soul to the next world. Socrates’s prayer, therefore, cannot be
compared to Rabbi Akiva’s recitation of the Shema, which is nether prayer
nor supplication but acceptance of the yoke of heaven and utmost fulfilment
of the commandment to love God.25 Socrates petitions the gods for his own
sake, while Rabbi Akiva observes God’s commandments out of love, asking for
nothing in return.
Socrates uttered his third statement shortly before his soul departed: “I
owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?”—as if to say, “I
am going on a journey to eternity with the good deeds I have accrued for my
soul in my lifetime. You who continue to live still have a moral obligation.” The
cock in question was a thanksgiving offering to Asclepius, Greek and Roman
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god of healing, customarily brought by those who had enjoyed a healthy life.
In this context one might say, despite the irreverence in the comparison, that
Socrates too gave up his soul with an affirmation of his connection to the
divine. Once again, however, Socrates’s prayer is an expression of gratitude to
the god for a physical benefit received rather than the disinterested fulfilment
of an obligation. All attempts at comparison between the two cases are necessarily superficial. As noted above, there is a fundamental difference between
Socrates’s conversation with his companions and the exchange between Rabbi
Akiva and his students. For Socrates, the source of meaning is the immortality
of the soul—its journey and fate as it leaves the body after death. For Rabbi
Akiva, on the other hand, it is the moral challenge in this world, within life
itself, that constitutes meaning.
Love to the Last Breath
In his usual fashion, Rabbi Akiva does not focus on the theory of moral behavior, but on its practice. He often acts first and only then explains his action.
For example, when one of his students was absent from the study hall for a
time, he went to visit him and discovered that he was gravely ill. He cared for
him with great devotion, washing and nursing him back to health—thereby
saving his life. Only when the student had fully recovered did Rabbi Akiva pass
from practice to theory (or to formulating the theory behind the appropriate
action), teaching that one who does not visit the sick it is as if he has shed
blood.26 On other occasions as well, he combined action with teaching. So too
in his final lesson in the philosophy of love—on the complete fulfilment of the
commandment to love God—he incorporates both theory and practice: “He
accepted the yoke of heaven . . . He drew out [the word] ‘one’ [ehad] until his
soul departed with ‘one.’” He actively fulfils the commandment as he explains
its theoretical basis to his students: “All my days I grieved at the words ‘with
all your soul [nafshekha]’—even when your soul [nishmatkha] is taken from
you. I said: when will I have the opportunity to fulfil this? And now that the
opportunity presents itself will I not fulfil it?”
As explained above, the way in which nafshekha is interpreted in relation to nishmatkha affects our understanding of Rabbi Akiva’s words. The
two words may, of course, simply be seen as synonyms and no more. Such
an approach is certainly legitimate, but would be inconsistent with the many
varied meanings afforded by the midrash to such words as nefesh, neshamah,
ruah. As we have already seen, both words appear in Genesis 2:7: “And the
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Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life [nishmat hayyim]; and man became a living soul [nefesh
hayyah].” According to the plain meaning of the verses in Genesis, as well as
their midrashic interpretation,27 the man had a “soul” [nefesh] when he was
first created—“of the dust of the ground.”
Similarly, the blood of a slaughtered animal is equated with the nefesh,
in Deuteronomy 12:23: “for the blood is the life [nefesh], and you shall not
eat the life with the flesh.” When the “breath of life” [nishmat hayyim] was
breathed into the man, he became a “living soul” [nefesh hayyah]. The nefesh
thus pertains to earthly existence—“from below” in the words of the midrash;
the life-giving neshamah is “from above—”28 When Rabbi Akiva speaks of fulfilling the commandment to love God, bekhol nafshekah [“with all your soul”],
he is referring to the act performed with the physical body, the nefesh—that is,
with one’s blood—and that is, why it pertains to life in this world. The neshamah enables the act by virtue of the life it gives the body and the nefesh, and
Rabbi Akiva fulfils the commandment bekhol nafsho—with all his nefesh—
until it is utterly exhausted with the departure of the neshamah.
He accepts the yoke of heaven, reads the Shema, and draws out the word
ehad [one], and the completion of the commandment merges with the departure of his soul—thereby actively fulfilling the verse “and you shall love the
Lord your God . . . with all your nefesh—even when your neshamah is taken
from you.” At that very moment, his neshamah—his “breath of life”—is taken,
as he completes the commandment to accept the yoke of heaven and the commandment to love God with his body and his nefesh.
“He drew out [the word] ‘one’ [ehad] until his soul departed with ‘one.’”
With all the strength in his body, with all the force of his nefesh, with immeasurable love of God, he devotes his final breath to “one.” “And you shall love
the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your nefesh, and with all
your might”—love to the last breath.
Notes
1. BT Sanhedrin 38b and parallel sources.
2. Pesikta Zutarta (Lekah Tov) on Ruth, introduction.
3. BT Hagigah 13a; Ben Sira 3:21.
4. Accounts of the Martyrs (not necessarily ten) can be found in the following talmudic
sources: BT Bava Batra 10b, Sotah 48b, Berakhot 61b, Avodah Zarah 8b, and Sanhedrin
14b. The deaths of Rabbi Simeon ben Gamaliel and Rabbi Ishmael are also described in
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tractate Semahot, chapter 5. The story of the Ten Martyrs comes from Lamentations Rabbah 2; it is also mentioned in the Epistle of Sherira Gaon. Its prominent place in cultural
consciousness, however, derives from the kinah [lament] of the Ten Martyrs, recited in
many communities on the Ninth of Av and/or on the Day of Atonement.
5. J. D. Eisenstein, Ozar Midrashim, s.v. “Asarah harugei malkhut,” vol. 2, 440.
6. Ibid.
7. Berakhot 61b.
8. Minor Tractates, Semahot, 8, 12.
9. Compare the words of Rabbi Akiva: “He is severe with the righteous, and calls them to
account in this world for their few evil deeds, that he might lavish happiness and abundant reward upon them in the world to come” (Genesis Rabbah 33,1). Similarly, Rabbi
Akiva’s statement, “Dear is suffering” (BT Sanhedrin 101a–b); see also below.
10. Semahot, 8, 12.
11. Berakhot 61b; Yalkut Shimoni, Va’ethanan.
12. Mekhilta, ed. M. Friedmann, 33a.
13. See also the exchange between R. Jose ben Kisma and R. Hanina ben Teradion in BT
Avodah Zarah 18a.
14. JT Hagigah 2,1.
15. Quoted in Eisenstein, Ozar Midrashim, vol. 2, 441–42.
16. For midrashim that support the interpretation of nefesh and neshamah in this vein, see
Genesis Rabbah, Bereshit 12 and 14.
17. BT Sanhedrin 101a and parallel sources.
18. Both this and the following quote are from Sanhedrin 101a.
19. The prisoner’s isolation from his executioners invites the comparison to martyrs in
other cultures and to the philosophy of nonviolence.
20. Plato, Phaedo, 58–118.
21. There are many comparisons between the death of Jesus and the death of Socrates.
See, for example, Emily Wilson, The Death of Socrates: Hero, Villain, Chatterbox, Saint
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 141–68.
22. R. Jose ben Kisma’s statement, “Hanina, my brother, do you not know that this
nation was appointed by heaven to rule?” (BT Avodah Zarah 18a), should not be seen
as affording political or moral legitimacy to Roman rule, even in the speaker’s opinion.
Rome has served as a symbol of anti-Jewish hatred from ancient times up to the modern
era. Such symbolic references to Rome abound in Jewish literature throughout the ages.
23. Some ascribe this dictum to Rabbi Akiva, although parallel sources offer no support
for this view.
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24. See Avigdor Shinan, Pirkei Avot: Perush Yisre’eli hadash (Jerusalem: Yediot Aharonot,
2009), 162.
25. There is no contradiction between this assertion and the talmudic account whereby “a
heavenly voice said: ‘Fortunate are you, Rabbi Akiva, for you are summoned to the next
world’” (BT Berakhot 61b), as this was not in response to a prayer or request by Rabbi
Akiva himself.
26. BT Nedarim 40a.
27. Genesis Rabbah, Bereshit 12.
28. Ibid.

Heaven on Earth: The World to Come
and Its (Dis)locations
Christine Hayes
INTRODUCTION
Ancient Jewish sources from the Bible to the Talmud contain a dizzying array
of ideas about a better life or world to come that features proximity to or dwelling with the divine—be it a personal life after death, a messianic period in
ordinary historical time, or an eschatological era when the world as we know it
is brought to a crashing end by God and an entirely new world order is established. Rather than explore any one of these ideas in detail, this essay focuses on
a question that occupied proponents of all three conceptions: can the world to
come—however it is imagined—be experienced, even if briefly, in this world?
If so, what might that experience look like, and how might it be attained?
To be sure, some ancient Jewish sources imagine a deep disjunction
between this world and the world to come. Take for example, the following
Talmudic teachings. The first is attributed to the third century c.e. Palestinian
sage, R. Yoh>anan:
b. Berakhot 34b
R. H˘iyya b. Abba also said in the name of R. Yoh>anan: All the
prophets prophesied about the days of the Messiah only, but as for
the world to come, “No eye has seen, O God, but You, Who act for
those that trust in You” (Isa 64:3).

R. Yoh>anan distinguishes here between the messianic age and the world to
come and states that all of the biblical prophets’ promises of a future ideal time
referred not to the world to come, but to a time in the course of human history
when a king anointed by God (a messiah) would once again reign in Israel.
Regarding the world to come, no human has ever seen what awaits us there,
not even the prophets. It is a world and a time completely apart.
A second tradition, attributed to the third century c.e. sage Rav, imagines what the world to come will be like, but does so in a way that only serves
to underscore the disjunction between that world and this one:
b. Berakhot 17a
A favorite saying of Rav was: The world to come is not like
this world.1 In the world to come there is no eating or drinking
69
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or propagation or business or jealousy or hatred or competition,
but the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads feasting on
the splendor of the shekinah [divine presence], as it says, “And they
beheld Elohim, and ate and drank” (Exod 24:11).

For Rav, this world and the world to come are not alike, but radically disjunctive. In this world, our material bodies are engaged in eating and drinking
and propagating; we sustain ourselves in business in competition with others,
which engenders jealousy and hatred. But in the world to come, when we are
free of material bodies of flesh and blood, none of these elements is present,
and the righteous will be sustained by the splendor of the divine presence.
Now if this world and the world to come are such distinct and disjunctive
realities, we might conclude that entry into the world to come requires a complete escape from the present world—through temporary elevations out of this
world or permanently, through death.
But according to some ancient Jewish sources, this world and the world
to come are not so radically disjunctive. I refer not only to sources, such as b.
Ketubot 111b, that assume there is plenty of eating and drinking in the afterlife, but to sources that posit certain points, or loci, of conjunction between
this world and the world to come. Take for example, this anonymous tradition, also from b. Berakhot:
b. Berakhot 57b
Five things are a sixtieth part [of something else]: namely,
fire, honey, Sabbath, sleep and a dream. Fire is one-sixtieth part of
Gehinnom. Honey is one-sixtieth part of manna. Sabbath is one-
sixtieth part of the world to come. Sleep is one-sixtieth part of death.
A dream is one-sixtieth part of prophecy.

According to this text, the experience of the Sabbath anticipates in some
way the experience of the world to come. If one may employ the shorthand
of “heaven” for this ideal world to come, then according to this tradition, the
Sabbath is a temporal point of conjunction—a meeting in time—that establishes a little piece of heaven on earth.
This essay explores the diverse ways in which different groups of ancient
Jews understood the relationship between this world and some version of
an ideal world to come. Some will assume an absolute disjunction between
the two. The disjunctive approach declares that no experience in this world
anticipates the experience of the next world. In fact, it is foolish or even dangerous to occupy oneself with such matters. But many others assume some
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point of connection or conjunction between the two worlds. This conjunctive approach takes two distinct forms. First, some ancient Jews who believed
in the conjunction of these worlds sought to identify or create a bridge that
would carry them from this world to the ideal world, certainly in death, but
perhaps also in moments of transcendence that elevate one out of this life.
There is a second approach, however, to experiencing the conjunction of this
world and the world to come that moves in the other direction. Some ancient
Jews sought not to escape the realities of this world, to travel from this world
to the ideal world beyond this one, but to experience “heaven on earth.”
Convinced that this world and the world to come are not radically divorced
from one another, these ancient Jews, particularly the talmudic rabbis, applied
themselves to the task of obtaining a foretaste of the world to come while in
this world by bringing the world to come into this world.
Ancient Jews developed their ideas in conversation with both the
Hebrew Bible and the intellectual currents and belief systems in their immediate cultural environment. We begin, then, with a brief overview of the relevant
biblical sources before moving on to Second Temple period Jewish writings
from the third century b.c.e. to the first century c.e., the centuries just prior
to the rise of the talmudic rabbis. These Second Temple sources emphasize a
movement from this world to another, ideal world. We will then turn to classical talmudic literature and examine the strategies employed by the rabbis for
moving in the opposite direction and locating heaven on earth.
BIBLICAL SOURCES ON THIS WORLD
AND THE WORLD TO COME
There is no clearly articulated notion of a world to come in the Pentateuch,
no promise of immortality, no life with God and celestial beings after death.
In fact, the Garden of Eden story in Genesis 2–3 makes it clear that humans
traded immortality for free will. While a few biblical stories refer to a shadowy
region below the earth, Sheol (see for example Gen 42:38, Prov 7:27, Job
10:21–22 and 17:16), to which the life force [nefesh] of the deceased descends,
this is not a robust concept of a world to come.
What we do find in the Hebrew Bible—and this is more relevant to
the central concern of this essay—is the basic idea of two realms: the earthly
realm is the abode of humans and the heavenly realm is the abode of God.
And so we may ask: do biblical sources understand there to be a radical
disjunction between the abode of humans (the earth) and the abode of the
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divine (heaven)? Or are their times, places, and experiences in which the two
realms—the human and the divine—are conjoined, creating the possibility for
some kind of shared experience or coexistence that might anticipate a future
world to come?
In the Bible, the meeting or conjunction of heaven and earth occurs
along three axes: the temporal, the covenantal, and the spatial. The first that
we encounter is the temporal axis. At the creation, God sets apart one time—
a day of the week—as a holy day of rest (Gen 2:1–3). Israel is enjoined to
observe this Sabbath day in imitation of God (Exod 20:8–10) and as an everlasting covenant between God and Israel (Exod 31:16):
Exodus 31:15–17
Six days may work be done, but on the seventh day there shall
be a Sabbath of complete rest, holy to Yahweh; whoever does work
on the Sabbath day shall be put to death. The Israelite people shall
keep the Sabbath, observing the Sabbath throughout the ages as a
covenant for all time. It shall be a sign for all time between Me and
the people of Israel. For in six days Yahweh made heaven and earth,
and on the seventh day He ceased from work and was refreshed.

In Leviticus 23:3, the Sabbath heads the list of appointed times, or festivals,
that are holy to God and that are to be observed as holy by Israel. Thus
the temporal conjunction of heaven and earth occurs in Israel’s calendar
observance.
The second axis along which heaven and earth are conjoined is the covenantal axis. The two realms meet in the giving and receiving of the Torah that
establishes the covenant between God and Israel. The Torah contains divine
instruction or wisdom; obedience to its terms is a requirement for those who
would live with God in his holy Land: “You shall faithfully observe all My laws
and all My regulations, lest the Land to which I bring you to settle in spew you
out” (Lev 20:22). By accepting this divine instruction and obeying the terms
of the covenant, Israel secures God’s protective presence in her midst.
Third, there is a spatial dimension to the conjunction of heaven and
earth—the sanctuary. Exodus 25:8 is explicit on this point. God says, “And
let them make Me a sanctuary that I may dwell among them.” When the
Israelites construct the sanctuary according to the divine direction, God’s
presence descends and fills the sanctuary. And in fact, the sanctuary is referred
to as the tent of meeting because it was there that God would meet and converse with Moses.
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In short, the Bible envisages three ways in which a piece of heaven may
be found on earth: through the covenant or Torah that conveys divine instruction and enables the Israelites to dwell in God’s Land, through sacred time
(i.e., the Sabbath and other sacred times of the calendar), and through sacred
space (the sanctuary or tent of meeting and of course eventually the Jerusalem
Temple where the divine and human realms meet).
We turn now to the literature of the Second Temple period. Do these
texts see the earthly realm and the divine realm as disjunctive or conjunctive?
If conjunctive, how do they understand and depict the three axes of that conjunctive relationship: the covenantal or Torah axis, the temporal or calendar
axis, and the spatial or sanctuary axis?
SECOND TEMPLE LITERATURE
We begin with the covenantal axis of the conjunction of the divine and human
realms. Some Second Temple writings continue the biblical portrayal of the
divinely revealed Torah as a body of divine wisdom given over to the people
of Israel, and therefore a piece of heaven on earth. Thus, chapter 24 of the
book of Sirach from the second century b.c.e. relates the journey of divine
wisdom, wandering throughout all of creation and all nations in search of a
resting place until, in the course of time, she came to dwell in Israel as the
Torah. Wisdom says:
24:3 “I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and like a
mist I covered the earth.
...
24:5 A circle of sky I encircled alone, and in the deep of abysses
I walked.
24:6 In the waves of the sea and in all the earth and in every
people and nation I led.
24:7 With all these I sought repose, and in whose inheritance I
would settle.
24:8 Then the creator of all commanded me, and he who created me put down my tent and said, ‘Encamp in Jacob, and in Israel
let your inheritance be.’
24:9 Before the age, from the beginning, he created me, and
until the age I will never fail.
24:10 In a holy tent I ministered before him, and thus in Zion
I was firmly set.
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24:11 In a beloved city as well he put me down, and in Jerusalem was my authority.
24:12 And I took root among a glorified people, in the portion
of the Lord is my inheritance.”
...
24:23 All these things are the book of the covenant of the Most
High God, a law that Moses commanded us, a heritage for the gatherings of Jacob.2

Wisdom permeated the cosmos and enjoyed a possession within each
nation, and yet in due time she was instructed by God to set down her tent in
Jacob and to dwell permanently in Zion, or Jerusalem. Verse 23 makes it clear
that this Wisdom—this portion of Yahweh—is none other than “the book
of the covenant of the Most High God, a law that Moses commanded us, a
heritage for the gatherings of Jacob” (v. 23). The Torah is clearly viewed here as
divine wisdom sent from on high to abide in Israel, a piece of heaven on earth.
At the same time, however, the Torah is described in spatial terms—it has a
holy tent, it encamps in the beloved city. By means of these spatial metaphors,
Torah and Temple are blended into a single image of heaven on earth spatially
located at the heart of the Jewish nation.
Other Second Temple texts, however, take a very different position,
despairing of the possibility of experiencing heaven on earth. While these
texts maintain a belief in and even a desperate yearning for the conjunction of
the divine and human realms, they indicate that accessing the divine requires
an ascent from the earthly realm to the divine realm where one can discover
hidden divine wisdom unavailable on earth. The germ of this idea is found
in Deuteronomy 29:28: “The secret things belong to Yahweh our God; but
the things that are revealed belong to us and our children forever, that we
may observe all the words of this Law.” In this verse, Moses draws a distinction between the exoteric revelation—the words of the Law or Torah given
at Sinai—and esoteric matters (“the secret things”) that were not revealed
and belong only to God. Certainly, some texts from this period, such as Sirach 3:21–24, warn against dabbling in the hidden and esoteric wisdom that
remains with God in heaven (“Things too difficult for you do not seek . . .
the things that have been prescribed for you, think about these, for you have
no need of hidden matters”),3 but others are drawn to it. For if the exoteric
Torah of Moses is only part of the divine wisdom, the part needed for life in
this world, then the hidden or esoteric wisdom that remains in heaven must
hold the key to life in the world to come.
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The desire to gain access to this wisdom that was not revealed is evident
in 1 Enoch, an unusual, composite work dating to the centuries before the
Common Era. Like Sirach, 1 Enoch contains a narrative of Wisdom’s search for
an abode, but the morals of the two stories couldn’t be more different. As we
saw, Sirach depicted the universal divine Wisdom emerging from heaven, wandering throughout the earth, and eventually establishing residence on earth
in the form of Israel’s Torah. 1 Enoch relates Wisdom’s story quite differently:
42:1) Wisdom did not find a place where she might dwell, so her
dwelling was in the heavens.
(2) Wisdom went forth to dwell among the sons of men, but
she did not find a dwelling. Wisdom returned to her place, and sat
down in the midst of the angels.4

According to 1 Enoch, Wisdom searched for a home among humankind, but finding no dwelling place on earth was forced to retire to heaven,
where she dwells among the angels. In Sirach, Wisdom takes the form of the
exoteric Torah, but the Wisdom spoken of in 1 Enoch is the esoteric wisdom
not revealed at Sinai. How then is humankind to learn of this esoteric divine
Wisdom that resides only in heaven? The book tells us: the secret treasures of
divine Wisdom were made known to one righteous individual, Enoch, not
through an act of revelation from heaven to earth (as in Sirach), but through
a movement in the opposite direction. Enoch was taken up from the earth; he
ascended to heaven where he was shown the secret divine Wisdom that resides
there and can be accessed only there. His visions were recorded in a book, 1
Enoch, and that book was transmitted to a select community of readers who
alone possess the esoteric wisdom.
And what is this esoteric divine wisdom? According to 1 Enoch, the esoteric divine wisdom that was not revealed at Sinai and can be experienced only
in heaven, has a temporal and to some extent a spatial content. 1 Enoch claims
that upon his ascent, Uriel, the angel in charge of all luminaries, guided Enoch
through the celestial sphere and revealed to him the “heavenly secrets,” that is,
the secret laws that govern the movement of the heavenly bodies (1 Enoch 72:1,
74:2, etc.) and determine the true 52-week, 365-day calendar (1 Enoch 74:12,
75:3). Uriel explains that this calendar, established at the time of creation, is
observed by the divine beings in heaven, and noncompliance with the calendar
by those on earth is a sinful breach of God’s commands to the cosmos (78:10,
79:6, 80:1, and 82:7).5 By obeying this divine calendar, humans participate in
the temporal rhythms of a supramundane or heavenly realm. Esoteric wisdom
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has a second specific content in 1 Enoch that is spatial. During his tour, Enoch
is given esoteric knowledge not only of astronomical and calendrical matters
but also of the heavenly palaces awaiting the holy and elect (41:1–2).6
We noted earlier that the Bible envisages the conjunction of heaven and
earth along three axes: the covenantal (or Torah-based) axis, the temporal (or
Sabbath-and calendar-based) axis, and the spatial (or sanctuary-based) axis. To
be specific, the divine presence is experienced in the mundane realm by virtue
of the exoteric Torah delivered from heaven; it is experienced in mundane time
by virtue of the Sabbath and festivals; and it is experienced in mundane space
by virtue of the sanctuary. 1 Enoch continues these three axes but where the
Bible locates each in this world, 1 Enoch takes them out of this world altogether
and locates them firmly in heaven in an esoteric, heavenly Torah and in supramundane time and space. It is only by accessing the secret and esoteric Torah
that one can observe the Sabbath at the correct time and in synchrony with the
angels who observe it in heaven. And it is only by accessing this esoteric Torah
that one can adopt the behaviors of purity, praise, and obedience required of
those who hope to reside, like the angels, in the heavenly sanctuary. In 1 Enoch,
the covenantal, temporal, and spatial dimensions of the conjunction of heaven
and earth remain intact but are lifted out of this world and placed in the heavens, accessible only to those who gain entry to that realm.
RABBINIC LITERATURE
We turn now to rabbinic sources. Some rabbinic sources view this world and
the next, or the earthly and heavenly realms, as disjunctive rather than conjunctive and, like Sirach, warn against dabbling in esoteric knowledge of the
world beyond this one. For example:
m. H˘agigah 2:1
The laws of sexual immorality may not be expounded in the
company of three persons, nor the account of Creation [i.e., cosmogony] [be expounded] before two persons, nor the account of the
Chariot [i.e., esoteric teachings about the divine] before one person
unless he is a sage and understands on his own. Whoever reflects on
four matters—it would be better for him had he not come into the
world: What is above? What is below? What is ahead and what is
behind?7

However, many more rabbinic texts assume some kind of conjunction
between the divine and human realms. Some of these sources continue the
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Second Temple focus on heaven, seeking to escape this world in order to experience heaven. But in other rabbinic sources, we see a reassertion of the biblical
model that moves in the opposite direction and brings heaven down to earth.
Consider the following traditions:
m. Avot 4:15 (following Kaufman ms):
R. Jacob said, “This world is like a vestibule to the world to
come; prepare yourself in the vestibule that you may enter into the
banqueting hall.”
He used to say, “Better is one hour of repentance and good
deeds in this world than the whole life of the world to come; and
better is one hour of bliss [qorat ruah>] in the world to come than all
the life of this world.”

According to R. Jacob, this life is a preparation or perhaps a dress rehearsal
for the world to come. Just as the noise, sights, sounds, and smells of the festivities of the banquet hall can be perceived from the vestibule, so too heaven
spills over into this world, providing a foretaste and creating anticipation. R.
Jacob’s second statement contains a three-way comparison that rates one hour
of bliss in the world to come above all of the life of this world (unremarkably
enough) except for repentance and good deeds; one hour of the latter is better
than the whole life of the world to come (remarkably enough). This second
statement is more radical than the first. Its claim is not that this world offers
glimpses of the world to come but rather that by performing acts of repentance
and good deeds in this world, the experience of the world to come is not only
anticipated but also outperformed in this world.
The idea in R. Jacob’s first teaching—that heaven’s pleasures are experienced in some small or attenuated way in this world—is also found in traditions that describe activities in this world [olam ha-zeh] that will continue in
the next world [olam ha-ba]:
b. Sanhedrin 91b
R Joshua b. Levi also said: Whoever utters song [of praise to
God] in this world shall be privileged to do so in the next world
too, as it is written, “Happy are those who dwell in your house: they
forever praise you. Selah” (Ps 84:5).8
b. Sanhedrin 92a
R. Sheshet said: Whoever teaches the Torah in this world will
be privileged to teach it in the next, as it is written, “And he who
satisfies others shall himself be sated” (Prov 11:25). . . .
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R. Eleazar said: Every leader who leads the community with
mildness will be privileged to lead them in the next world [too], as
it is written, “for he who loves them will lead them; he will guide
them to springs of water” (Isa 49:10).

While these passages speak of reward for good deeds in this world, the
reward is the continuation of the deed in the next world. Thus, singing God’s
praise, teaching Torah, and leading the community are among the common
activities engaged in every day that afford an experience of the next world.
Unlike the Second Temple sources that envisage a movement out of
this world in order to enter the heavenly realm, many rabbinic sources seek
to locate heaven on earth. They do so along the three axes we have identified thus far—the covenantal, the temporal, and the spatial. Moreover, the
heightened rhetoric of the rabbinic sources suggests that the rabbis knew
that in seeking to transform rather than transcend this world, they were
swimming against a tide.
We consider first the covenantal axis. The rabbis reassert the biblical
depiction of the Torah as divine instruction given over to Israel and found
on earth, but with a twist. In some rabbinic sources, Moses must forcibly
wrest the Torah from heaven in a dramatic move that arouses the jealousy of
the angels, who believe it belongs in heaven.9 See, for example, the following
midrash in which God has to disguise Moses to prevent the angels’ attack:
Exodus Rabbah 28:1
“And Moses went up to God” (Exod 19:3). It is written “You
have ascended on high, you have led captivity captive” (Ps 68:19).
What is the meaning of “You have ascended on high”? It means
you (Moses) have been exalted because you wrestled with angels on
high. . . . At that moment, the angels wanted to attack Moses, but
God changed the features of Moses to resemble those of Abraham
and said to the angels: “Are you not ashamed to touch this man to
whom you descended [from heaven] and in whose house you ate?”

Later in the same midrashic work, God prepares an escape tunnel as the raging
angels come after Moses to destroy him:
Exodus Rabbah 42:4
R. Isaac said: When God said to Moses, “Go, get down” (Exod
32:7), Moses’ face darkened so that he became like a blind man on
account of his many troubles and did not know which way to go
down. The angels sought to kill him, saying “Now is the time to slay
him”; but God knew the intention of the angels. What did He do?
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. . . The Lord opened unto him a window under his throne of glory
and said to him: “Go, get down” (Exod 32:7).

In several traditions, the angels articulate the reasons for their vociferous
objections to God’s plan to place heaven’s greatest treasure in the hands of
mere mortals.10 In Song of Songs Rabbah 8:11, 2, the angels fear abandonment.
Arguing that the Torah belongs in heaven with them, the angels compel God
to assure them that he will not abandon the heavens in order to be with his
Torah on earth:
Song of Songs Rabbah 8:11, 2
When the Holy One, blessed be he, announced his intention of
giving the Torah to Israel, the ministering angels said to the Holy
One, blessed be he: “Sovereign of the Universe, You are he whose
majesty is over the heaven; it is your happiness, your glory, and your
praise that the Torah should be in heaven.” He said to them: “What
does it matter to you?” They said: “Perhaps tomorrow you will cause
your divine presence to abide in the lower world.” Then the Holy
One, blessed be he, replied to them: “I will give my Torah to the
dwellers on earth but I will abide with the celestial beings. I will give
away my daughter with her marriage portion to another country in
order that she may pride herself with her husband in her beauty and
charm and be honored as befits a king’s daughter. But I will abide
with you in the upper world. . . .
R. Shimeon said in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi: Wherever
God made His law to abide, there He made His divine presence
to abide.

In the following midrash, the angels are described as coveting the Torah
for themselves:
Deuteronomy Rabbah 7:9
And should you say that I have given you the law to your
disadvantage, [know that] I have given it for your benefit, for the
ministering angels coveted it, but it was hidden from them, as it is
said “Seeing it is hidden from the eyes of all living . . . and kept close
from the flying beings of the air” (Job 28:21)—this is the angels.

Remarkably, this midrash reverses 1 Enoch’s trope of a Torah hidden in the
heavens away from humans and speaks instead of a Torah hidden from the
angels and given to humans. In a similar reversal, the next midrash asserts that
it is the angels who are unworthy of the divine Law. It is too abstruse or difficult for them and therefore God gives the Torah to humans:
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Deuteronomy Rabbah 8:2
God said to Israel: “My children, the law is too abstruse for the
ministering angels, but for you it is not too abstruse.” Whence do we
know this? From what we read [in Deut 30:11] “For this commandment which I command you this day, it is not too hard for you” [for
you, but it is too hard for ministering angels].

While the Second Temple sources examined above idealized an esoteric Torah
beyond the ken of humans and known only to the angels in heaven, this
rabbinic source idealizes the exoteric Torah as beyond the ken of angels and
known only to humans on earth.
In all of these sources, the Torah conjoins heaven and earth and does so
in this world. As for the temporal and spatial dimensions of the conjunction
of heaven and earth, here too some rabbinic sources focus on bringing heaven
down to earth. Contrary to Second Temple sources that move in the opposite
direction, it is not the heavenly calendar that is privileged. On the contrary,
the earthly calendar is privileged and sets the standard to be followed by those
residing in heaven, rather than the reverse. We see this in:
Pesiqta Rabbati piska 15 (parallels b. RoshHaShanah 8a–b, Exodus
Rabbah 15:2, Deuteronony Rabbah 2:14)
R. Hoshaya taught: When the lower court makes a decision and
declares “Today is the new year,” then the Holy One, Blessed be He,
says to the ministering angels: set up the tribunal, install the advocate, install the clerk of the court, for the lower court has decided
and made fast today and this morning is the new year!
If the witnesses are delayed or if the court reconsiders and
transfers it to the next day, says God, blessed be he, to the angels:
take down the tribunal, and the advocate and dismiss the clerk of
the court, for the lower court has made a decree saying that tomorrow should be the new year. And what is the proof? “For it is a law
for Israel, a ruling of the God of Jacob” [read by the rabbis as: For
a law in Israel is also a ruling, i.e., obligation, for the God of Israel]
(Ps 81:5)—what is not a law for Israel is also if we may say so, no
obligation for the God of Israel.
R. Pinh>as and R. Hilkiah b. R. Simon say: When all the ministering angels assemble before God and ask, “Lord of the universe,
when is the new year?” he answers them: “You’re asking me? I and
you, we should ask the lower court.” And what is the proof? “For
what great nation is there that has a god so close at hand as is the
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Lord our God whenever we call upon Him?” [read by the rabbis as:
when we make known to him (the festivals)] (Deut 4:7).

The calendar as determined by Israel on earth is the calendar to be followed in heaven and the angels align their worship with the worship of Israel,
rather than the reverse. Indeed, the power of Sabbath observance in this world
to actualize the conjunction of heaven and earth may be seen in the following
traditions:
b. Shabbat 118b
R. Yoh>anan said in the name of R. Simeon b. Yoh>ai: If Israel
were to keep two Sabbaths according to the Sabbath laws, they
would be redeemed immediately, for it is said, “Thus says the
Lord: ‘As for the eunuchs who keep my Sabbaths . . . ’ (Isa 56:4),
which is followed by, ‘I will bring them to My sacred mount, etc.’
(ibid. v, 517).”

Two properly observed Sabbaths can bring redemption, which here is likely
an indication of the world to come, since it is also said that just one Sabbath
properly observed has the power to usher in the Messianic age (Leviticus Rabbah 3:1).
Finally, we turn to the spatial dimension of the conjunction of heaven
and earth. In the Bible, of course, the spatial conjunction of heaven and earth
was concentrated in the sanctuary. It was the central sanctuary in the Jerusalem Temple that attracted and housed the Shekinah or divine presence. In the
Second Temple period sources reviewed above, the divine presence filled the
heavenly temple to which humans seek access beyond this world. For their
part, the rabbis reasserted the biblical emphasis on the central sanctuary in
Jerusalem but, again, with a twist. They lived in a post-Temple era. The sanctuary was destroyed. Where, then, was the divine presence to be experienced?
In what space and place on earth is heaven to be found?
Rabbinic sources provide two responses: the holy Land or the holy community.11 According to the first, the entire Land of Israel and not simply the
site of the Jerusalem Temple attracts and houses the Shekinah. The idea of
the divine presence in the Land was adduced by the rabbis when asserting
the importance of residing in the Land of Israel and delegitimizing Jewish
life outside the Land, as may be seen in m. Ketubbot 13:10–11 and t. Ketubbot 12:12, according to which a spouse (in some versions, husband or wife)
cannot be compelled to leave the Land but can be compelled to move to the
Land. According to t. Avodah Zarah 5:2–5 it is preferable to live in the Land
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even in a town in which the majority of the inhabitants are non-Jews than to
live outside the Land in a town in which the majority of the inhabitants are
Jews. In case the point is lost, the text goes on to explain that “dwelling in the
Land of Israel is deemed as important as fulfilling all the commandments in
the Torah” (a view repeated in Sifre Deuteronomy 80). A little further on, the
same passage stigmatizes those living in the Diaspora as comparable to those
who have renounced God altogether and interprets Leviticus 25:38 (“I am the
Lord your God, who brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, to give you
the land of Canaan, to be your God”) as saying “as long as you are in the Land
of Canaan I will be your God, but when you are not dwelling in the Land of
Canaan, it is as if I am not your God.” The passage ends with the climactic
assertion that “anyone who leaves the Land during peacetime and goes [to live]
abroad is as if he were worshiping idols,” and “Israelites who reside outside the
Land are idolaters” even when they take pains to live in accordance with God’s
laws.12 Only in the Land does one encounter the divine presence and experience a little heaven on earth.
Indeed, some texts go further. The Palestinian Talmud contains an
extended reflection on the virtue not only of residing in the Land but also of
dying in the Land. The dead in the Land will be the first to be resurrected in
the messianic age. Although God intervenes to ensure that sages who die and
are buried in exile will have a rapid underground transit to the holy Land,
Palestinian sages scorn those who seek burial in the Land after a life lived outside the Land, and the sage Ulla is depicted as lamenting the fact that he will
die in exile, with these words: “Losing the soul in the bosom of one’s mother
is not to be compared to losing the soul in the bosom of a foreign woman”
(y. Kil’ayim 9:4, 32c).13
These sources, extolling the Land of Israel as the locus of the divine
presence in a postdestruction world and indeed the point of entry to the
world to come, were not uncontested. Indeed, Isaiah Gafni argues that the
rabbis’ hyperbole concerning the Land, and their insistence on residence in
the Land, increased in intensity in the early Amoraic period, precisely in
response to an enhanced self-assuredness in Babylonia.14 And so we conclude
by considering rabbinic sources that give a different account of where, in
spatial terms, the divine presence may be found in this world. We begin with
the Babylonian Talmud.
While the Babylonian Talmud incorporates Palestinian traditions that
valorize the holy Land and residence within it, it moderates this rhetoric of
loyalty to the Land with a rhetoric of what Gafni has called “local patriotism”15
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that asserts the value of the Diaspora. The result is an often conflicted discourse, exemplified in an extensive passage at the end of Bavli tractate Ketubbot (110b–112a).16 The Gemara on this Mishnah opens with some of the
heavily pro-Land Palestinian traditions already cited and closes with other
strongly pro-Land traditions, attributed primarily to Palestinian authorities:
“The dead outside the Land will not be resurrected” (R. Eleazar); “Whoever
walks four cubits in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in the world to
come” (R. Yoh>anan); and in the most explicit statement of the Land as both
a necessary and sufficient condition for life in the world to come, R. Abbahu
is reported as saying: “Even a Canaanite bondwoman who lives in the Land
of Israel is assured of a place in the world to come.” Residence alone—even
for a non-Jewish, female slave (who, in the rabbis’ view, occupies the lowest
status before God)—suffices to secure a place in the world to come.17 The unit
ends with hyperbolic expressions of the love that certain sages feel towards the
Land; they kiss its cliffs and roll themselves in its dust.
However, these pro-Land statements serve as an envelope around dueling Babylonian and Palestinian traditions in which the status of the Holy
Land, particularly vis-à-vis Babylonia, is contested. For their part, the pro-
Babylonian voices in this dialogue subvert Palestinian claims, elevating Babylonia to a status that is sometimes second, sometimes equal, and sometimes
superior to that of the holy Land18 and asserting that the divine presence, or
Shekinah, is found in Babylonia.
Taking advantage of a Tannaitic tradition that states that the Shekinah
accompanies the Israelites wherever they are exiled, Abaye and Rava and even
some Palestinian authorities teach in b. Megillah 29a that the Shekinah is currently in Babylonia, in certain synagogues and houses of learning. Indeed, this
is said to be the meaning of Ezekiel 11:16, “I have been to them a small sanctuary.” According to Midrash Tanh>uma Noah 3, the superiority of the Babylonian yeshivot that were transferred to Babylonia from Jerusalem after the first
destruction is attributed to the fact that they never saw captivity or persecution
or despoilment and were never ruled by Greece or Rome, but dwelled securely
in Babylonia with their Torah since the first destruction. In short, the Palestinians may have the Land, but the Babylonians have the Shekinah, synagogues
and study houses, and the relatively safe and secure conditions needed for
Torah learning to thrive.
Related to this idea of the attachment of the Shekinah to yeshivot is the
rabbis’ second response to the problem of the location of the divine presence
after the destruction of the Temple: the Shekinah is connected not to a specific
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geographic location, such as the Land of Israel or Babylonia, but to righteous
individuals wherever they might be. Hence we read:
Numbers Rabbah Naso 13, 2
When the Tabernacle was erected Israel said: “Let my beloved
come into his garden” (Song 4:16). . . . He [the Holy One, blessed
be He] sent word to them through Moses, saying, “Why do you
fear? I have already, ‘Come into my garden, my sister, my bride!’”
(Song 5:1).
R. Ishmael son of R. Yosi said: It does not say in this text, “I am
come into the garden” but “I am come into my garden” (Song
5:1)—this means, into My bridal chamber; namely, into the place
which has been My principal abode from the very beginning, for was
not the principal abode of the shekinah in the terrestrial regions [i.e.,
on earth]?
When Adam sinned, the shekinah withdrew to the first sky;
when Cain sinned, it withdrew to the second sky; when the generation of Enosh sinned, it ascended to the third sky; when the
generation of the Flood sinned, it rose to the fourth sky; when the
generation of the Dispersion sinned [at the time of the Tower of
Babel], it moved up into the fifth sky; when the Sodomites sinned,
it rose into the sixth sky, and when the Egyptians sinned, it ascended
into the seventh sky. As a counterpart to these, seven righteous men
arose who brought the shekinah down from the celestial to the terrestrial regions. They were the following: Abraham brought it down
from the seventh to the sixth; Isaac brought it down from the sixth
to the fifth; Jacob brought it down from the fifth to the fourth; Levi
brought it down from the fourth to the third; Kohat brought it
down from the third to the second; Amram brought it down from
the second to the first; and Moses brought it down from the celestial
to the terrestrial region. . . .
The wicked caused the shekinah to depart from the earth, but
the righteous have caused the shekinah to dwell on the earth.

How different this text is from the Second Temple sources reviewed
above. In the narratives related in Sirach and 1 Enoch, divine Wisdom was
portrayed as descending from heaven and seeking a home in the earth (successfully in Sirach but unsuccessfully in 1 Enoch). By contrast, in this rabbinic
narrative the direction of the movement of the divine element is reversed!
The original home and principal abode of the Shekinah, or divine presence,
is not in the heavens but on earth. In the beginning, the Shekinah dwelled on
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earth. But human wickedness caused the Shekinah to retreat to the heavens,
implying that when the Shekinah is in heaven it is in exile. The Shekinah is
redeemed, however, brought back to its rightful abode on earth by the actions
of the righteous. Thus, beginning with Abraham, the Shekinah began the
return journey until finally, with the construction of the sanctuary by the
Israelites, it was safely home.
This text both affirms and undermines the importance of the sanctuary
as the site of the spatial conjunction of heaven and earth. Although the passage
ends with the Shekinah’s descent into the sanctuary, it makes clear that the
earth as a whole is the dwelling place of the Shekinah, not just the sanctuary.
Moreover, it ties the Shekinah’s presence or absence to human morality.
Other texts go further in explicitly connecting the Shekinah to communities or to individuals who are righteous. In b. Megillah 29a we read that the
Shekinah leaves the Holy Land and goes into exile with the people,19 choosing
Israel the people over Israel the Land, an idea found already in the book of
Ezekiel. While according to some texts, the Shekinah plays favorites, attaching
only to persons of good lineage (b. Qiddushin 70b) or certain personal qualities
(b. Shabbat 92a), other texts focus on the activities that draw the Shekinah. As
might be expected, the Shekinah is said to be found in synagogues and houses
of learning (b. Megillah 29a), but also:
b. Berakhot 6a
Rabin b. R. Adda says in the name of R. Isaac: How do you
know that the Holy One, blessed be He, is to be found in the
synagogue? Because it is said, “God stands in the divine assembly”
(Ps 82:1). And how do you know that if ten people pray together
the shekinah is with them? Because it is said, “God stands in the
divine assembly” (Ps 82:1). And how do you know that if three
are sitting as a court of judges the shekinah is with them? Because
it is said, “among the divine beings He pronounces judgment”
(Ps 82:1). And how do you know that if two are sitting and studying the Torah together the shekinah is with them? Because it is
said, “In this vein have those who revere the Lord been talking
to one another. The Lord has heard and noted it, and a scroll of
remembrance has been written at His behest concerning those
who revere the Lord and esteem His name” (Mal 3:1). . . . And
how do you know that even if one man sits and studies the Torah
the shekinah is with him? Because it is said, “In every place where
I cause My name to be mentioned, I will come to you and bless
you” (Exod 20:21).
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b. Bava Batra 10a
If a man gives even the smallest coin to a beggar, he is deemed
worthy to receive the shekinah.
b. Menah>ot 43b
R. Simeon b. Yoh>ai says, “Whosoever is scrupulous in the
observance of this precept [tsitsit, the wearing of fringes] is worthy
to receive the shekinah.”

These and other sources teach that wherever prayer, judging, Torah
study, ritual observance, hospitality, kindness, and other benevolent deeds
occur, there too the Shekinah is to be found. The actions and activities of
humans create a space in the mundane world into which the Shekinah enters,
thereby actualizing the conjunction of worlds and locating heaven on earth.
CONCLUSION
Ancient Jews prior to the rise of Islam did more than imagine a better world
to come. They sought not only to gain access to it after death but to experience it, even if fleetingly, while yet living. To do so they identified points of
conjunction between heaven and earth along three axes: a covenantal axis
centering on Torah or wisdom as the bridge between the two, a temporal axis
centering on the Sabbath and festivals as the bridge between the two, and a
spatial axis centering on the sanctuary or other holy sites as the bridge between
the two. While some Second Temple Jews privileged the esoteric Torah hidden in heaven, the Sabbath and festivals as observed in heaven, and the pure
sanctuary in heaven as sites for accessing an experience of the next world, a
set of texts within rabbinic literature pushed against this trend. Privileging the
exoteric Torah given over to Israel on earth, the Sabbath as determined and
observed on earth, and earthbound spaces such as the Land and even righteous
human communities or individuals as opportunities for accessing an experience of the next world, the rabbis sought to bridge the gap between this world
and the world to come so as to locate “heaven on earth.”
Notes
1. Following the Oxford ms.
2. Translations of Sirach are based on the translation of Benjamin G. Wright as found in
Albert Pietersma, et al., eds., A New English Translation of the Septuagint (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), with standardization of proper names such as Moses and Jacob.
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3. The full passage reads: “Things too difficult for you do not seek, and things too strong
for you do not scrutinize. The things that have been prescribed for you, think about
these, for you have no need of hidden matters. With matters greater than your affairs do
not meddle, for things beyond human understanding have been shown to you. For their
presumption has led many astray, and their evil fancy has diminished their understanding.” For a discussion of this passage and the claim that “hidden matters” in Sirach refers
to knowledge of past occurrences and future events, see Yair Furstenberg, “The Rabbinic
Ban on Maaseh Bereshit: Sources, Contexts and Concerns,” in In the Beginning: Jewish and
Christian Cosmogony in Late Antiquity (Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism; ed. S. Kattan, et al.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 39–63, esp. 45–47.
4. Translations of 1 Enoch are based on George W. E. Nickelsberg et al., eds., 1 Enoch: A
New Translation, Based on the Hermeneia Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004).
5. See Maxwell J. Davidson, Angels at Qumran: A Comparative Study of 1 Enoch 1–36,
72–108 and Sectarian Writings from Qumran (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992),
310; also, Christoph Berner, “The Four (or Seven) Archangels in the First Book of Enoch
and Early Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period,” in Angels: The Concept of Celestial
Beings—Origins, Development and Reception (Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature
Yearbook 2007; ed. F. V. Reiterer, et al.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2007), 395–411; esp. 400.
6. This knowledge is referred to as the “books of zeal and wrath” as well as the “books of
haste and whirlwind” received by Enoch (39:2).
7. For a full discussion of this passage and a persuasive explanation of the inclusion of the
laws of sexual immorality in this list, see Furstenberg, “The Rabbinic Ban.”
8. This passage does not appear in some witnesses due to homoioteleuton.
9. The following five texts are cited in connection with a different thesis in Christine
Hayes, “‘The Torah Was Not Given to Ministering Angels’: Rabbinic Aspirationalism,”
in Talmudic Transgressions: Festschrift for Daniel Boyarin (ed. C. Fonrobert, et al.; Leiden:
Brill, 2017).
10. For the similar second to third century c.e. gnostic myth of the opposition of the evil
planets to the soul’s ascent to heaven in order to bring the powers of light to earth, see
Peter Schäfer, Rivalität zwischen Engeln und Menschen. Untersuchungen zur rabbinischen
Engelvorstellung (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 219; for the idea that the angelic opposition
to Moses reflects a Jewish adaptation of this gnostic myth, see Joseph P. Schultz, “Angelic
Opposition to the Ascension of Moses and the Revelation of the Law,” Jewish Quarterly
Review 61 (1971): 282–307, 288. For more on the angelic opposition to the revelation,
see Hindy Najman, “Angels at Sinai: Exegesis, Theology and Interpretive Authority,”
Dead Sea Discoveries 7:3 (2000): 313–33.
11. For a clear discussion of the tension generated by the lack of congruence between
Israel the holy Land and Israel the holy people, see Richard Sarason, “The Significance of
the Land of Israel in the Mishnah,” in Land of Israel: Jewish Perspectives (ed. L. Hoffman;
Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 109–38.
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12. The relevant parts of the passage are t. Avodah Zarah 5:3–6.
3. One should rather dwell in the Land of Israel even in a town in which
the majority of the inhabitants are Gentiles, than outside the Land even
in a town in which all the inhabitants are Jews.
—This [ruling] implies that dwelling in the Land of Israel is deemed as
important as fulfilling all the commandments in the Torah, and all who
are buried in the Land of Israel it is as if they were buried beneath the
altar [of the temple in Jerusalem]. . . .
5 And [Scripture also] states, “[I am the Lord your God who brought
you forth out of the land of Egypt] to give you the land of Canaan, and
to be your God” (Lev 25:38) [which implies] that as long as you are in
the Land of Canaan I will be your God, but when you are not dwelling
in the Land of Canaan, it is as if I am not your God. . . .
R. Simeon b. Eleazar says, “Israelites who reside outside the Land are
idolaters. How so? If it gentile threw a party for his son and went and
invited all the Jews dwelling in his town, even if they should eat and
drink [only] their own [food and drink], and their own attendant
should stand ready to serve them, they still worship idols, as Scripture
states “[. . . lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the Land,
and when they play the harlot after their gods and sacrifice to their
gods] and one invites you, you eat of his sacrifices” (Exod 34:15).
13. The same metaphor appears in y. Moed Qatan 3, 81c, where a priest is severely chastised for proposing to leave the holy Land—even temporarily—to perform the mitzvah
of levirate marriage on behalf of his deceased brother. “Your brother,” he is told, “left [the
Land] and God is to be blessed for killing him; do you wish to follow in his steps? He
abandoned his mother’s bosom and embraced a foreign bosom—would you now commit the same sin?” According to an alternative tradition, the brother’s sin is described as
abandoning his mother’s bosom and embracing a foreign bosom.
14. Isaiah Gafni, Land, Center and Diaspora: Jewish Constructs in Late Antiquity (Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 71–72.
15. Ibid., 12–13, 41–57.
16. An excellent analysis of this unit may be found in Jeffrey Rubenstein, “Coping with
the Virtues of the Land of Israel: An Analysis of Bavli Ketubot 110b–112a,” in Israel-
Diapora Relations in the Second Temple and Talmudic Periods (ed. I. Gafni; Jerusalem:
Shazar Institute, 2004), 159–88. Relevant excerpts from this extensive unit are as follows
[PA= Palestinian Amora; BA = Babylonian Amora]:
Rab Judah [BA] said: Whoever lives in Babylon is deemed as though he
lived in the Land of Israel; for it is said in Scripture, “Away, escape, O
Zion, you who dwell in Fair Babylon” (Zech 2:11).
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Abaye [BA] stated: We have a tradition that Babylon will not witness
the sufferings [that will precede the coming] of the Messiah. . . .
R. Eleazar [PA] stated: The dead outside the Land will not be resurrected; for it is said in Scripture, “And I will give glory in the land of
the living” (Ezek 26:20) [implying] the dead of the Land in which I
have my desire will be resurrected, but the dead [of the Land] in which
I have no desire will not be resurrected.
Abba b. Memel [PA] objected: “Oh, let your dead revive, let corpses
arise” (Isa 26:19); does not [the expression] “let your dead revive” refer
to the dead of the Land of Israel, and “let corpses arise” to the dead
outside the Land; while the text, “And I will give glory in the land of the
living” (Ezek 26:20) was written of Nebuchadnezzar concerning whom
the All-Merciful said, “I will bring against them a king who is as swift as
a stag”? The other replied: Master, I am expounding another Scriptural
text: “Who gave breath to the people upon it, and life to those that walk
thereon” (Isa 42:5). . . .
Now as to R. Abba b. Memel, what [is the application] he makes of
the text, “Who gave breath to the people upon it”? He requires it for
[a teaching] like that of R. Abbahu [PA] who stated: Even a Canaanite
bondwoman who [lives] in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in
the world to come. . . .
“and life to those that walk thereon.” R. Jeremiah b. Abba [BA] said in
the name of R. Yoh>anan [PA], that [this teaches that] whoever walks four
cubits in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in the world to come.
Now according to R. Eleazar [PA], would not the righteous outside the
Land be revived? R. Ilai [PA] replied: [They will be revived] by rolling
[to the Land of Israel].
R. Abba Sala the Great demurred: Will not the rolling be painful to
the righteous? Abaye [BA] replied: Cavities will be made for them
underground.
17. Residence also takes priority over fulfilling the commandment to be fruitful and
multiply as we learn from the story about the man who remained unmarried rather than
leave the Land in order to marry a particular woman.
18. Thus, immediately following the first set of pro-Land teachings, the Gemara tells the
story of Rav Zera who evaded Rav Judah because he wanted to emigrate to the Land, but
Rav Judah had taught that “whoever goes up from Babylon to the Land of Israel transgresses a positive commandment” since it is God who will effect the restoration of the
exiles. Rav Judah cites a tradition that locates Babylonia just below the Land in status: “As
it is forbidden to leave the Land of Israel for Babylon, so it is forbidden to leave Babylon
for other countries.” Rabbah and R. Joseph go further in asserting Babylonia’s superiority
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to the Land in some respects: “all countries are like dough (an indeterminate admixture
as opposed to fine flour) towards the Land of Israel, and the Land of Israel is like dough
towards Babylonia.” The two are equated by Rav Judah: “Whoever lives in Babylon is
deemed as though he lived in the Land of Israel,” and Abaye maintains that Babylonia
will not witness the sufferings that will precede the coming of the Messiah.
19. The passage reads:
It has been taught: R. Simon b. Yoh>ai said: Come and see how beloved
are Israel in the sight of God: to every place to which they were exiled
the shekinah went with them. They were exiled to Egypt and the shekinah was with them, as it says, “Lo, I revealed Myself to your father’s
house in Egypt” (1 Sam 2:27). They were exiled to Babylon, and the
shekinah was with them, as it says, “for your sake I was sent to Babylon”
(Isa 43:14). And when they will be redeemed in the future, the shekinah will be with them, as it says, “Then the Lord your God will return
[with] your captivity” (Deut 30:3).
On this text as an expression of local patriotism, see Gafni, Land, 55–56.

Olam Ha-ba in Rabbinic Literature:
A Functional Reading
Dov Weiss
INTRODUCTION
The Hebrew phrase olam ha-ba [the next world] first appears in rabbinic literature.1 It is not found in the Hebrew Bible or Second Temple Hebrew writings.2
Typically, the rabbinic term olam ha-ba is juxtaposed with olam ha-zeh [this
world]. But what exactly does olam ha-ba mean? What world does it refer to?
A physical one or a spiritual? Here, the rabbinic sources are vague.
At times, it seems to refer to the messianic age, to the time of resurrection, when all of the dead will rise again and return to their original bodies.
At other times, the term denotes the place to which every (worthy) individual
soul (re)turns after death. In this latter case, olam ha-ba would exist in present
time—though on a different realm. This connotation would be roughly synonymous with Gan Eden [Garden of Eden]. And, still yet, on other occasions
one gets the sense that the rabbis themselves are not sure what they mean by
olam ha-ba. They simply have in mind another world that is different from
this one.3 Like olam ha-ba, a similar amorphous phrase used by the rabbis is
le-atid lavo [the future to come].
According to either explanation—whether olam ha-ba refers to the messianic age or a spiritual life after death—the concept in rabbinic literature
transformed Judaism. It became a supreme article of Jewish faith. Remarkably,
the term olam ha-ba appears over two thousand times in rabbinic literature,
yet the Hebrew Bible contains no notion of an individual receiving rewards
and punishments after death. And the belief in bodily resurrection emerges
only in the latest books of Tanakh, most notably in Daniel 12.4 For the most
part, reward and punishment in the Hebrew Bible is relegated to the mundane
pre-messianic physical world.5 Thus, with their intense emphasis on olam
ha-ba, the rabbis in the first few centuries of the Common Era were able to
restructure the primary arena of religious life. This world was understood to
be merely a prelude to the more significant next world. The following rabbinic
texts make this point: (1) The Mishnah in Avot (4:16) has Rabbi Jacob declare:
“This world is like a hallway before the World to Come. Prepare yourself in
the hallway so that you may enter the banquet hall.” (2) Midrash Tanhuma
claims that God gave Israel the Torah and mitzvoth only so that they could
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merit olam ha-ba.6 (3) A late rabbinic midrash on Exodus compares olam ha-
zeh [this world] to a man and woman who are engaged but the all-the-more-
important olam ha-ba symbolizes the actual marriage.7 That same midrash
also compares this world to the first tablets of law [luchot] that were smashed
by Moses, and the next world to the second tablets that were to be eternal.8
The rabbinic decision to place olam ha-ba at the center of their religious
consciousness did not go unnoticed by many medieval Jewish theologians,
such as Sa’adia Gaon, Judah Halevy, and Bahya Ibn Pakuda.9 And the apparent
absence of olam ha-ba in the Hebrew Bible disturbed these medieval thinkers, for they wondered: if the rabbis regarded olam ha-ba as embodying the
very aim of Jewish life, why did the Hebrew Bible never explicitly mention it?
Interestingly, this medieval Jewish anxiety became inverted in contemporary
times, when, in most denominations (excluding the Ultra-Orthodox) this
world, olam ha-zeh, stood—and continues to stand—at the core of religious
life.10 Post-Enlightenment, modern Jews are typically not interested in afterlife
speculations. In short, whereas medieval Jewish theologians were consumed
with afterlife speculation—and anxious about its apparent absence in the
Hebrew Bible—modern Jews, by stark contrast, are obsessed with this world
and anxious about the centrality that the next world occupies in rabbinic and
medieval Jewish literature.
The modern Jewish sidelining of olam ha-ba has also affected the academic study of ancient Judaism, as scholars of rabbinic literature have given
relatively little attention to olam ha-ba. None of the great rabbinics scholars
of the twentieth century, such as Ephraim Urbach, Abraham Joshua Heschel,
Arthur Marmorstein, and Max Kaddushin, devote a separate section of their
theological books to olam ha-ba.11 Admittedly, the term olam ha-ba or a discussion of the afterlife appears here and there, but their works do not provide
a systematic or comprehensive analysis of a religious category that is so fundamental to rabbinic thinking. While the phrase olam ha-ba can be found close
to two thousand times in rabbinic literature, a quick database search of contemporary academic articles on the subject reveals very little by way of scholarship. To be sure, Ephraim Urbach, the great systemizer of rabbinic theology,
has a multipage discussion on olam ha-ba, but this reflection appears only in
the context of describing God’s justice system.12 Reading Urbach, one would
come away with the mistaken impression that the rabbis imagined olam ha-ba
to be merely a place where humans are judged. But, of course, the rabbinic
view of olam ha-ba is richer than that.
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Strikingly, two lesser-known scholars of ancient Judaism, Claude Montefiore (1858–1938) and Herbert Loewe (1882–1940), admit this very point
when defending their pithy and highly disorganized chapter on olam ha-ba.13
They maintain that the rabbis “thought about [olam ha-ba] in terms and
conceptions most of which have become obsolete and remote for us today,
and so their ideas are of small interest or profit.”14 Similarly, the founder of
Reconstructionist Judaism, Mordechai Kaplan (1881–1983), in Judaism as a
Civilization argues:
We are so far removed from the world-outlook and thought-habits
of the pre-enlightenment days that, with the best of intentions to
know and understand the past, we find it hard not to read into it
our own ideas. We are habituated to the modern emphasis upon
improvement of life in this world as the only aim worthy of our
endeavors. We take for granted that, if we do our best here, we can
afford to let the hereafter take care of itself. So much a part of our
thinking has this modern conception of human life become that
we can scarcely conceive that not long ago the center of gravity of
human existence for Jews, Christians and Mohammedans alike, lay
not in this world, but in the world to come.15

Notwithstanding Kaplan’s commitment to modernity and his attendant
rejection of the miraculous and supernatural realms, Kaplan celebrates olam
ha-ba not because it actually exists but because of how the concept functioned
for the rabbis. Kaplan posits: “[T]he traditional conception of the world to
come expresses man’s discontent with the things as they are and his yearning
for the things as they ought to be. From this viewpoint, the important element
in this belief is not the fantastic picture of the ideal world, but the inner urge
of which it was an expression.”16
In short, according to Kaplan, rabbinic writings on olam ha-ba reflect
rabbinic dreams, desires, and aspirations. In what follows, I will use Kaplan’s
functional method of interpretation to make sense of the rabbinic descriptions
of olam ha-ba.
SIX PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF OLAM HA-BA
Broadly speaking, rabbinic teachings on olam ha-ba can be grouped into six
functions. After outlining the first five of them quickly, I will explore the sixth
one, the moral function, in greater detail.
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JUDICIAL

The first and most crucial function of olam ha-ba in rabbinic literature is judicial: olam ha-ba provided a defense of God, a theodicy.17 Although righteous
people suffer in this world, they could now be thought of as duly compensated
in the next world. Inversely, although some wicked people prosper in this
world, they would be duly punished in the next world. In short, olam ha-ba
squares everything away; debts will be paid and rewards will be procured. The
most famous rabbinic articulation of this theology is when the Babylonian
Talmud claims that all of a person’s deeds in this world will be replayed back
for him/her in the next world.18
The judicial function of olam ha-ba has three basic versions: one moderate, one extreme, and one intermediate. The moderate position envisions God
primarily rewarding and punishing in this world, but subsequently, if necessary, slightly adjusting each person’s accounts via punishments and rewards
in the next world. This method guarantees that full justice will be ultimately
implemented. The radical view, attributed to Rabbi Yaakov in the Babylonian
Talmud (Kiddushin 39b) is that God rewards (and punishes) people only in
the next world.19
Between the moderate and radical positions, we have the famous view
attributed to Rabbi Akiva that God reluctantly rewards the wicked in this
world—but God does so only in order to punish the wicked more harshly in
the next world; inversely, God punishes, lovingly, the righteous in this world
so as to protect them from incurring a more painful punishment in olam ha-
ba.20 Rabbi Akiva’s position assumes that divine rewards and punishments in
the next world are far more potent than the rewards and punishments of this
world. Rabbi Akiva, thus, radically reverses the biblical picture. In the Bible,
the righteous are rewarded in this world, and the wicked are punished in this
world. Now, the righteous are punished in this world, and the wicked are
rewarded in this world. As a consequence of this theology, Rabbi Akiva’s followers argued that human suffering in this world should be regarded as a sign
of divine love, for only the truly righteous are punished in this world.21
HERMENEUTICAL

The second function for olam ha-ba, the interpretive one, provided the rabbis
with a new hermeneutical tool to read biblical passages that, ostensibly, have
nothing to do with reward and punishment. This binary of olam ha-zeh and
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olam ha-ba is often employed to explain strange or redundant biblical words
and phrases. At times, the rabbis situate olam ha-zeh and olam ha-ba as opposites: for example, they would argue, unlike this world where suffering occurs,
the next world would be full of pleasure.22 At other times, the rabbis use the
binary of olam ha-zeh and olam ha-ba to express continuities or foreshadowing: for example, just as there are Torah academies in this world, so too there
will be Torah academies in the next world, albeit even greater ones.23
MYSTICAL

The third function of olam ha-ba in rabbinic literature is what I would call
the mystical one. In these instances, the rabbis use olam ha-ba as a method to
satisfy their spiritual yearnings of having an unmediated encounter with God
in a world where God is hidden. For example, Sifre Deuteronomy posits that
the dead will be able to see God in olam ha-ba.24 Or a more moderate version
from Leviticus Rabbah, which asserts that that whereas in this world only select
individuals can see God, in olam ha-ba everyone would see God.25 A teaching in Pesikta de-Rav Kahana maintains that whereas in this world the priests
purify the impure, in the next world God would assume the role of purifier.26
Also in Pesikta de-Rav Kahana it is said that God would directly teach Torah
to all of Israel.27 Two more examples: the Jerusalem Talmud has God dancing
with the righteous in olam ha-ba.28 And, Ecclesiastes Rabbah presents us with a
picture of God leading the olam ha-ba choir.29
POLEMICAL

The fourth function is polemical. Here, the rabbis invoke olam ha-ba as a theological weapon to express their animosity toward specific nations or peoples,
such as their immediate Jewish rivals or gentiles. Most famously, a Mishnah in
Sanhedrin declares that Epicureans, and those who reject the resurrection of
the dead or that Torah is from Heaven, will lose their place in olam ha-ba.30
Many scholars, such as Menachem Kellner, read this Mishnah as a critique of
the Sadducees, who rejected the afterlife and the Oral Torah.31 Or consider the
Tosefta in Sanhedrin that has Rabbi Eliezer posit that “none of the gentiles will
have a place in the World to Come.”32 One final instance: the rabbis use olam
ha-ba as a method to express their disgust at particular biblical villains and at
wicked generations such as the people of Sodom, Korach and his followers, the
generation of the Flood, and the spies.33
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RHETORICAL

The fifth function, the rhetorical one, represents the inverse of the polemical
function. In these cases, the rabbis invoke olam ha-ba not to lambast others,
but to motivate or threaten righteous Jews to comply with various rabbinic
ethics and laws. They appropriate olam ha-ba as a placeholder or carrier to
express their deepest values and concerns. Examples of actions that would
cause a person to forfeit his or her olam ha-ba include desecrating holy objects,
disgracing the holidays, embarrassing a fellow Jew, teaching an incorrect halachah,34 eating meat that is not slaughtered,35 eating pork,36 making use of the
tetragrammaton,37 acting jealously, having desires, seeking honor,38 ceasing to
learn Torah, neglecting to tend to the needs of Torah sages,39 sleeping in the
morning, drinking in the afternoon, speaking like a child, or attending the
synagogues of simpletons.40 On the positive side of the rhetorical function,
Midrash Mishlei states that any Jew who walks six feet in the Land of Israel
will receive a share in olam ha-ba,41 while Avot de-Rabbi Nathan contains an
entire list of olam ha-ba achieving actions that include being a good friend and
a good neighbor.42
ETHICAL

The sixth function of olam ha-ba is ethical. In these cases, the rabbis use the
afterlife as a method to subtly express moral discomfort with a biblical idea or
received Jewish tradition. They accomplish this by declaring the problematic
Jewish principle inoperative for the next world. Stated differently, olam ha-ba
provided the rabbis, among other things, with a moral safe haven: although
a troubling law or theology might not be eradicated in this world, at least
it could be so in the next.43 This ethical response does not solve the moral
problem, but minimizes it.44 In what follows, I present three such examples
in some detail.
The first example revolves around the rabbinic concept of the Yetser
Hara [the evil inclination]. As Ishay Rosen-Zvi has shown, the various strata
of rabbinic literature convey different conceptions of the Yetser Hara.45 For R.
Ishmael and his school, the Yetser Hara is not an essential component of the
human being, as it was for R. Akiva. It is rather an external and independent
entity housed within the human heart. Moreover, for R. Ishmael, the Yetser
Hara does not drive a human being to sin by manipulating a person’s emotions
or desires, but rationally incites him or her to disobey God.46
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According to Rosen-Zvi, the position of Rabbi Ishmael and his students
emerged as the dominant one in the post-Tannaitic period as these sages
regarded the evil inclination as fundamentally evil. Because of that, not unexpectedly, a moral-theological problem arose: why would God create something
that is evil or harmful to humanity? Does this not imply that God is evil, or
at least is responsible for evil? Indeed, some late antique thinkers, such as
Marcion (85–160 c.e.), Celsus (second century c.e.), and Adimantus (fourth
century c.e. student of Mani) all railed against the idea that the biblical God
implanted an evil desire in the hearts of humanity, beginning with Adam.47
They argued: if God created this sinful force, why should humanity suffer
the consequences? God, therefore, must be unjust. These types of critiques
might have reached the rabbis and naturally would have only exacerbated the
theological crisis. Either way, the rabbis were confronted with this theological-
moral dilemma. Many early rabbinic texts attempt to solve the problem.48 For
example, Sifre Deuteronomy (ca. third century c.e.) maintains that God provided a method by which an individual could overcome the deleterious effects
of the evil inclination: the study of Torah. Only through it could humanity
defeat the evil inclination’s power.49
Other rabbinic texts ignore this solution and evince a profound discomfort
and unease with an evil entity created by God. But they invoke olam ha-ba as
a method to mitigate the problem. So, for example, Exodus Rabbah has God
making this distinction: “In this world [Israel] made idols because of the evil
inclination in them, but in the future world I will uproot from them the evil
inclination.”50 About a dozen or so rabbinic texts make this type of distinction.51
Using olam ha-ba to mitigate problematic Jewish principles also emerges
in response to the biblical notion, first found in the context of the Decalogue
(Exod 20:5), where God announces that, as a “jealous God,” He will “visit the
guilt of the parents upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth
generations.” This theology posed serious ethical problems for select rabbis
who struggled with how the Torah could endorse a theology that punishes
an innocent person for the sins of another. How does this punitive doctrine
comport with God’s attributes of mercy and kindness? Moreover, the need for
Jewish—and for that matter Christian—biblical exegetes to respond to this
problematic idea was heightened by the fact that late antique thinkers, from
Marcion onward, were wont to cite the doctrine of inherited punishment to
argue for the immorality of the Old Testament and the Old Testament God.52
Some early rabbinic texts ignore the ethical problems and simply affirm
the theology of transgenerational punishment. Others, like Mekhilta de-Rabbi
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Ishmael, posit that a child of the third generation would be punished for the
sins of his grandparent only if there were a continuous line of evildoers from
the grandparent to the grandchild. If the grandparent, parent, or child were
righteous, then the child would not be punished for any of his or her ancestors’
sins. By limiting the applicability of inherited punishment to those who continue in their parents’ evil ways, this Tannaitic text resolves the implicit moral
problem: innocent children are not punished for the sins of their parents or
grandparents.53
Other rabbis reject this solution and continue to insist—along with a
simple reading of Scripture—that righteous children indeed suffer for the
sins of the parents. One of them, Rabbi Yossi, however, mitigates the moral
problem by limiting the theological doctrine to this world only: “[If a person’s]
deeds are good but his father’s deeds are not good. His father causes him to
suffer (lit. not to enjoy) in this world, but his [own] deeds cause him to enjoy
the next world []עולם הבא.”54
One last example of where olam ha-ba acts as an ethical reflex involves a
specific type of inherited punishment that has real-life consequences. And that
is the case of mamzer, a bastard child that is the product of incest or an extramarital affair. Tragically, this child can never marry a standard (non-mamzer)
Jew. No doubt, this law clashes with the moral principle of individual responsibility that the rabbis elsewhere promote. Consequently, Leviticus Rabbah
attributes the following question to Daniel the Tailor: “If the parents of these
mamzerim committed transgression, what concern is it of these poor sufferers
[i.e., the children]?”55 Strikingly, according to Daniel the Tailor, when Ecclesiastes 4:1 speaks of “all the oppressions that are done under the sun,” it refers
specifically to children who are mamzerim due to no fault of their own. Amazingly, this late rabbinic text depicts this challenging Torah law as “oppressive.”
Yet, here too—as in the other two cases—the midrash has God declare
that the “next world” will provide respite for the “oppressed” children: “It
shall be My task to comfort them. For in this world there is dross in them,
but in the World to Come . . . they will all be pure gold.”56 Needless to say,
these types of distinctions—between this world and the next world—do not
appear in the Bible itself.57 Notably, in each of these three aforementioned
examples—evil inclination, inherited guilt, and mamzer—the exegetical
grounding is forced, thus highlighting the rabbinic agenda to minimize the
moral-theological irritant.58
In conclusion, the rabbis use olam ha-ba as a category to place their
hopes, fears, anxieties, and yearnings. However, not all of them adopted the
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mythic speculations of their colleagues. There was some rabbinic pushback
against these types of theologizing. For instance, in the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 99a), we have two forms of critique: the first, attributed
to the early Palestinian Amora, Rav Yochanan, challenges the very notion
that we can know what olam ha-ba will bring:59 “R. Hiyya b. Abba said in
R. Yohanan’s name: All the prophets prophesied [all the good things] only
in respect of the Messianic era; but as for the world to come ‘the eye has not
seen, O Lord, beside You, what he has prepared for him that waits for him’
[Isaiah 64:3].”
The second critique of olam ha-ba speculation, attributed to the early
Babylonian Amora Samuel, relies on the belief that olam ha-ba will be exactly
the same as olam ha-zeh, with only one difference: the Jewish people will no
longer be controlled by foreign nations; they will have political independence.
“Samuel said: This world differs from [that of ] the days of the Messiah only
in respect of servitude to [foreign] powers.”
DEDICATION
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Yehi Zichro Baruch [May his memory be for a blessing].
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Dining In(to) the World to Come
Jordan D. Rosenblum
The ancient rabbis believe in two worlds: their present, lived reality, which
they refer to in Hebrew as olam ha-zeh, or “this world”; and a future, not-
yet-experienced realm, which they call in Hebrew olam ha-ba, or “the world
to come.” It is in olam ha-ba that the just receive their divine reward and the
wicked incur their divine punishment. The world to come thus solves the
problem of theodicy, or divine justice. Since present, lived reality does not
always accord with rabbinic ideals, the future realm of olam ha-ba establishes
an alternate universe in which the real and the ideal resolve from discord into
harmony. The world to come is how the rabbis explain theologically problematic but empirically observed paradoxes encountered in this world. For
example, why do good things happen to bad people, while bad things happen
to good people? Why is a young child afflicted with cancer or killed in a car
crash? And why do reality television shows bring fame and fortune on the
amoral and the rabbinically reprehensible?
While other essays in this volume explore additional aspects of the dual
rabbinic realms of this world and the world to come, some of which also
intersect with food, I focus in this essay on two specific, and interrelated, questions: (1) What diet in this world merits entrance into the world to come; and
(2) Upon entering this future realm, what menu awaits therein? In doing so, I
argue that consideration of dining into and in olam ha-ba, the world to come,
is a mechanism for the ancient rabbis to justify their preferred dietary practices
in olam ha-zeh, this world.
DINING INTO THE WORLD TO COME
In the Hebrew Bible, certain foods are permitted, while others are tabooed.
Explicit rationales for the inclusion or the exclusion of various foodstuffs,
however, are almost never found in biblical texts. The rabbis, like other both
Jewish and non-Jewish ancient commentators, seek to explain the meaning
behind these often unjustified practices.1 One example of this phenomenon is
encountered during a conversation about why God chose to give the Torah to
Israel (i.e., to Jews) rather than to any other nation. In the midst of this discussion, the following parable appears in Leviticus Rabbah 13:2:
105
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[A] Rabbi Tanh>um bar Hanilai said:
[B] This may be compared with the case of a physician who went to
visit two sick persons, one who would live, and another who would
die.
[C] To the one who would live, he said: “This and that you may
not eat.”
[D] But to the one would die, he said to them:2 “Whatever he wants
[to eat], bring it to him.”
[E] Thus, of the [other] nations of the world, who are not destined
for the life of the world to come, [it is written in regard to them,]
“[Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you;] as the green
herbs, I have given you all” (Gen 9:3).
[F] But to Israel, who are destined for the life of the world to come,
[it is written,] “These are the living things [ha-h>ayyah] that you may
eat from among all of the quadrupeds on the land” (Lev 11:2).3

Using the parable, a common rabbinic interpretive mechanism, this text
discusses a physician who has two patients: one presents with merely a minor
malady and the other with a fatal illness. To the one who will survive, the doctor prescribes a careful dietary regimen, since that patient will heal and recover.
To the one who will not survive, however, the doctor permits all foods, since
a dying person need not count calories, worry about how much sodium she is
eating, or order the heart-healthy entrée.4 After all, there is no reason to skip
dessert if these are your last few meals in this world.
Gentiles are the terminal patient in this parable. Destined to die in this
world, but not be revived in the world to come, they can eat “all.” Hence,
Genesis 9:3 allows them to eat everything. Jews, on the other hand, are the
living patient in this parable. Destined to live beyond this world and to enter
the world to come, they cannot eat “all.” It is for this reason that in Leviticus 11:2 their divine doctor commands them to only eat “living things”
[ha-h>ayyah].5
I have purposely translated “living things” differently from how it is usually rendered when translating the biblical verse in its original context, simply
as “creatures.” Playing on the dual meaning of the Hebrew word ha-h>ayyah,
which literally means “living things,” the rabbis understand God, the divine
physician, to command Jews to eat only living things, which in turn will grant
Jews life in the world to come. Gentiles do not eat only living things, and thus
they are denied access to the world to come.6
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This text presumes the chosenness of Israel, who alone enters the world
to come.7 Of course, this is not the only domain in which the rabbis presume
that Israel is a special, chosen, and divinely set-apart people. It is for this reason, for example, that since the early rabbinic period, the daily morning liturgy
includes a blessing praising the fact “that [God] did not make me a Gentile.”8
Chosen for a special diet with special benefits, Jews are rewarded. Meanwhile,
like the child who was not chosen for the kickball team in gym class, Gentiles
must remain eternally on the sidelines and watch while others enjoy the fun.9
As a biological necessity, eating is a matter of life or death. For the rabbis,
eating is also a matter of eternal life or death. One key reason for the biblical
food laws is therefore to guarantee that, by following these dietary prescriptions,
Jews ingest the essential vitamins and nutrients to assure them entrance into the
world to come.10 Eating “all” food sustains Gentiles in this world, but eating
only “living things” sustains Jews both in this world and in the world to come.
Though Jews must fastidiously observe the proper rabbinic diet in order
to guarantee their acceptance into the world to come, the rabbis are careful not
to renounce the permitted pleasures of this world. According to one tradition,
for example:
[A] Rabbi H˘ezekiah [said] Rabbi Cohen [said] in the name of Rav:
[B] In the future, man must give a summary and account concerning
all [permitted foods] that his eyes beheld, but he did not eat.
[C] Rabbi Lazar considered this teaching and set aside funds so that
he could eat every [permitted] thing once a year.11

The world to come promises to be a culinary extravaganza.12 That being said,
the rabbis do not want Jews to forget that there are myriad delicious foods available for consumption in this world.13 In fact, these very permitted foods combine to form the diet necessary for entrance into the buffet found in the world
to come. A good rabbinic Jew should not completely forsake this world. To
reformulate a famous biblical pseudo-quotation:14 eat all rabbinically permitted
foods, drink all rabbinically permitted drinks, and be merry in all rabbinically
permitted manners, for tomorrow you die in this world, but through engaging
in a rabbinically permitted lifestyle, you will live eternally in the world to come.
DINING IN THE WORLD TO COME
Though proper diet merits one entrance into the world to come, upon arrival,
two important culinary changes occur: (1) previously forbidden foods are now
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permitted, and (2) previously mythical foods are now existent. Taken together,
this means that the world to come features a cornucopia of cuisines unimaginable in this world.
The world to come is a realm of reversals. The wicked are punished; the
good are rewarded; and perhaps most shockingly of all, nonkosher food is now
kosher. In a fascinating reversal, foods forbidden to Jews in this world will be
permitted in the world to come. The reward reaped by the pious rabbinic Jew
for not eating nonkosher food in this world, therefore, is not only entrance
into the world to come, but the opportunity to enjoy these formerly forbidden
foodstuffs for eternity. As Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 makes abundantly clear: Why
are Jews commanded not to eat forbidden food in this world?
[A] In order that you may eat it in the time to come.
[B] For this reason, Moses cautioned Israel, and said to them:
[C] “These are the living things [ha-h>ayyah] that you may eat”
(Lev 11:2).15

The time to come, in Hebrew la‘atid labo’, is a common variant rabbinic
term for the world to come. This text contains another future-food-related
exegesis of Leviticus 11:2, wherein the divine doctor is now the divine teacher.
Acting on behalf of God, Moses declares only some foods suitable for ingestion by the Israelites in order to teach Israel the vital rabbinic virtue of self-
restraint.16 To observe the rabbinic food laws is therefore to embody rabbinic
theology relating to diet, eschatology, and ethics. Israel must refrain from
placing pork on its plate in this world in order to cultivate self-restraint; and,
in doing so, Israel shall enjoy piles of pork on its plate in the world to come.
Or, to pun a common English idiom: a piggy saved is a piggy earned.
In fact, the Hebrew word for pig, h>azir, contains this very lesson hidden
within it etymologically. “Why is [pig] called by the name ‘h>azir’? Because
it is destined to restore [lehah>azir] greatness and sovereignty to its rightful
owner.”17 In this text, “pig” stands in for all nonkosher animals. However, casting the pig to play this role is quite important. In antiquity, as in today, pig is
understood to represent the most nonkosher animal. It therefore often serves
as a synecdoche for the entire category of “nonkosher.” Further, “pig” was a
common rabbinic metonym for Rome, Romanness, and Roman authority.18
So Rome, or “The Pig,” currently possesses greatness and sovereignty.
However, that is only in this world. In the world to come, greatness and sovereignty will be restored to their rightful owner, the Jews. And how does the
Hebrew word for pig, h>azir, teach this lesson? In Hebrew, the infinitive “to
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restore” is lehah>azir. Pig, h>azir, and “to restore,” lehah>azir, therefore share the
same Hebrew root letters, h>-z-r, a linguistic connection that the rabbis also
pun in other texts.19 This shared root is understood to be instructive: in this
world, Jews, who cannot eat pig, are ruled by Rome, or “The Pig.” As non-
Jews, however, Romans cannot transcend this world; as such, “The Pig” shall
not enter into the world to come. In the world to come, a world without “The
Pig,” Jews will once again rule themselves. Restored to power, Jews may then
eat pig, which represents both protein and power, both now rightfully theirs.
But today, in this world, both the literal and the figurative pig is best avoided.
As we have just seen, the world to come features a smorgasbord that
would put even the fanciest Las Vegas buffet to shame. In addition to famously
nonkosher foods like pork and shellfish, the righteous, deserving diners in the
world to come will be allowed to dine on formerly mythical beasts, like the
Behemoth, a land creature; the Leviathan, a sea creature; and the lesser-known
Ziz, a bird.20 According to some traditions, God created these mythical creatures for the specific future purpose of feeding those who merit entrance into
the world to come.21 According to another tradition, found on b. Bava Batra
74b–75a, God created male and female Leviathans and Behemoths and then
realized that, should they mate, they and their kin would be capable of complete world domination. (They are, after all, enormous sea and land creatures.)
Turning lemons into future lemonade, God castrated both the male Leviathan
and the male Behemoth, and then dealt with their potential mates: in the case
of the Leviathan, Mrs. Leviathan is killed; in the case of the Behemoth, Mrs.
Behemoth is “cooled,” which suggests a removal of her sexual drive, rendering
her functionally sterile. This text implies that the male Leviathan and the male
Behemoth are allowed to roam the world, without companion or mate. They
cannot propagate; they can only wait.
The female Leviathan and the female Behemoth, however, are both “preserved for the righteous in the time to come.”22 Further, the future banquet
at which the Leviathan’s flesh shall be served is understood to have a specific
guest list: not just Jews, but talmidei h>akhamim, or rabbinic scholars.23 The
remainder of the Leviathan carcass will be sold in the Jerusalem markets, suggesting that nonscholars may enter into the world to come and that Jerusalem
will still hold markets in the world to come, but also implying that if one
wishes to have a seat at the best table and to eat the best food for eternity,
then he24 should aspire to a life of Torah study. As is a common practice
throughout rabbinic literature, the rabbis once again remind their audience of
the importance of busying oneself in the study of rabbinic texts. Otherwise,
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even if you are righteous enough to merit entrance into the world to come,
you will spend eternity shopping for and eating second-rate cuts of Leviathan
and Behemoth meat.
Further, according to Leviticus Rabbah 22:10:
[A] Rabbi Menah>ma and Rabbi Bebai and Rabbi Ah>a and Rabbi
Yoh>anan [said] in the name of Rabbi Yonatan:25
[B] As compensation for what I have forbidden you [in this world],
I have permitted you [in the world to come].
[C] As compensation for the prohibition of fishes,26 the Leviathan
will be a pure fish.27
[D] As compensation for the prohibition of fowl,28 the Ziz will be
a pure bird. . . .
[E] And why do they call it “Ziz”?
[F] Because it has many kinds of tastes, [the taste of ] this [zeh] and
[the taste of ] that [zeh].
[G] As compensation for the prohibition of beasts [behemah], the
Behemoth [will be eaten on] a thousand mountains.29

The rabbis imagine God as offering what psychologists term delayed gratification, in which a mild pleasure or small reward now is deferred in order to
receive a significantly greater pleasure or reward at a later time.30 The divine
reward for following biblical food taboos was built into the system by God
at Creation. This conceptualization provides a subtle rabbinic rationalization
for unjustified biblical culinary regulations. Why should a Jew not eat a fish
without fins and scales or a biblically forbidden bird, such as the raven, in this
world? Because to do so is to forfeit forever an opportunity to dine on an even
better meal in the world to come. Why eat a McDonald’s cheeseburger today
when you can feast on Behemoth burgers on “a thousand mountains” for all of
eternity? Why eat bland chicken not slaughtered according to rabbinic regulations, when you know that one day the nuanced flavors of the Ziz will caress
your palate? These mythical creatures provide a sense of purpose to unjustified
biblical law. They whet the theological palate.
CONCLUSION
As a realm of reversal, retribution, and redemption, the world to come rebalances the rabbinic scales of justice. It also serves as a mechanism to explain
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the unexplainable in this world. This is especially true in regard to the biblical
food laws. The rabbis divide all biblical commandments into two categories:
(1) mišpatim, which are based on logical principles; and (2) h>ukim, which are
illogical in nature. The rabbis categorize the biblical food laws as h>ukim, and
hence, though they must be followed like any other biblical commandment,
they lack a logical justification.31 A rabbinic Jew must engage in these practices
simply because God said so.32
The role that diet plays in regard to dining into and dining in the world
to come therefore serves as an important rabbinic means of justification for
a seemingly illogical set of divine commandments in this world.33 Though
illogical, dietary rules are central to daily practice; for this reason, that which
is unjustified demands justification. The function of dietary practice in dining
into and dining in the world to come offers significant explanatory value for
the function of dining practices in this world.
Faithfully following these illogical divine commandments promises a
good rabbinic Jew an opportunity to earn the golden ticket, allowing entrance
into Chef God’s eternal banquet of mythical and magical mouthwatering
foods. Much like Charlie in Willie Wonka’s Chocolate Factory, a Jew in this
world is presented with temptation. After all, according to one rabbinic source:
[A] A person should not say: . . . I do not want to eat pig meat. . . .
[B] But [rather, a person should say]: I want [to perform this prohibited act, but] what can I do, for my father in heaven decreed
concerning me thusly?34

As Charlie discovered inside Willie Wonka’s Chocolate Factory, rejecting
one illicit offer can lead to a far greater reward. Acknowledging gastronomic
temptation, the proper rabbinic Jew must make the theologically correct decision and delay his or her gratification in this world. By doing so, the faithful
rabbinic Jew merits entrance into the world to come, wherein he or she reaps
the reward of delayed gratification: not only is the formerly prohibited now
permitted, but previously unimaginable delicacies are now on the dinner menu.
Notes
1. I discuss this process in The Jewish Dietary Laws in Late Antiquity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The core of this essay draws from a section therein (see
135–39).
2. The plural pronoun [la-hem] here either anticipates the application of the parable
(wherein the dying person is compared to the other nations), is addressed to the ones
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taking care of the patient, is a typographical error (the singular form appears in one
manuscript), or the plural form should appear in both instances (as it does in some manuscripts) and merely suggests the general application of this parable.
3. Ed. Margulies 276, emphasis added. See also Exodus Rabbah 30:22, Ecclesiastes Rabbah
5.6.1, Tanhuma Shemini 10. The translation of Leviticus 11:2 is based on that of Jacob
Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (Anchor
Bible 3; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 643, 645–46 (with an important difference, which
I discuss below). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
In addition to in The Jewish Dietary Laws in Late Antiquity (see 136–37), I have also written about this text in Jordan D. Rosenblum, “Justifications for Foodways and the Study
of Commensality,” in Commensality: From Everyday Food to Feast (ed. Susanne Kerner, et
al.; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 189–94; and “Jewish Meals in Antiquity,”
in A Companion to Food in the Ancient World (ed. John M. Wilkins and Robin Nadeau;
New York: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 353–54.
4. Though in a different context, a similar metaphor is used by the early Christian author
Augustine (On the Profit of Believing, 29).
5. Some rabbinic slaughter regulations are derived from the same wording of this passage
(e.g., b. Hullin 42a).
6. For other discussions about Gentiles eating everything only in this world and only Jews
entering the world to come, see Pesiqta Rabbati 16:6, Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1. Converts
receive entrance to the world to come and can partake of the food therein, as is implied
in regard to the Leviathan in y. Megillah 1:13, 72b (see y. Megillah 3:2, 74a, y. Sanhedrin
10:6, 29c). On this text, see Shaye J. D. Cohen, “The Conversion of Antoninus,” in
The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture I (ed. Peter Schäfer; Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1997), 141–72.
7. For a discussion of how this general concept functions throughout the rabbinic corpus,
see Sacha Stern, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings (New York: E. J. Brill, 1994),
42–46, 200–202, and passim.
8. t. Berakhot 6:18 (ed. Lieberman 1:38); see also b. Menahot 43b.
9. On the rabbinic limitation of the applicability of kosher laws only to Jews, see Jordan
D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 68–73. For a text that depicts Gentiles unsuccessfully trying to alter
their diet in order to enter the world to come, see Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1.
10. Speaking more generally, b. Yoma 39a notes that if one makes himself impure in this
world, then he is impure also in the world to come (an exegesis of Lev 11:43); in contrast, if
one makes himself sanctified in this world, then he is sanctified also in the world to come.
11. y. Qiddushin 4:12, 66b (ed. Schäfer and Becker 3:432); see also b. Eruvin 54a. On
making sure to eat food that one likes (perhaps with repercussions in the world to come),
see Avot d’Rabbi Natan A26:19. For further discussion of one’s yearly food budget, see
b. Betzah 15b–16a.
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12. This belief, which appears often in rabbinic texts (e.g., Pesiqta Rabbati 41:5, b. Ketubbot 111b, and several texts noted in this essay), is not unique to the rabbis. Other Jews in
antiquity held the same belief, though each group interpreted this future practice based
on its own theological assumptions. For example, see the messianic banquet described in
the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g., 1Q28a 2:11–22). It should be noted that not all rabbis agreed
with these views. For example, Rav argues that there is neither eating nor drinking in
the world to come (b. Berakhot 17a). Most rabbis, however, presume not only eating and
drinking, but sumptuous feasting therein.
13. On how the rabbinic gaze functions in this narrative, see Rachel Neis, The Sense of
Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 115.
14. This “quote” jumbles Isaiah 22:13 and Ecclesiastes 8:15.
15. Ed. Margulies 279 (emphasis added). Also see Midrash Tehillim 146:4, which contains
traditions both supporting and arguing against the permission of eating in the world to
come flesh that is forbidden in this world. I thank Dov Weiss for this reference.
16. In general, see Michael L. Satlow, “‘Try to Be a Man’: The Rabbinic Construction of
Masculinity,” Harvard Theological Review 89:1 (1996): 19–40.
17. Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1.9.1.
18. For the history of this association, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “‘Why Do You Refuse to
Eat Pork?’: Jews, Food, and Identity in Roman Palestine,” Jewish Quarterly Review 100:1
(2010): 95–110.
19. For example, see Jordan D. Rosenblum, “The Night Rabbi Aqiba Slept with Two
Women,” in A Most Reliable Witness: Essays in Honor of Ross Shepard Kraemer (ed. Susan
Ashbrook Harvey, et al.; Brown Judaic Studies 358; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies,
2015), 67–75 (esp. 73–74).
20. See, e.g., Leviticus Rabbah 13:3 (which includes their method of slaughter, with reference to m. Hullin 1:2), 22:10. See also Pesiqta Rabbati 16:4, Pesiqta Rabbati 48:3, Tanhuma Beshallah 24, b. Bava Batra 74b–75a, and above, n. 6. For an excellent discussion
that sets these, and additional, traditions into their ancient context, see Debra Scoggins
Ballentine, The Conflict Myth and the Biblical Tradition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 150–66.
21. See Pesiqta Rabbati 48:3; Ballentine, Conflict Myth, 165.
22. b. Bava Batra 74b. See Ballentine, Conflict Myth, 163–64. The term “preserved” is
different for each animal in this text, as more literally the female Leviathan is “salted” and
the female Behemoth is “kept/guarded.” Perhaps Mrs. Leviathan is “salted” because she
is killed (at least in this world), and salting is a common method for preserving meat.
23. b. Bava Batra 75a. On converts eating Leviathan meat, see above, n. 6.
24. Throughout, I am careful to use the gendered pronouns that most accurately reflect
ancient rabbinic opinions. For example, I use the male pronoun here because the rabbis
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gendered Torah study as a male activity (see Satlow, “Try to Be a Man”). However, when
the gender is not specific or can include either gender, then I use gender neutral and/or
inclusive pronouns.
25. The names of these rabbis are not consistent in the manuscripts. On the redemptive
value for citing the names of those who uttered a rabbinic tradition, see b. Hullin 104b.
26. In Leviticus 11:9–12 and Deuteronomy 14:9–10. Pure sea creatures must have both
fins and scales.
27. On the Leviathan as a pure fish, also see, e.g., b. Hullin 67b.
28. In Leviticus 11:13–19 and Deuteronomy 14:11–20. Biblical texts offer no explicit
criteria for inclusion or exclusion of fowl from the category of pure (and hence permitted
for ingestion). Later interpreters claim that the category of excluded fowl are birds of prey
(e.g., b. Hullin 65a [commenting on m. Hullin 3:6], b. Niddah 50b).
29. Ed. Margulies 522–23. On the thousand mountain tradition for the Behemoth, see
Psalm 50:10, Pesiqta Rabbati 48:3.
30. See, e.g., Walter Mischel, The Marshmallow Test: Mastering Self-Control (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 2014).
31. See Sifra Ahare Mot 13:10 (see also b. Yoma 67b).
32. When I delivered this essay, I had not yet read the recent book by fellow contributor
Christine Hayes: What’s Divine About Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). In this excellent volume, Hayes contextualizes the claims I
make herein within the broader scope of the rabbinic corpus. While we worked in parallel
and without knowledge of each other’s recent scholarship, we agree on most related issues.
I also would like to thank Christine Hayes for offering useful feedback on the version of
this essay that I delivered at the conference.
33. This is a major reason why many of the texts I cite in the body of this essay are from
Leviticus Rabbah, a rabbinic commentary on the book of Leviticus, which contains the
locus classicus for the biblical food laws (Lev 11; see also Deut 14).
34. Sifra Qedoshim 11:22 (ed. Weiss 93b).

What’s for Dinner in Olam Ha-ba? Why Do
We Care in Olam Ha-zeh?: Medieval Jewish
Ideas about Meals in the World to Come
in R. Bahya ben Asher’s Shulhan Shel Arba
Jonathan Brumberg-Kraus
May it be Your will, Lord our God and God of our ancestors that just as
I have stood up and dwelled in this sukkah so may I merit next year to
dwell in the sukkah of the hide of the Leviathan. (Jewish blessing upon
leaving the sukkah at the end of the holiday of Sukkot)

Any modern discussion of Jewish traditions about rewards in the world to
come must confront both the mixed messages the sources themselves present
us and our contemporary skepticism about the plausibility of any supernatural
realms for rewards and punishments after death. A case in point is the contradictory rabbinic traditions about meals for the righteous in the world to
come. On the one hand, the righteous are promised a banquet of Leviathan,
Bar Yuchnai, and Behemoth in a tent made of Leviathan’s skin. But Rav says,
“In the world to come, there is no eating and drinking.” Rabbenu Bahya ben
Asher, the fourteenth century Spanish biblical exegete and kabbalist, devotes
the fourth and final “Gate” of his short treatise on Jewish eating practices,
Shulhan Shel Arba [Table of Four], to address this apparent contradiction
about meals prepared for the righteous in the world to come.1 R. Bahya thus
not only attempts to resolve the problem of the mixed messages of our sources,
but in doing so, I suggest, he also hints to us moderns, who are sure only about
this world, why speculating about the world to come nevertheless might still
be of some value.
Since R. Bahya wrote Shulhan Shel Arba as a guide for meals in this
world, the question arises: How does talking about, imagining, and knowing
about what meals are like in the next world affect our practice and enjoyment
of our meals in this world? Moreover, as Caroline Walker Bynum points out
in her discussion of medieval Christian traditions about the resurrection of
the dead more or less contemporary with R. Bahya’s account of meals in the
world to come, we moderns, even beyond our general skepticism about any
sort of afterlife, are embarrassed particularly by the “extreme literalism and
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materialism” of these accounts.2 Just as R. Bahya insists the meal of Leviathan,
Bar Yuchnai, and Behemoth reserved for the righteous will be an actual meal
of kosher fish, fowl, and beef flesh eaten and enjoyed by our physical bodies
in a big sukkah made out of Leviathan’s skin, so Christian theologians in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries worried about whether our resurrected bodies
will wear clothes; if Christ’s foreskin will be restored; whether we’ll eat and
taste, smell nice aromas, or touch other bodies in heaven; or what will happen
to cannibalized bodies at the resurrection of the dead.3 Will they rise as part
of the people that ate them or separately as the persons they were before they
were sliced, diced, and eaten?4
Medieval Christian artistic representations of the resurrection of the
dead seem particularly preoccupied with the reassembling of dismembered
body parts in at this time! Bynum suggests that bizarre as such hypermaterialistic accounts of resurrected bodies seem to us today, they are not so different
in purpose from contemporary popular talk about Star Trek “teletransportation,” future growing of new bodies attached to cryogenically preserved
brains, and people with organ transplants and their families feeling that
they’ve somehow absorbed their donor’s personality. Namely, they reflect concern for and assumptions about “personal identity and survival.”5 In medieval
terms, these issues are usually framed in terms of body/soul dualism: does
our personhood reside in the form and matter of our physical bodies or in
our souls that persist after our death? However, as we shall see, R. Bahya and
other medieval Jewish thinkers were quite insistent that our bodies and souls
are not really separated in the world to come: both our bodies and souls get
to experience the rewards of the world to come, since both worked together
in this world to earn them.
And the proof is in the pudding (so to speak) that actual tasty meaty
meals are reserved for the righteous in the world to come. Similarly, our bodies
and souls will also dine on the intellectual meals of the “splendor of the Shekinah” (albeit in radically transformed bodies but bodies nonetheless). After the
resurrection of the dead, we’ll be clothed in a new kind of body without ordinary measure and dimensions, which allows our souls infinite enjoyment of
and nourishment from the light of God’s presence. So what does all this mean
for us to talk about these meals now in olam ha-zeh—this world?
For most certainly, Rabbenu Bahya provided his account of Jewish traditions of meals in the world to come in his Shulhan Shel Arba as talking points
for meals in this world.6 And so he says:

What's for Dinner in Olam Ha-ba? Why Do We Care in Olam Ha-zeh?

117

With these words the enlightened will discern when they’re eating,
may they make themselves holy and their minds burnished fully. With
these words engaged, may they be at their table; raise their table’s
renown so that “all shall say ‘Glory!’” Let their hearts be made pure,
to withstand any test. “By these raise up the table,” so that “before the
Lord” is its label.7

Such talk about body-and soul-rewarding meals in the world to come while
at meals in this world is intended to cultivate what Jonathan Haidt calls the
“emotion of elevation,” or what Leon Kass describes in The Hungry Soul as the
transformation of our physical hunger for food from “Fressen to Essen . . . to
sanctified eating.”8
DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO MEALS
IN THE WORLD TO COME
In order to resolve the apparent contradiction between the Talmudic traditions
that specify the menu of the meal reserved for the righteous in the world to
come and the baraita of Rav that “in the world to come there will be no eating
and drinking,” R. Bahya distinguishes between two kinds of meals that will
occur in the future to come: (1) the banquet reserved for the righteous after
they die when the Messiah comes, and (2) a second banquet after the general
resurrection of the dead at the end of time. He makes the sequence of these
two meals quite clear in his entry on “The Bridegroom Over the Table” in his
book Kad Ha-Kemach:
And thus we have found that our sages z”l interpreted the future:
In the future the Holy One Blessed Be He will make a meal for the
righteous. And we ought to believe that this meal will be an actual
physical meal, for the foods are the pure foods prepared from the
time of the six days of creation. And they are: Leviathan from the
fishes, and from the birds Bar Yuchnai, and from the beasts “Behemoth upon a Thousand Hills” [Ps 50:12]. And perhaps they will be
“offsprings” of the supernal light like the manna in the desert, which
are more refined and whose goal is to elevate [those who eat them],
because the flow of wisdom and capacity to conceive intelligible
things will be greater in them then than at any other time. And after
these meals that will be at the end of time, there will be another time
made anew, and this is the time of the resurrection of the dead, and in it
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they will be nourished and enjoy the radiance of the Shekhinah, and they
will not revert to the dust, as our rabbis z”l interpreted, “The dead,
whom The Holy One Blessed be He will resurrect, will not revert to
the dust.” [b.Sanhedrin 92a], but rather they will exist eternally like
the ministering angels, and they will enjoy themselves in the seven
huppot, as our sages z”l interpreted in Seder Eliahu, “Seven huppot
will the Holy One Blessed Be He make for the righteous in the
future to come [le-atid la-vo], as it is said, ‘and the Lord will create
over all of Mt. Zion and over its places of assembly a cloud by day
and smoke and the glow of a flaming fire by night, for over all the
glory will be a huppah.’”9

This idea is not unique to him. Before him in the twelfth century,
R. Abraham ibn Ezra in his commentary on Daniel 12:12 says:
In my opinion, the righteous who died in exile will be resurrected
when the Redeemer comes. . . .They will then partake of the Leviathan, Ziz, and the Behemoth and will die a second time, only to be
again resurrected in the Age to Come, in which they will neither
eat nor drink but luxuriate in the splendor of the Shekhina [God’s
Presence].10

R. Bahya in Shulhan Shel Arba goes into a little more detail about the difference between the two meals and their sequence, emphasizing the different
kinds of bodies the righteous will have for these two meals, to account for
Rav’s saying that “there will be no eating or drinking”:
So in the future Israel will merit two statuses in their body and soul.
Bodily meals of fine and pure foods which I mentioned, and an
intellectual meal for the soul alone of the holy spirit, for so all Israel
will ascend to the level of prophecy.
And now I will explain to you in what follows about the world
of souls, which will come to human beings after their separation
from the world, and the matter of the world to come, which is
after the resurrection and the matter of the joy that the soul has in
all these worlds together. Know that the intellectual meal is for the
body and soul at the time of the resurrection of the dead, because the
routine for the body will be cancelled completely, and another routine—marvelous and new—will replace it, and moral rot [zohama’]
will cease from the world, and the Accuser will be swallowed up,
“there is no adversary [satan] and no mischance,” “the Lord will
make something new on earth,” and the souls will be made anew
“like the eagle is renewed,”11 all of them shall be new, “the work of
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the Artist’s hand,” so much the more so than with vessels of glass.
Then the “children of the resurrection of the dead” whose body and
their soul have been renewed shall take delight in the intellectual
meal in the world to come, which is after the resurrection, in which
there is no bodily meal at all, and it is regarding this meal that our
rabbis z”l said, “Rav was accustomed to say, ‘In the world to come,
there is no eating and no drinking, no envy, no hatred, and no
rivalry, but rather the righteous will sit with crowns on their heads
and enjoy the splendor of the Shekhinah.’”12

R. Bahya also interprets the expression “Until Shiloh will come” in Jacob’s
blessing for Judah in Gen 49:10 to “refer to the two redemptions: the first,
which is nearer in time, and the last, which is more distant.”13
FIRST, THE LEVIATHAN BANQUET
According to R. Bahya, these are the characteristics of the food of first banquet—the Leviathan banquet—in the future to come and of the bodies of the
righteous who eat it. On the menu for the first banquet is the big fish Leviathan, the big bird Bar Yuchnai (or Ziz), and the big cow Behemoth.14 These
foods are special not only because of their enormous size, but also because they
are kind of a magical “offspring of the light” [toldot ha-or] suggesting a heavenly origin. Similarly, manna, “the bread from heaven,” is also an “offspring of
the light” that has special powers to refine the intellect. Thus manna prompted
an intellectual response when it first fell miraculously from heaven: Man hu?
[What is it?], hence its name “manna.”15 It’s what Joel Hecker calls “brain
food” in his discussion of similar traditions in the Zohar.16 It is related to the
Shekinah’s light, the light at the beginning of Creation.
Thus the rabbinic traditions that Leviathan, et al., were reserved for the
banquet of the righteous from the time of the six days of creation are understood to allude to them being an “offspring” of the primordial light of the
Shekinah. Moreover, as “light food,” it provides a temporary glow from the
heads of those who eat it, like the rays from the light on which Moses was
nourished during his forty days of fasting on Mt. Sinai or the “halo effect”
on the righteous at the Leviathan banquet when they’re described as having
“crowns on their heads.” Nevertheless, this “light food” is still physical and
material, enjoyed by body and soul together. The banquet is kosher. R. Bahya
insists that Leviathan is a kosher fish, an appropriate reward for the righteous
who kept kosher in this world. That said, my student artist/collaborator
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Rosemary Liss, who composed illustrations in the style of medieval illuminations for my English translation of Shulhan Shel Arba, was inspired by contemporary cinematic representations of “Leviathan” as a kraken, and so she
imagined Leviathan differently. 17
Moses, the shihulah kardona, will cater this meal as I mentioned above.
Here’s the full reference from Shulhan Shel Arba:
And thus they said in a midrash about Moses our Teacher (may he
rest in peace): shihula kardona—the skinner for preparing a meal,
“who was pulled out”—the explanation of shihula, is Moses, which
is from the Aramaic [shihaltay] for the Hebrew, “I drew him out”
(Exod 2:10). And a “skinner” (for preparing a meal) is a type of
butcher or cook. So here the goal of the intention of these bodily
meals is to be a device to refine the body and matter and to sharpen
the mind so that it will attain knowledge of the Creator (May He
be blessed) and meditate upon the purely intelligible beings, and
then the souls by this looking of their bodies will become fit for the
intellectual banquet from which the ministering angels themselves
who are near the Shekinah eat—for then the soul will perceive the
brilliant light which it is impossible to perceive as long as it is stuck
in matter.18

The righteous diners themselves are composed of material bodies and souls,
more or less the same bodies they had in this world, to eat this fleshy but light
food. Nevertheless, I suspect R. Bahya’s reference to Moses as a “skinner” and
the “I drew him out” etymology of his name hint at the power of food at this
meal to catalyze the bodily transformation of the righteous to dine “without
eating and drinking” at the next, “intellectual meal” after the resurrection of
the dead. That is, at this meal, the righteous souls are somehow “skinned” and
“drawn out” of their ordinary this worldly bodies.
INTELLECTUAL MEAL AFTER
THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD
At the intellectual meal in the world to come, there is “no eating or drinking,”
but R. Bahya qualifies this to mean no eating or drinking as we ordinarily
understand it. For at this meal, the Messiah/descendent of David will raise
a cup of blessing. As the much later Chasidic song, “Shnirele Perele,” about
this banquet puts it: meshiekh ben dovid zist oybn on, halt a beckher in der
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rekhter hant, makht a brockhe afn gantsn land [the Messiah, son of David, is
above us. He holds a goblet in his right hand and gives his blessing to the
whole earth]. It’s an enormous overflowing cup [kos revayah], with a capacity
of 221 logs. According to R. Bahya, this is an allegory for a different kind of
consumption—“not eating and drinking” per se, but still something requiring
both body and soul to enjoy. Otherwise, according R. Bahya, there would be
no need to specify “no eating or drinking,” since of course our presumption
for embodied souls was that consumption would involve some kind of eating
or drinking.
But unlike the light food of the earlier meal, those nourished by this
“food”—the splendor of the Shekinah—experience an eternal glow. Unlike
the temporary glow, the rays of light shooting out of his head Moses acquired
during his forty days of being nourished by the Shekinah on Mt. Sinai, this
halo is like “the light Moses earned in the cleft of the rock.” As R. Bahya says:
And this is the light that Moses our Rabbi (peace upon him) earned
in “the cleft of the rock,” “the reflecting mirror” out of which he was
able to prophesy, and thus earned the “radiation from the skin of his
face” that was as bright as “the face of the sun.” And in an interpretation they said, “a variety of the upper light is the globe of the sun”
because the light of this level is the level of Moses’ prophecy, and
the globe of the sun, which is a variety of this, is the “radiation from
the skin of his face.” And this is what is written, “rays [karnayyim]
given off from every side, and therein His glory is enveloped,” that
is, the “radiation from the skin of his face.” This came directly from
the hand of the Holy One Blessed be He to Moses, and this radiation is the fruit of what was his in this world, distinct from the eternal
radiance that would be his in the world to come, and that is the level
of the upper light. If so, then the word karnayyim—“rays”—includes
both the fruit and the eternal radiance. And all this was because of
the tablets—luhot—that he was holding. And so this is hinted at in
the word “LU’a”H,” which is an acronym of the words in Habakkuk 3:4: karnayyim mi-yado Lo Ve-sham Hevyon ‘uzo. And they said
in a midrash, “[They saw] the rays of the skin of his face,” all the
majesty that Moses got was but temporary fruit, a gift he earned, but the
eternal radiance would be his in the world to come, as it is said, “rays
[karnayyim] from His hand to him.”19

In other words, the dual form of the word karnayyim [rays] refers both
to the temporary radiance Moses experienced as his reward while alive on
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Mt. Sinai in this world, and the eternal radiance he and the rest of the righteous can experience after the resurrection of the dead in their transformed
bodies, as their reward in the next world. With both of these radiant rewards
comes a prophetic, visionary capacity, like the “real eating” suggested by
the experience of the Israelite elders and Moses at Mt. Sinai: “They had
a vision of God and they ate and drank” (Exod 24:11).20 However, the
visionary capacity that will occur at the intellectual meal after the resurrection of the dead will be so far superior to that which even Moses experienced while in this world that it “cannot be pictured.” We cannot picture
it now:
because of our being sunken in the world of thick and coarse bodies, which are totally thickness and coarseness, while the world of
souls are totally elevation, refinement, and purity. Indeed, the two
are opposites; it’s impossible to think of what we are diametrically
opposed to. Just as for fish, because they exist in the element of
water, and need it to exist and live, it would be impossible for them
to turn to the element of fire because it is its opposite, so these two
worlds are opposites, and “every man is proved dull, without knowledge” of the quality of the world to come while in this world, and
even the wisest of the wise are fools about this.21

And yet paradoxically, R. Bahya attempts to depict it nevertheless:
However, we know in general through what we can infer through
reason and from the Torah “which makes wise the simple” that just
as the body enjoys and takes delight [mitaden] in a pleasant aromatic
meal according to the body’s standards of pleasure, so the soul will
enjoy and take delight in this upper world. . . . So even though the
power of the body is weak and unable to picture in the heart the existence of the upper beings and their delight that is without measure,
the power of the upper beings and their perfection is not diminished
by lesser beings, composed of matter, who are unable to conceive of
them, just as the human wisdom and virtue is not diminished by a
fool or beast who cannot imagine or conceive of it.22

This is what Jewish tradition refers to as “Gan Eden” because this meal is
where souls “mitad’nim” [take delight] without limit in the splendor of the
Divine Presence. This indeed is the “Real Eating,” the akhilah vada’it, R. Bahya
discusses at length in the Second Gate of Shulhan Shel Arba, though there his
examples refer primarily to the kinds of “real eating” of which humans are
capable within the limits of their body/soul bundles in this world.
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IN TRANSFORMED BODIES: “THE FULL VESSEL THAT
CAN CONTAIN, BUT THE EMPTY ONE CANNOT”
But the bodies we’ll have to “eat” the intellectual meals of “Gan Eden” after the
resurrection of the dead will be dramatically transformed. First of all, they will
be much, much bigger. This is a reversal of the contraction of Adam and Eve’s
bodies (and the “downsizing” of their descendants as well) after the sin in the
Garden of Eden. R. Bahya knows this because of rabbinic traditions about the
heavenly Jerusalem where the windows are so high that we would have to be
supersized to be able to use them. But even more importantly, our new bodies
will have an unbounded capacity to take in the light.
Here’s how R. Bahya tries to describe the new and improved resurrected
body’s capacities in analogies and parables:
However, its way of taking delight there is not measured like bodily
things, which have measures and dimensions, but the upper beings
have no measure and dimension because their status is great, beyond
conception, and their way of taking delight deeper than any measure.
Come and see how the way of the Holy One Blessed be He is not
the way of flesh and blood. For flesh and blood, an empty vessel can
contain something, a full one cannot. But it is not so for the Holy One
Blessed be He. The full vessel can contain, the empty one cannot, as it is
said, “If only they would surely hear.” The explanation of this is that
insofar as bodily things have measure and dimension, when they are
empty they can filled, but when one fills it, they cannot contain any
more since they are already filled to their capacity, and nothing with
a capacity can contain something more than its capacity. But among
the upper things, full contains, since it has no measured capacity.23

I find this imaginative conceptualization of dimensionless bodies that the
righteous will acquire after the resurrection of the dead particularly striking,
with no temporal or spatial limits to the shiny goodness of the Divine Presence
one takes in.
R. Bahya mention of “upper beings” here alludes to his discussion of the
hierarchy of beings with which he begins his book to set the scene of God’s
original differentiation of upper from lower beings at the beginning of time
by means of the way they eat:
“This is the table which is before the Lord,” who spreads the heavens
like a canopy for a tent, sets earth over water, and feeds the creatures
of His home in three divisions: “the bottom, middle, and topmost

124

olam ha-zeh v’olam ha-ba: This World and the World to Come in Jewish Belief and Practice

decks.” In the highest realm are the ministering angels nearest to
Him: the cherubim, the seraphim, the ofanim, and the arielim. They
are attendants in His palace; in legions they feast on the light of His
presence, from the flowing light of His own radiance. The middle
realm is the “vest of the heavens,” an assembly of fire and water—
rains constraining and constrained—by day and night God restrains
them. The eyes of their minds see [tzofim] their Master’s delight as
their food, far sweeter to them than choice honey [tzufim]. They
hunger for the Cause of their existence; the pillars supporting their
realm are suspended by the arm of His wisdom, and quake at His
rebuke. But the lowest dwelling, a circle radiating from its midpoint,
has measurable dimensions. Our food is not their food. Their food is
conceived in their mind, when they see the face of their Maker. Our
food is meager bread, water, and tears, gotten by hard work and toil.24

For R. Bahya, this inequitable hierarchy is the cosmic consequence of Adam’s
sin in the Garden, when:
it was decreed for him that he would earn his bread only by the
sweat of his brow, and that man be humbled and brought low. He
traded pleasure [‘oneg] for plague [nega’], got hard work instead of
rest. His wisdom spoiled and his stature was diminished. It caused him
weakness instead of strength; instead of wheat, thorns came forth.
Instead of eternal life, death; instead of light, the shadow of death. With
all this the Lord raised the power of the upper beings, and worsened
the power of the lower beings.25

So the new bigger and better bodies with their unlimited capacities
promised to the righteous with the resurrection of the dead are clearly meant
to elevate them from their human status to an angelic status (and diet), which
they lost when Adam sinned and he and Eve were exiled from the Garden of
Eden. In the future they will get the angels’ uncomplicated and direct access to
the nourishing powers of the Divine Presence. What kind of people with what
kind of historical memories and experiences imagines as their future reward
bodies without borders, uninterrupted connection to their “real food” source,
elevation from their humble status, restoration to their “original” exalted status, and return from their exile from the primordial Garden of Eden?
WHY DO WE CARE NOW?
Any reflection about the world to come, whether medieval or modern, tells us
as much about the hopes, fears, desires, and aspirations of those in this world
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who imagine them (or deny or repress them) than the actual status (if any) of
those in the world to come. Moreover, as far as we know, only we in this world
receive the emotional and intellectual benefits (or disadvantages) of talking or
not talking about the specifics of the world to come. Perhaps the most conventional explanation for why descriptions of the next world are important for us
in this world, particularly those that emphasize rewards and punishments, is
that they offer an emotionally satisfying resolution to the problem of theodicy,
or the blatant injustice we often see in this world. It is patently obvious that
many wicked people go unpunished in this world and many good people seem
to get more than their fair share of suffering and little material reward for their
efforts; the world to come will make this all right and confirm our faith that
justice triumphs, even if we don’t see it now. But this works only for those who
actually find a next world plausible.
And though R. Bahya certainly assumes rewards and punishments are
part of what occurs in the world to come, what he says specifically about it
(and what he doesn’t) suggests he is interested in more than theodicy. Yes, he
insists on recompense for both body and soul for the righteous in the next
world, if not in this. But while he focuses on the specifics of the rewards,
namely, the delightful meals in the world to come, in Shulhan Shel Arba at
least, he pays almost no attention to the punishment of the unjust. There are
no tours of hell in this book, though his rabbinic sources certainly could have
provided them.
Rather, R. Bahya stresses how the meals in the world to come are the
restoration of the world as God had originally intended it, as he says in his
interpretation of the phrase b’alma di-vara herutay from the Kaddish.26 He
also tends to stress the quality of the next world’s “knowability,” as if what
he says about it were a sacred secret or revelation that we in this world
both tremble before and are attracted to know, a mysterium tremendum et
fascinans. He uses some of the typical phrases mystics use to effect a kind
of conspiratorial attentiveness in those of his audience who want to view
themselves as enlightened, that he’s about to divulge something fraught and
significant. It’s like he’s often saying, I’ve got a secret, and now I’m going to
tell you. Even though words are inadequate to express it, I’m going to do it
anyway.
R. Bahya even hints that what he’s revealing about the world to come
might come from near-death experiences (NDEs). For example, R. Bahya says
God’s reply to Moses, that a “man may not see me and live,” might actually
mean that:
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“while alive they [human beings with material bodies] do not see, but
upon their death they do see.” And this is after the separation of the
soul from its material form. And it is possible to specify further that
“upon their death” means when they are about to die, as in the topic
they discussed in Midrash Deuteronomy Rabbah, Parashat Ekev.27

And R. Bahya goes on to say:
“How abundant is the good that You have in store for those who fear
You.”28 It happened that when R. Abbahu was about to die, he saw the
gift of his reward, what the Holy One Blessed be He was going to give
him in the time to come, and all the good prepared for the righteous
themselves in the time to come. So when he saw all these consolations
which had been prepared, he exclaimed, “All these are for Abbahu!”
and immediately he desired to die, and began reciting: “How abundant is the good that You have in store for those who fear You.”29

In other words, the reward for the righteous upon death is as much the “gift”
of the insight and enhanced cognitive capacity the moment of their death gives
them as it is the content of the vision they see with it. But R. Bahya is in effect
sharing the visions of what might have come from near-death or deathbed
experiences with those living in this world now, so one doesn’t necessarily have
to die first to receive at least some benefit, some taste of this heightened insight.
R. Bahya also suggests this enhanced cognitive capacity is the same as
the insight of mystical ascent that heroic prophetic ancestors like Moses and
Enoch experienced. Moses and Enoch were vouchsafed secret revelations
about the soul’s rewards after death that are not mentioned explicitly in the
Bible, which were concealed from the masses who couldn’t understand them
but which were nevertheless necessary for their salvation:
Torah does not specify explicitly anywhere the matter of the Garden
of Eden being destined for the soul as a reward for the mitzvot, but
does specify the bodily things destined for Israel when they return
most certainly to their land, when they will have “all their rains in
their season” [Lev 26:4] and with the abundance of blessing and
happiness . . . because the Torah was given to the masses of all of
Israel, and the masses would not be able to understand the destined
intellectual things.30

Again, the secret knowledge revealed to prophets like Moses and Enoch, such
as that “Gan Eden” in the Torah is code for “the world of the souls,” is shared
with the enlightened in this world, who can now discern it through their intellect. That is what R. Bahya means when he says:
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It should be clear to the enlightened that the world of souls is the
“Garden of Eden” for the soul, but Scripture mixes it in the general
list of things destined for the body, and depended on the intellect of
the enlightened to discern it from them, that it would not be hidden
from him as it would be from the masses.31

While one could take this at face value as an assertion of the social class
hierarchy of enlightened Jews over “the masses” of Jews, to say to one’s audience
“this is a secret that only the enlightened know but the masses don’t” and then
immediately reveal the secret in effect confers onto anyone in R. Bahya’s audience the elevated status of “the enlightened.” Here is an example of the conspiratorial attentiveness I mentioned above that the rhetoric of mysticism typically
evokes by prefacing its “revelations” with phrases like “I’ve got a secret,” in order
to include its audience as sharers in an extraspecial, elite knowledge.32
TRANSFORMATIVE ECSTATIC
EXPERIENCE OF “SUPER BODIES”
That said, I don’t want to gloss over the importance of at least one striking aspect of the content of these visionary NDEs possibly alluded to in
R. Bahya’s Fourth Gate of Shulhan Shel Arba. Namely, R. Bahya discusses at
length how bodies are transformed into what might be called “super bodies,”
bodies unbounded by the normal physical and temporal boundaries of this
world, often bathed and glowing in light. We can find these phenomena cross-
culturally in different religions. As a modern scholar of comparative religion,
Jeffrey Kripal, puts it:
Human beings have consistently reported moments in which the
body functions as a window or star-gate into other dimensions
of reality. Indeed in religions we encounter paradoxical descriptions—such as a “spiritual body,” a “subtle body,” a “rainbow
body,” an “energetic body,” a “diamond body,” a “glorified body,”
a “resurrected body,” and so on. In art, moreover, the body literally glows. . . . Many religious traditions then have understood,
and no doubt experienced, the human body in truly fantastic ways
that overflow and transcend our present biomedical models, which
assume of course that all the action stops at the skin.33

These moments of expansive insight are typically described as life changing by those who report them. Kripal calls these experiences “super sexualities”
because they are often mentioned in accounts of illumination during sexual
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experiences, but they share features with both NDEs in general and with
R. Bahya’s descriptions of “bodies” at meals in the world to come. Kripal,
drawing upon the research of Jenny Wade, gives her list of features of these
“sexual spiritual events,” of which four in particular are pertinent:
•
•
•
•

streams of liquid light shooting out of the top of the head or skull;
past-life memories or visions, often compared to “watching a movie”;
the stopping of time and a sense of eternity;
the experience of every cell in the body vibrating at an extremely high
frequency, which in turn leads to an out-of-body experience and of being
both inside and outside the body.34

These also overlap with some of the characteristics typical of NDEs, that
is, “separation from the body, sometimes accompanied by a ‘spectator perspective,’” encounters with “beings of light,” and, as we alluded to above, an “indescribable” experience of being immersed in light and love in which “cognitive
and affective characteristics are fused,” “a sense of receiving special messages
or hidden truths,” and “for some . . . an instantaneous, timeless, and comprehensive vision of the totality of existence.”35 Moreover, they nearly always have
a profound personal effect on the way those who have them see and conduct
their lives after such experiences: “transforming aftereffects, such as loss of the
fear of death, newfound zest for everyday life, and renewed dedication to the
values of empathetic love, lifelong-learning, and service to others.”36
The association between NDEs and other visionary experiences of
transformed, enlightened super bodies that occur for extraordinary individuals or for ordinary individuals experiencing extraordinary events in this
world should be clear. Moreover, it is likely that R. Bahya’s description of
transformed soul/bodies nourished on the light of the Shekinah at meals in
the world to come are projections, at least in part, of such visionary experiences. It certainly is not unheard of for medieval kabbalistic literature to be
composed in part from ecstatic or visionary experiences, that is, through
automatic writing.37 It should also not be surprising that R. Bahya’s descriptions of transformed bodies and their enhanced capacities in the world to
come are similar to those found cross-culturally in other accounts of NDEs
and the afterlife:
As Gregory Shushan has suggested, mythologies surrounding death
and the afterlife are unusually similar across cultural and temporal
boundaries in ways that other types of mythologies are not . . .
because mythologies of the end are “correlates” (which is not to say
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literal descriptions) of actual human experiences of death,38 whereas
mythologies of the beginning can be only speculative. . . . Everyone
everywhere dies, but no human being was present at the Big Bang.39

On the other hand, R. Bahya’s particular choice of language to describe
the transformed bodies of the righteous as soul-bodies without boundaries—
“like a full vessel that can contain [more]”—may reflect particular Jewish
cultural and historical social experiences of the general human experience of
death.40 Might not the promise of such rewards express the sublimated social
anxieties of a people whose boundaries in their historical memory are constantly being violated, whose present social and political impact in this world
seems quite diminished in comparison to the dignity they deserve as faithful
members of God’s elect? Living under Christian and Muslim rule subject to
laws designed to humiliate them and thus “prove” their theological inferiority, Jews in this world imagine bodies whose boundaries are irrelevant, bodies
restored in the world to come to their original enormous size before Adam’s
sin in the Garden of Eden. This restoration of Jews’ stature (i.e., status) is
markedly different from contemporary Christian mythic imagination of transformed bodies in the afterlife.
Medieval Christian art and theological speculation about the next world
are preoccupied with the reassembly of fragmented bodies in their depiction
of the resurrection.41 While both R. Bahya’s Jewish and medieval Christian
depictions of transformed bodies insist on the “material continuity and personal survival” of this world’s embodied souls when they are resurrected in the
next world, they imagine the this worldly “problem” that bodily resurrection
“solves” differently. Perhaps the reassembly of fragmented bodies reflects sublimated Christian social anxieties about the constant religious divisions breaking
up the Christian empires, while Jewish resurrection is more concerned with
returning Jews to their exalted religious status.
Or maybe Jewish imagination of unlimited bodily capacity to consume
meals in the world to come expresses psychological longing for unblocked,
unbounded, and unmediated relationship with other persons: where the
line between diner and dinner, lover and beloved dissolves. Where we are
personally redeemed from exile and alienation from our Creator. Where our
bodies a ren’t fragmented, but we feel ourselves as fragments from the whole
of which we were originally an integral part. The “real eating” described in
the world to come and as a visionary experience is a metaphor for the union
or reunion of us creatures with our Creator that crosses even the boundary of death. Indeed R. Bahya concludes all that he has to say in his book
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Shulhan Shel Arba about meals in the world to come and in this world with
a comforting blessing to this effect: “May he encompass us with favor; in
the ‘bundle of life’ may He hide us, in the path of life may He guide us, and
grant us what is written, ‘For God is our God forever; He will guide us even
beyond death’ (Psalm 48:15).”42
Speaking words of Torah about the world to come, especially words of
Torah about meals while tasting them, has the power to elevate us emotionally and spiritually at our tables in this world.43 So R. Bahya says at the end
of his book:
With these words the enlightened will discern when they’re eating.
May they make themselves holy and their minds burnished fully. With
these words engaged, may they be at their table; raise their table’s
renown so that “all shall say ‘Glory!’” [Ps 29:9]. Let their hearts be
made pure, to withstand any test. “By these raise up the table” [Exod
28:28], so that “before the Lord” [Exod 41:22] is its label. This table
is greater than the table of kings, “he shall be permitted to join those
attending” [Zech 3:7], and to be lifted in honor to gaze on [ye-hazeh,
lit., “have a vision of ”] the face of David “among the lilies grazing”
[Song 6:3] to earn “the three-legged table”of gold ablazing.44 They will
earn the physical and intellectual meals, and be counted among the
benei aliyah [the elite, who have literally “gone up”].45

Creative imaginative conversations in the sacred language of Torah about
the elevating topics of God, our higher soul selves, sacred visionary or NDEs,
and the material and spiritual nourishment we remember from the past that is
promised to the righteous in the future, while enjoying meals in the company
of friends in the present, are a kind of perfect storm of experiences that have
the cumulative effect of elevating the basic physical acts of eating we need to
do to stay alive through the emotions of elevation they evoke. Self-conscious
experiences of thinking aloud about the Torah of meals in this world and the
world to come are fused with the concrete experiences of eating and drinking
at the table. Thus R. Bahya scripts ritual performances of textual study at meals
to heighten its users’ awareness of their experience of imaginative “midrashic”
reinterpretations of Jewish traditions.46 But if these traditional visions of the
world to come and our modern conversations about them can “only” imagine
our life after death, and not conclusively prove it, what’s the point of engaging
in them? Why should we care about an imagined olam ha-ba in olam ha-zeh?
In her book The Life of the World to Come, Carol Zaleski has a wonderful
reply to this objection:
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Certainly it is true that such imaginings will at present tell us more
about our own assumptions and longings than they do about the
heavenly society. And yet we have a right to them. The effort to
starve out the will to imagine has not produced the humane fruits it
was expected to bring. If anything, the contrary has been the case:
totalistic efforts to create utopia on earth and to suppress pie-in-the-
sky thinking have ended by creating hell on earth.
The social psychologist Robert Jay Lifton makes a convincing
case for the need for symbols of immortality that provide a sense
of continuity in the face of death. He finds that when individuals or societies are prevented from cultivating images of death that
promised continued life or transcendence, their moral energy is soon
sapped, and “psychic numbing” sets in. . . .
The common achievement of symbols of immortality is to offer
the individual a wider cosmos within which to dwell, nourished by
a rich network of social, natural, and spiritual connections. They
overcome isolation, and are therefore both reasonable and adaptive,
rather than illusory and regressive.47

It is reasonable and adaptive, not to mention morally compelling, for us Jews,
for all of us as humans, to exercise our imagination to maintain an expansive
view of what the world and we could be, and not be restricted by the boundaries of what our human sense perceptions, reason, and mortality limit us to
assume. Not like the empty cup in this world of flesh and blood, which can
contain only as much as its physical capacity allows, but rather like the full cup
in the world to come, which always has room for more.
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The Dybbuk: The Origins
and History of a Concept
Morris M. Faierstein
Approximately a century ago, Shlomo Zanvil Rapoport, better known by his
pen name, S. An-sky, began to write a play he called Between Two Worlds.
The play was a love story surrounded by a story of dybbuk possession.1 An-
sky’s interest in the dybbuk came from his ethnographic work, collecting
and preserving East European Jewish folk traditions that were quickly disappearing. The play premiered on December 9, 1920, in Warsaw, and the rest
is history. It became the most popular Yiddish play, quickly translated into
Hebrew and a number of other languages, and performed all over the world.
It remains the great icon of Yiddish theater. A side effect was that the subject
of the dybbuk was popularized as a folk motif. Despite this popularity, or
perhaps because of it, the subject of dybbuk possession did not become the
subject of serious scholarly inquiry. The few scholarly studies that have been
published take An-sky’s play as their starting point and assume it represents
an accurate understanding of the concept and its history.2 This study will
endeavor to reconsider the concept of the dybbuk through an examination
of the primary sources that discuss this concept without prior assumptions
or theories. It will also trace the historical development and evolution of the
dybbuk concept.
Tales of people being possessed by demons and other evil spirits can
be found in Jewish literature as early as the first century c.e. Talmudic and
midrashic literature also contain such stories,3 but these stories did not attract
significant attention or comments in the post-talmudic medieval Jewish tradition. The classic models of possession in Christianity were the stories of possession of people by demons and by Satan, and their exorcism by Jesus in the
New Testament.4 Following Jesus’s example, stories of possession and exorcism
were often encountered in the lives of Christian saints. The ability to exorcise
or subdue a demonic spirit or even to vanquish the works of Satan was a sure
sign of sainthood. Stories of demonic possession and connection to Satanic
forces, which came to be known as witchcraft, grew in the course of the medieval period and reached a high point in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
in the midst of the religious and political conflicts arising from the Protestant
Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation.5
135
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In the Jewish tradition, aside from the talmudic stories of demonic possession, it was only in sixteenth century Safed that we hear of cases of people
being possessed and needing exorcism. A new type of entity appeared, the
soul of a Jewish man who had committed a sin whose punishment was that
the soul would be trapped between this world and the next and would have
to wander until expiation was found for the sin. There is no evidence in the
literature of a female dybbuk. Hayyim Vital explicitly stated that the soul of
a woman cannot become a dybbuk because women do not participate in the
process of gilgul. Rather, their souls are sent directly to gehenna, where they are
punished for their sins.6 There is also no evidence that the soul of a non-Jew
could be a dybbuk.7
The soul of the sinner condemned to gilgul was originally called an “evil
spirit” [ruah rah] in the early possession stories from Safed. It has been the
conventional wisdom that the term dybbuk, meaning that which is attached,
began to be used instead of “evil spirit” at the end of the seventeenth century.8
More recently, Sara Zfatman has demonstrated that this terminological transition took place later, in the first part of the eighteenth century. The first reference to the term dybbuk that she found is in a story of an exorcism in Speyer
in 1715.9 For the purpose of clarity, I will use the term dybbuk even where it
is historically anachronistic.
Theoretical Origins of the Dybbuk Concept
The theoretical bases for the concept of the dybbuk are two kabbalistic concepts, gilgul [transmigration or metempsychosis] and ibbur [impregnation].
The concept of gilgul is first found in the early kabbalistic work, Sefer Bahir,
and then expanded in the Zohar, the great classic of medieval Kabbalah. The
punishment of gilgul was originally related in kabbalistic literature to transgressing the laws of levirate marriage. The person who refused to marry his
sister-in-law and perpetuate the memory of his brother by having a son with
her or participating in the ritual of halitzah, which would allow her to marry
someone else, was punished with gilgul. That is, his soul would wander the
earth endlessly and he would never find rest or find expiation for his other sins.
Gradually, the range of sins that necessitated the punishment of gilgul and that
could be expiated through it was expanded.
There is a midrashic exemplum, “The Tanna and the Dead Man,” that
is probably the earliest description of a case of gilgul and its resolution, even
though the term gilgul is not attached to this story. Various versions of this
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story are cited in a number of post-talmudic and medieval sources, including
the Zohar.10 An early version of this story is found in tractate Kallah Rabbati:
Come and hear; R. Akiba went to a certain place [a cemetery] where
he met a man [i.e., a ghost] carrying a heavy load on his shoulder with which he was unable to proceed, and he was crying and
groaning. He asked him, “What did you do [in your lifetime]?” He
replied, “There is no forbidden act in the world which I left undone,
and now guards have been set over me who do not allow me to
rest.” R. Akiba asked him, “have you left a son?” He answered, “By
your life! Do not detain me because I fear the angels who beat me
with fiery lashes and say to me, ‘Why do you not walk quickly?’”
R. Akiba said to him, “Tell me whom have you left?” He replied,
“I have left behind my wife who was pregnant.” R. Akiba then proceeded to that city and inquired, “Where is the son of So and So?”
[The inhabitants] replied, “May the memory of that wicked person
be uprooted.” He asked them the reason and they said, “He robbed
and preyed upon people and caused them suffering; what is more,
he violated a betrothed girl on the Day of Atonement.” He made his
way to the house and found the wife about to be delivered of a child.
He waited until she gave birth to [a son], circumcised him and when
he grew up, took him to the Synagogue to join in public worship.
Later R. Akiba returned to that [cemetery] and [the ghost] appeared
to him and said, “May your mind be [always] at rest because you
have set my mind at rest.”11

Later versions of this story are much more detailed and have many
similarities to the interrogations of the dybbuk found in some of the dybbuk
tales from the seventeenth century and later. However, this story, which is the
prototype for the concept of gilgul, only brings us halfway to the concept of
the dybbuk. The second aspect that is also crucial to the dybbuk is the concept of ibbur, impregnation of a soul within the body of another person. As
we will see, ibbur remained a theoretical concept until we get to the kabbalists
of Safed.
Another definition of gilgul that evolved entailed the soul being reborn
into a new body and being given the opportunity to atone for a sin that had
not been completely expiated in the original lifetime of the soul. A famous
example is the story of the ten Rabbinic Martyrs who were killed by the
Romans at the end of the Bar Kochba rebellion. According to the medieval
Midrash Bereshit Rabbati, by Rabbi Moses ha-Darshan, the death of the ten
martyrs was a punishment for the sin committed by Joseph’s ten brothers, who
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were present when they sold him into slavery. This is found in an extended
commentary on Genesis 37:26. The rabbis were the gilgulim of the ten
brothers.12 An extended discussion of this type of gilgul can also be found in
Hayyim Vital’s mystical diary, Sefer Hezyonot, which will be discussed below.
A dybbuk was a soul that had committed particularly heinous crimes
that could not be atoned for merely by being transmigrated into a new body,
where it could atone for its original sin. The dybbuk was trapped in a limbo,
wandering between heaven and gehenna, between this world and the next,
until expiation was found and the soul could be judged and sent to gehenna
for its punishment and then on to the Garden of Eden for its reward. Ibbur
was considered a much more esoteric subject than gilgul and was not the subject of significant discussion. The term ibbur was always preceded by the term
sod [the secret of ], and any discussion of the concept and its significance was
strongly discouraged. For the most part, ibbur was restricted to the righteous
and considered a reward rather than a punishment.13
Before the fifteenth century, the concepts of gilgul and ibbur were only
abstract concepts found in rabbinic and kabbalistic literature. With the dissemination of kabbalistic texts and ideas the concept of gilgul became the
subject of debate and disagreement between kabbalists and rationalist Jewish
philosophers.14 The philosophers rejected the concept of gilgul, under the
influence of philosophical traditions going back to Aristotle’s concept of the
soul. It is noteworthy that Christianity and mainstream Islam also rejected the
concept of transmigration. Christian theologians of all denominations, Protestant and Catholic, repeatedly rejected the concept of transmigration and the
possibility of possession by the souls of the deceased.15 Sunni Islam also does
not accept the concept of transmigration, but some offshoots of Shi’ite Islam,
like the Druze, Alawites, and Ismailis, accept the concept of transmigration.16
In other words, belief in possession by a dybbuk is impossible in the Christian
and mainstream Muslim traditions. It is a uniquely Jewish concept. Of course,
transmigration is a key concept in Hinduism and Buddhism along with the
religions that emanate from them. However, the understanding of this concept
in these religions is different from its understanding in Judaism, and an analysis is beyond our present purview.
Gilgul and Ibbur in Safed
The first reports of actual cases of possession, based on the concepts gilgul and
ibbur, appeared in the literature of the kabbalistic revival in Safed. Why did
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the Safed kabbalists give life to the concept of dybbuk possession, and what
purpose did it serve in their reinterpretation of Jewish belief and practice? Why
did this concept move from the theoretical to the actual only in Safed? There
are no reports of the appearance of a dybbuk prior to the Safed events. Central
to answering this question are the concepts of gilgul and ibbur and how they
were implemented by the kabbalists of Safed. The aspect of gilgul that most
interested the kabbalists of Safed is the idea of soul families and family trees.17
This concept asserts that there is a familial relationship between souls that can
impact a person’s present life and behaviors. One of Luria’s mystical talents was
that he could also look at someone’s forehead and tell them about the history
of their soul, not only about their previous gilgulim, but also identify to which
soul families they belonged.
In the fourth part of his mystical diary, Book of Visions, Hayyim Vital discusses in great detail what he was told by R. Isaac Luria about the origins and
history of his soul, tracing it back to Adam’s sons, Cain and Abel. Surprisingly,
Vital’s soul is traced back to Cain, rather than to Abel, as one might normally
expect. Luria also told Vital about his prior gilgulim, starting with Rabbi Vidal
de Tolosa (second half of the fourteenth century), author of the Maggid Mishneh, an important commentary on Maimonides’ great halachic work, Mishneh
Torah. Vital then went through several more gilgulim in undistinguished
people, each of whom committed a sin relating to blood that was not atoned
for. It was now Vital’s turn, and he needed to exert himself to finally atone for
the sin first committed by Rabbi Vidal de Tolosa.18
This was important because a Yihud or unification, which is a form of
ibbur, was efficacious when one tried to unite their soul with the soul of a
deceased worthy who was from the same soul family. Yihud of two souls that
have a familial connection is one version of positive ibbur. The concept of
ibbur asserts that it is possible for the soul of a deceased person to enter the
body of a living person and communicate with the living person’s soul and
mind. There are two types of positive ibbur, and one of negative ibbur, and
all three, Yihud and the two types of ibbur, are represented in the literature of
Safed. Of the three, the negative one, dybbuk possession, is the best known,
but the positive ones were the more important ones for the kabbalists of Safed.
The most important practitioner of Yihudim was Isaac Luria, who regularly
visited the grave of Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, the purported author of the
Zohar, the canonical text of the kabbalistic tradition. Rabbi Simeon’s grave
was in Meron, not far from Safed. Luria also saw himself, and was seen by
his disciples, as a gilgul of Rabbi Simeon, which further enhanced his aura of
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authority.19 Not only was Luria a gilgul of Rabbi Simeon, but his disciples were
also seen as the gilgulim of Rabbi Simeon’s disciples mentioned in the Zohar.20
In addition to the Yihudim of Luria and his disciples, there was another
type of positive ibbur possession in Safed. In this type of ibbur, the person
being possessed did not directly invite the possession, but it was for a positive purpose and the person was not harmed. The best known example is the
Maggid, the heavenly messenger who guided Rabbi Joseph Karo in many ways
throughout his life. The messages and instructions of the Maggid are contained
in Karo’s book, Maggid Mesharim.21 Another example of maggidic possession is found in Hayyim Vital’s mystical diary, the Book of Visions. It tells the
story of the heavenly messenger who possessed the daughter of Raphael Anav
and brought a number of messages for Hayyim Vital, with her acting as the
medium.22
Maggid and Dybbuk
About the same time that the phenomenon of maggidic possession appeared
in the sixteenth century, another type of possession appeared, by a malevolent
spirit that came to be known as a dybbuk and that could be seen as the negative inverse of the maggid. Rather than bringing positive revelations, it brought
discord and the revelation of sins and misbehavior on the part of participants
and observers. As Moshe Idel has observed, it is no accident that Rabbi Joseph
Karo, the best known person possessed by a maggid,23 was also the first exorcist
of a dybbuk. The two phenomena were two sides of the same coin, the result
of attempts by kabbalists in the sixteenth century to access divine revelations
by magical means.24
Dybbuk Possession in Safed
The negative form of ibbur is what we call dybbuk possession. In this circumstance, a soul that has been condemned to the punishment of gilgul finds a
vulnerable human host and takes it over. Dybbukim, when questioned, often
mentioned the pain of wandering and their desire to find rest, which can be
found only in a host. The dybbuk not only took over control of the host’s
body, but also took over the ability to speak and move, and the host became a
puppet that was controlled by the dybbuk. While the details of how and why a
dybbuk entered a person are interesting, our interest here is in the larger social
and cultural significance of dybbuk possession.

The Dybbuk

141

The Safed literature contains seven stories of dybbuk possession. Certain
things stand out about this group of stories. The people being possessed were
four men and three women. Two of the males were described as young boys,
and one was eighteen years old. The fourth man was Rabbi Hayyim Vital,
Luria’s most important disciple.25 The three females are described as a woman,
the daughter of someone, and a widow.26
Another characteristic of the Safed exorcism stories is that relatively little
attention is paid to the actual events in most of the Safed descriptions. There
are no detailed descriptions of what happened at an exorcism in Safed in the
literature produced by the Safed kabbalists themselves. The event of possession
is mentioned and that an attempt at exorcism was made. Half the time the
exorcism failed, and the person being possessed died as a result of the process
of forcing the dybbuk to leave. In one case, R. Isaac Luria could not go, so he
taught his disciple, R. Hayyim Vital, what to do and sent him to deal with the
matter alone. In another case, Vital records that he became angry at a dybbuk
for not showing the proper respect he felt was due him. After slapping the dybbuk and rebuking him, he concludes his account with, “and then I exorcised
him.”27 It would seem that getting proper respect was more important for Vital
than exorcising a dybbuk.
The Purpose of Dybbuk Stories in Safed
There does not seem to be any larger purpose in these stories. Unlike other
stories about Luria, they do not reflect positively on his mystical powers and
abilities, which seems to be the purpose of most of the other stories preserved
about him. What then was the significance and meaning of these dybbuk possession stories for the kabbalists of Safed? If the purpose were to glorify Luria’s
magical and mystical powers, one would have expected a much higher success
rate for the exorcisms that Luria attempted. Rather, I would suggest that they
are related to the important role that the concepts of gilgul and ibbur played
in Safed Kabbalah. These two interrelated concepts were central to the process
of validating and authenticating the apparently new ideas and practices of the
Safed kabbalists.
By the second half of the sixteenth century, a combination of factors,
including the codification of Jewish law in Rabbi Joseph Karo’s Shulhan
Arukh28 and the printing press, which made many more works available, had
the effect of canonizing certain ideas and practices. This gave them an air of
authority that made religious innovation more difficult than it had been before
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the age of print. Yet, in spite of the increasing difficulties of religious innovation and creativity, Isaac Luria and the circle of kabbalists in Safed were able
to revolutionize both the study of Kabbalah and more importantly the practice
of Judaism. The new religious practices and rituals created or “rediscovered”
by the Safed kabbalists in the Zohar and other medieval kabbalistic texts transformed Judaism in the following centuries.29
The Source of Isaac Luria’s Religious Authority
Central to understanding how this innovation occurred is the question of Isaac
Luria’s religious authority. There were two stages in Luria’s career, and in each
of them a different reason was offered to support the religious authority and
sanctity of Luria’s teachings. The first phase was the six years in Egypt that
began when he obtained a manuscript of mystical writings and ended with
his heavenly mentor, Elijah the prophet, telling him that the time had come
for him to go to the land of Israel and become a teacher of mysticism. During
these six years he spent his time in a hut near the Nile studying with Elijah,
who taught him the meaning of the esoteric manuscript that he had obtained.
Thus, his ideas had the approval and support of his heavenly mentor.30
Luria arrived in Safed in early 1570 c.e. That summer, Moses Cordovero, who had been considered the greatest kabbalist of Safed before Luria’s
arrival, became ill. Before his death his disciples asked him, who would be
his successor? He responded that it would be the one who would see the
pillar of fire over his grave. At the funeral, Luria said that he saw a pillar of
fire in a certain place in the cemetery and that should be the site of Cordovero’s grave. Luria had fulfilled the sign that Cordovero had told his disciples
to look for. Within a few months of his arrival in Safed, Luria became the
dominant figure in the Safed kabbalistic community that had been established approximately thirty-five years earlier. His kabbalistic teachings supplanted those of Cordovero and became the dominant school of kabbalistic
thought.31
There is no evidence of any claims to revelations from Elijah during his
period in Safed. Aside from his personal charisma, which undoubtedly was
great, what was the religious authority that gave the great weight necessary
to move the community to accept his teachings and innovations in religious
practice over those of his predecessors? An additional problem is the belief
among kabbalists that true innovation in Kabbalah ended with Nahmanides
(d. 1270 c.e.).32 I believe the answer is to be found in his claim to be a gilgul,
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a transmigration of Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, the author of the Zohar, the
most authoritative work of Kabbalah, and the use of the concepts of gilgul and
ibbur, which were combined in the concept of Yihud as the explanation and
validation of his spiritual and charismatic authority.
Yihudim
The process of Yihudim [unifications] was that Luria would prostrate himself
on the grave of his soul mate, Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, and through a series
of prayers and mystical incantations invite the soul of the deceased to come
down from heaven and unite with the kabbalist’s soul in his body. When this
union was effected, the kabbalist could communicate with the other soul and
acquire information about future events or obtain a better understanding of a
text that was not clear. R. Shloimel Dreznitz, author of the first hagiography
of R. Isaac Luria, quoted a description of Luria’s practice of Yihudim:
He [Luria] used to stretch himself out on the tomb of R. Simeon bar
Yohai, and he knew how to cleave spirit to spirit, and to concentrate
on binding and raising up his soul with that of R. Simeon until he
brought about unity above. Afterwards, R. Simeon’s soul descended
into his body, and R. Simeon would speak with him, revealing to
him all that he had learned in the academy on high, as a man speaks
with his neighbor.33

Were one to see R. Isaac Luria as he engaged in one of his Yihudim in
Meron, one would see little beyond Luria lying on the grave, praying and
perhaps some small bodily movement. On the other hand, the positive and
negative public manifestations of gilgul and ibbur, that is, dybbukim and maggidim, were public events that the community could see and hear. They helped
reinforce Luria’s claims to spiritual authority. Having seen a dybbuk possess
someone or hearing from eyewitnesses about Karo’s maggid gave greater credence to the idea that Luria could meditate on the grave of a great talmudic
figure, like Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, and come back with new interpretations and teachings that derived from a heavenly source that vouched for its
authenticity and authority. The dybbuk stories in Safed did not play a central
role in developing the status of Rabbi Isaac Luria as a holy man. Rather, they
supported and added further validation of his status as a religious authority
whose innovations were supported by the heavenly and ancient authority of
his earlier incarnation and soul mate, Rabbi Simeon bar Yohai, the author of
the holy Zohar.
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The Dybbuk in the Seventeenth Century
The subsequent history of the dybbuk concept and its relation to the Safed
incidents is complicated. Many of the relevant Safed stories concerning dybbukim were found in documents that remained in manuscript and were not
published until much later, some as late as the middle of the twentieth century.
For example, Hayyim Vital’s Sefer Hezyonot, the single most important source
of dybbuk stories in Safed, was not published in a complete edition until
1954.34 Thus, most of what was subsequently known about dybbuk possession
was based on two documents first published in the seventeenth century.
The first source is a letter written by R. Elijah Falcon, a disciple of
Luria’s, who was expelled by Luria from his group of disciples.35 Falcon wrote
a long letter in which he described in great detail an exorcism that occurred in
Safed in 1571. He also appended a second shorter exorcism story. He circulated copies of this letter to a number of Jewish communities. His motivations
in sending this letter are not clear, and we do not know to which communities
he sent this letter. However, copies of this letter have survived in a number of
sources. The first published version of his whole letter was in Manasseh Ben
Israel’s work Nishmat Hayyim, which defended the immortality of the soul and
was published in Amsterdam in 1652. The story of the possession and exorcism was published in the context of being another piece of evidence attesting
to the immortality of the soul. The second story in Falcon’s letter appeared
in the Yiddish Mayse Bukh, first published at Basel in 1602. This is the first
published account of a dybbuk.36 Another important witness to the circulation
of Falcon’s letter is Divrei Yosef, a chronicle by Joseph Sambari, composed in
Damascus in the 1670s, but not published until the 1990s.37
The second description of a dybbuk is found in Rabbi Yosef Shlomo
Delmedigo’s Ta’alumot Hokhmah, published by his disciple, Samuel Ashkenazi,
at Basel in 1629. Among the things published in this kabbalistic miscellany
were three letters by R. Shloimel Dresnitz and an appendix that described the
possession and exorcism of a dybbuk. Dresnitz was a kabbalist from Moravia
who went to Safed in the 1590s to learn more about the new kabbalistic developments there. He stayed and married the daughter of one of Luria’s disciples.
He also sent a series of letters to his friend, Rabbi Issachar Ber of Kremnitz,
in Poland describing what he had heard about Luria and his greatness. These
letters became the basis of the hagiographical account of Luria’s life known as
Shivhei ha-AR”I. At the end of the third letter there is a dybbuk story, similar
in many ways to Falcon’s account.38
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These two accounts by Dresnitz and Falcon became the basis for many
of the future dybbuk stories and traditions. The relationship of these two
documents to the actual events in Safed that they purport to describe is not
entirely clear. Further analysis and comparison of these two accounts is necessary before a decision can be made with regard to their historical accuracy.
There are significant differences between these two accounts and the accounts
of possession and exorcism found in the writings of Hayyim Vital and other
Safed kabbalists that were not published until the late nineteenth or even
twentieth century.
One thing that jumps out when one compares the Safed accounts to
these two letters is the brevity and lack of detail in the Safed accounts and the
prolixity and great detail of these letters. In addition, motifs, concepts, and
procedures first found in these two texts became stereotypical aspects of almost
all the later stories of possession and exorcism, but are not found in the Safed
texts. For example, the intense interrogation of the dybbuk that is a central
part of the Falcon letter is not a feature of the Safed stories. Isaac Luria had
the unique ability to discern the sources and sins of souls and did not need to
interrogate the dybbuk. Introducing smoke under the nose of the possessed
person to drive out the dybbuk is also not found in Safed. It is noteworthy that
both of these motifs are important in stories of Christian stories of demonic
exorcisms. A closer comparison between the details of the Safed stories with
the Dresnitz and Falcon accounts is an important desideratum. The Falcon
account, in particular, has aspects that raise questions about its authenticity.
The second half of the seventeenth century also produced the first
dybbuk account that is most likely fictional. Sarah Zfatman found an interesting Yiddish pamphlet that is known in only one copy that has survived,
called “The Exorcism of the Evil Spirit in Koretz.” Her study of this story
demonstrated that it had no historical basis and must be considered to be a
fictional account. The pamphlet has no date, but the physical evidence of the
pamphlet dates it to the end of the seventeenth century in Eastern Europe.39
More recently, Zfatman has discussed several more dybbuk stories reported in
the same period and geographical area in a major monograph.40 Unlike the
Koretz story, the story of a dybbuk in Nikolsburg, Moravia, in 1696 included
well-known historical figures, and the story was widely reported and may have
become a model for later dybbuk stories.41
One aspect of this story that stands out is the Sabbatean connection of
some of the figures involved in this episode.42 This relationship to Sabbateanism may be the key to understanding the significance of this dybbuk incident.
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From its beginnings, this movement sought to demonstrate its legitimacy by
modeling itself on the Safed kabbalistic revival. Prophecy and direct contact
with the divine world were central aspects of Sabbateanism,43 and like in
Safed, a dybbuk would be a vivid illustration that direct contact between the
mundane and heavenly worlds was still possible. In other words, the dybbuk
played a similar role for the Sabbateans in late seventeenth century Moravia as
it did for the kabbalists in Safed a century earlier.
The Sabbatean relation to the dybbuk is confirmed by the significant
role it played in the writings of Rabbi Elijah ha-Cohen of Izmir, known by
his nickname, Ittamari. He was born in the middle of the seventeenth century, lived in Izmir, and died in 1729. He is best known as the author of the
famous ethical work Shevet Musar, but he was a prolific author who wrote a
large number of homiletical and ethical works, most of which were published
after his death. He never served as a rabbi, but was a popular and influential
preacher, who was influenced by Kabbalah.44 Recent scholarship has suggested
that he was a moderate follower of the false messiah, Sabbetai Sevi.45 He gives
the following explanation as his reason for his interest in dybbukim: “I the
author say that it is a mitzvah to publicly inform the public about the concept
of gilgul and to inculcate this in their minds that through the concept of gilgul many difficult questions can be resolved that cause a person to turn from
God, because of the [problem of ] the righteous who suffer, and similar things.
Through the concept of gilgul, these problems will be resolved, and the wise
will understand the matter.”46
With the rise of Chasidism, the ability to exorcise a dybbuk became one
of the attributes of the Chasidic zaddiq. The hagiographical biography of Israel
Baal Shem Tov (Besht), the founder of Hasidism, Shivhei ha-Besht, was directly
modeled on Shivhei ha-Ari, that of Isaac Luria.47 Shivhei ha-Besht included an
important story of his encounter with and domination of a dybbuk. According
to one story, when the Besht and several others entered the room where a possessed woman was found, the spirit possessing her greeted each according to
his deeds and status. However, the spirit said to the Besht that it was not afraid
of him because it knew that he had been forbidden by heaven to utilize holy
names and to practice as a baal shem before his thirty-sixth birthday.48 In turn,
the Baal Shem Tov became the model for future Chasidic leaders, and exorcism stories proliferated and became a standard part of Chasidic hagiography.
Accounts of dybbuk possession and exorcism were part of later Chasidic hagiography, chapbooks, and popular folklore. It is also noteworthy that most of
the dybbuk stories in Chasidic hagiography are secondhand accounts, stories
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told about earlier figures and not firsthand accounts of events witnessed by the
narrator of the story.49
An-sky’s play is a combination of several of these factors with a heavy
dose of influence from Russian theatrical adaptations of Romeo and Juliet, as
has been demonstrated by a number of authors in the important collection of
essays on An-sky edited by Steve Zipperstein and Gabriella Safran.50 It may
be good theater, but in no way does it reflect the historical reality of dybbuk
possession. The full history and meaning of the dybbuk concept remains to
be explored.
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Tasting Heaven: Wine and the World
to Come from the Talmud to Safed
Vadim Putzu
INTRODUCTION
Until recently, in Italian family restaurants it was customary to find, hanging
on the walls, a plaque that pictured two monks standing by a barrel, mugs in
their hands. The picture was captioned with the saying: “In heaven there is no
wine, so drink up while you are on earth!” In addition to encouraging patrons
to have a drink while at the restaurant, this sign also teaches us that, according
to Italian folk wisdom, one of the features that characterize the hereafter, as
opposed to the present world, is its absence of wine. What is the situation as
far as the Jewish tradition is concerned? Can wine help us distinguish between
the olam ha-zeh and the olam ha-ba?
What follows is a short investigation of wine as it is represented and
employed in relation to the world to come in kabbalistic literature and in
some rabbinic texts. It will be argued that an analysis of the ways in which
the rabbinic sages and, most prominently, renowned kabbalists (such as the
authors of the Zohar [Book of Splendor], Joseph Karo, and Moses Cordovero)
pictured and/or used wine gives us an intoxicating taste of their perspectives
about this world and the hereafter alike. More specifically, the stage will be
set by first showing how rabbinic descriptions of wine mirror, on the one
hand, their authors’ preoccupation with the olam ha-zeh: both winemaking
and this-worldly existence require much toiling; the joys we can derive from
them need to be regulated and confined to holy times; both can easily end up
in degradation and sin. On the other hand, according to the rabbinic sages,
the wine of the olam ha-ba is deprived of all of its negative aspects: it is easy
to make, abundant, and gladdens without ever leading to sinful drunkenness—thus coming to represent the very delights that characterize existence
in the world to come.
Kabbalists further contributed to the development of this picture by
variously elaborating on the role of wine drinking for the sake of earning
one’s place in the hereafter. In this regard, the second and main part of this
study contends that, while Karo’s insistence on the importance of abstention
and the Zoharic authors’ recommendation to imbibe the symbolic wine of
Torah signal their negative perception of this world, Cordovero’s strategic
151
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Italian popular plaque with wine-drinking monks. The text translates as: “In heaven
there is no wine. Let us drink it while on earth!” Courtesy of Cristina Forest.

emphasis on the significance of preserving wine from Gentile contact for
the sake of reaching the olam ha-ba reveals much about his overall plan for
the olam ha-zeh.
THE PLACE OF WINE IN (PREMODERN) JUDAISM
The topic of wine in Judaism has, until recently, received little scholarly attention, especially for what concerns the medieval and early modern periods.1
However, the current state of studies does not reflect the peculiarly important
role of wine in Judaism and Jewish history. For our purposes, it is worthwhile
to briefly highlight the ubiquitous presence of this beverage in various aspects
of Jewish life in premodern times:
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• As food, wine constituted one of the basic ingredients of the biblical2
and the medieval meal,3 providing an important caloric intake and
reputedly stimulating appetite and digestion.4
• In the medical field, wine was widely employed and was credited with
many beneficial properties,5 including that of sanitizing drinking water.
• As an occupation, wine production and trade represented a significant
activity from both a religious and an economic viewpoint.6 Moreover,
vintage and winemaking activities must have employed, at least for
limited periods, most members of the Jewish community.7
• In the area of worship, wine was—and still is—an essential element of
several rituals that characterize both the regularly recurring holy days
(Sabbath, Passover, Purim, etc.) and some special lifecycle events (such
as circumcision and marriage).8
Connected to this latter aspect in particular is the role that wine has performed, since biblical times, as an indicator of a specific socio-religious identity9 and/or ethnicity.10 In this sense, the act of (not) drinking (a certain type
of ) wine has served both to distinguish Jews from non-Jews,11 and to establish
an internal differentiation within the Jewish population itself.12
The important and conspicuous presence of wine in many dimensions
of Jewish existence has also facilitated its use as a metaphor and a symbol, as
is apparent already in the Tanakh. Ever since its first biblical attestations, this
beverage is characterized by a fundamental symbolic ambivalence, inasmuch
as it is associated with prosperity and beauty on the one hand, but also with
debauchery and sin on the other.13 As we shall see, this alternation between
positive and negative connotations of wine as a symbol or metaphor can also
be found in rabbinic literature and among kabbalists.
FOR A JEWISH CULTURAL ENOLOGY
The above-mentioned ubiquitous presence and important role of wine in multiple realms of premodern Jewish life, combined with certain general features
of this beverage (variety of colors, aromas, and flavors; mind-altering effects;
integration of natural and cultural components), conferred to it a distinctive
status within Judaism. This has resulted in its prominent use as an ambivalent
symbol throughout Jewish history.14 Following from this recognition, the present study argues that the attitudes premodern Jews maintained toward wine
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provide a smaller-scale reflection of their perspectives on broader ideological
and existential issues (in our case, their assessment of the nature and state of
this world, and their expectations and plans for the hereafter). This is a contention that—within certain historical and geographical limitations—allows for
an anthropology of wine within Judaism or, rather, for a Jewish cultural enology.15 Accordingly, investigating the attitudes of Jewish authors toward wine
may contribute to elucidating more fundamental elements in their mentalities,
highlighting larger similarities and differences in their general religious and
cultural outlooks.16
IS THERE WINE IN THE WORLD-TO- COME?
In the above-mentioned sign warning customers about the lack of wine in
heaven, which used to camp in many Italian popular restaurants, this beverage
is singled out and employed to characterize the afterworld in opposition to
the present one. Here, Italian culture expresses its perspectives on this world
and the hereafter by appealing to one of its most popular and central products—wine. Quite similarly, premodern Judaism, for which wine also held a
very important role, used this beverage to depict the olam ha-ba, voicing its
concerns for the olam ha-zeh in the process.
Jewish representations of the afterworld in vinous terms appear in
many classic texts of rabbinic literature. For example, in the Talmud we find:
“The world to come is not like this world. In this world there is the trouble
of harvesting and treading [of the grapes], but in the world to come a man
will bring one grape on a wagon or a ship, put it in a corner of his house
and use its contents as [if it had been] a large wine cask, while its timber
would be used to make fires for cooking. There will be no grape that will not
contain thirty kegs of wine.”17 The rabbis’ portrayal of the world to come
through references to winemaking is one of leisurely existence and abundance. At the same time, this life of ease and plenty is presented as being
radically different from the ordinary existence of the rabbinic sages in this
world. From their depiction of the olam ha-ba, it appears that the rabbis of
the Talmud perceived that the life they were living was marked by scarcity
and uncertainty. One needed to do much toiling in order to achieve very
little and could never be sure that she would succeed in reaping the fruits of
her hard work.
The notion that, according to the rabbinic sages, our worldly existence is
characterized by insecurity and risk can also be evinced from their descriptions
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of the effects of wine on those who drink it in the olam ha-zeh as opposed to
what will happen in the olam ha ba. If, on the one hand, the Talmud states
that, after the destruction of the Temple, the joys man can experience in this
world can come only from the heart-gladdening effect of wine,18 on the other
hand, the rabbis variously declare that these same wine-induced pleasures need
to be regulated and confined to holy times, inasmuch as they can all too easily
lead one to degradation and sin.19
Some rabbinic texts explain the fact that the unavoidable threat of pleasure
slipping into debauchery is an inherent trait of human existence in the olam
ha-zeh by portraying the origin of the post-Edenic world as an act of (excessive)
wine drinking. For example, one midrashic tradition attributes Adam and Eve’s
“original sin” to wine, as it claims: “That [forbidden] tree from which Adam ate
was a vine, for nothing else but wine brings woe to man.”20 According to this
text, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was a grapevine, and therefore
wine was the substance responsible for interrupting the paradisiac life of man’s
progenitors in the Garden of Eden and for plunging them into the uncertain
and dangerous condition that is this-worldly existence.
Interestingly, when presenting wine in the olam ha-zeh and the human
condition its consumption has engendered in rather ambivalent terms, the
rabbinic sages also envisage a radical reversal of this situation in the olam
ha-ba. As one texts puts it: “The Holy One Blessed be He said: ‘Since in this
world wine is a problem to the world, in the future to come I will turn it into
[a bearer of ] joy.’”21 Unlike ordinary wine, the wine of the world to come
brings about all of the positive and none of the negative effects it ordinarily
has on its drinkers. In this, this special beverage epitomizes the extraordinary
existence—all joys, no problems—that awaits those who have earned their
portion in the hereafter, and it is thus indicated as the eschatological reward
for the righteous.
Indeed, according to various passages, those deserving to return to the
Garden of Eden in the messianic age will drink “the wine which has been
preserved in its grapes since the six days of Creation.”22 In dealing with wine
and the afterworld, the rabbis establish a reverse parallel between the existence
of mankind in its protological and eschatological state. Just as wine drinking
drove the first humans out of the Garden, causing them to forfeit their Edenic
condition for a this-worldly one (which the production and consumption of
this beverage come to exemplify), the act of imbibing a unique vintage, stored
in Eden since before the time of Adam and Eve’s transgression, will characterize the otherworldly state of those living in the olam ha-ba.23
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THE WINE OF TORAH
What is this extraordinary wine, preserved in its grapes since the six days of
Creation, which awaits the righteous in the world to come? Considering the
fact that, due to the technological limitations of the premodern period, wine
could not be preserved for any length of time, it appears that the rabbinic
sages did not conceive of this afterworldly drink as a variety—no matter how
special—of the actual beverage, but rather used it to signify the delights that
characterize existence in the hereafter.
Medieval Spanish kabbalists appropriated these rabbinic traditions and
ideas about wine and the world to come, and they further contributed to
developing the characterization of the “wine preserved in its grapes since the
six days of Creation” as well as to defining the role of the actual beverage in
either facilitating or impeding man’s earning of their portion in the olam ha-ba.
As for the former contribution, both within the Zohar24 itself and in
other Hebrew writings associated with the Zoharic circle,25 the special vintage
kept in store for the righteous is described, much like in rabbinic literature, as
the gladdening nourishment that typifies existence in the Garden of Eden and
the world to come. Furthermore, building on the equivalence between wine,
Torah, and secret that had been established by the rabbis,26 these medieval
Spanish kabbalists identified the heavenly liquid “preserved in its grapes since
the six days of Creation” with the deepest scriptural secrets that will be revealed
to the upright in the hereafter.27 The picture of the kabbalistic olam ha-ba that
emerges from this peculiar wine–Torah association is that of a scholar’s paradise, where all the mysteries of the universe are finally unveiled and in which
the righteous, for whom the ultimate delight is esoteric knowledge, can at last
make sense of it all.
That afterworldly existence for the meritorious will involve engaging
with (the wine of ) Torah is confirmed by a Zoharic passage expounding on
the Song of Songs, where good wine is contrasted with “another wine that is
not good”:
Rabbi Yitzhak opened, saying: Your mouth like choicest wine, flowing
smoothly to my beloved (Song 7:10). Your mouth like choicest wine—
this is the wine of Torah that is good, for there is another wine that
is not good,28 but the wine of Torah is good for all, good for this
world and good for the world that is coming. And this is the wine
that pleases the Blessed Holy One more than all. And by virtue of
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this, he who is saturated with the wine of Torah will awaken to the
world that is coming and will merit to arise to life when the Blessed
Holy One shall raise the righteous. Rabbi Yehudah said: Rousing
[dovev] the lips of sleepers (Song 7:10)—for we have learned that even
in that world he will merit to ply Torah, as it is written, causing the
lips of sleepers to move.29

Here the Zohar views Torah as a wine that brings joy and intoxicates, arousing
the drinker’s senses when it is ingested: “The quest here is to be saturated with
the wine of Torah, filled with the divine plenty, the flow of divinity, through
learning or, more literally, through imbibing and internalizing words of
Torah.”30 The “good wine” of Torah transforms human consciousness, awakening the learner to a state of mystical awareness of the divine dimensions of
reality and of the world to come. The effect of inward transformation triggered
by wine would almost suggest its use as a mystical tool, were it not for the fact
that here we are dealing not with the actual beverage, but with a “drinkable”
symbol of Torah.
Given that, as is apparent from other passages, the Zoharic authors viewed
real wine as an all-too-dangerous beverage for the humans of this world,31 it
seems clear that the text above encourages the consumption of Torah, not
actual wine, for the sake of deserving a spot in the afterworld. Why would
the Zohar want to undermine wine consumption in this manner? While it has
been proposed that the passage discussed above should be seen as an attack on
medieval Andalusian Hebrew poetry and its glorification of promiscuous wine
parties,32 let us suggest here two alternative avenues of interpretation.
First, if we frame this statement within the intellectual context of thirteenth century Jewish Spain, then its invitation to replace wine with Torah
could be viewed as an echo of the devaluation of the material in favor of the
spiritual championed by philosophers such as Moses Maimonides (Rambam).33 In this sense, acknowledging the complex influence of Maimonidean
philosophy on the Zohar,34 we could regard the aforementioned text as an
appropriation of the Rambam’s ascetic ideal of spiritual perfection and his
quest for freedom from bodily needs and pleasures.35
Second, if we consider the immediate non-Jewish historical and socioreligious environment surrounding the likely author of the passage above, then its
call to Torah for the sake of the hereafter over and against wine could function
as a pronouncement in defense of the traditional Jewish values of education
and scholarship vis-à-vis Christian doctrines and their supporters. At a basic
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level, to the extent that medieval Spanish Kabbalah can be seen as a particularistic reaction to philosophical universalism and its potential assimilationist
threats,36 the Zohar’s urging Jews to devote themselves to Torah instead of
indulging with wine—the most popular social lubricant of the day—amounts
to advocating for Jewish separateness and distinction, as well as to criticizing
dangerous convivial interaction with Gentiles. At a more specific level, by
insisting that it is the internalization of Torah, not the ingestion of wine—as
Christians claim—that has salvific value (it gets you “high,” awakening you to
the afterworld), this Zoharic text might be polemicizing against the doctrine
of the Eucharistic transubstantiation, which the Church officially adopted in
the early thirteenth century.37
Overall, it appears from our analysis that the Zohar’s manifold strategy
of discouraging actual wine consumption in this world for the sake of the
olam ha-ba bespeaks a rather negative perception of the olam ha-zeh as a place
where a Jew’s existence is constantly threatened by desire, be it the craving
for material and bodily pleasures or the attraction to esoteric knowledge and
foreign ideas.
DRINKING IN AND OUT OF EDEN
As our summary investigation of the kabbalistic representations and uses of
wine in relation to the world to come shifts from the medieval to the early
modern period, the remainder of this study will consist of presenting, comparing, and contrasting the perspectives of Joseph Karo and Moses Cordovero,
two central figures of the mystical renaissance that took place in Safed around
the middle of the sixteenth century. As we focus on the differing ways in
which these two kabbalists conceived of the role of wine drinking for the sake
of earning one’s place in the hereafter, it is imperative to keep in mind that
Karo and Cordovero shared a peculiar common heritage and audience. Not
only did they study together in Safed, but they were also both part of the wave
of Jews who, after the expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula and the outward
conversion of many to Christianity, decided to move to the land of Israel with
the intention to return to Judaism and atone for their sins.
WHERE THERE IS WINE, THERE IS NO TORAH
Joseph Karo (1488–1575 c.e.) is one of the most senior characters among a
number of important authors who were active in Safed around the middle of
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the sixteenth century.38 Having abandoned the Iberian Peninsula in the wake
of the expulsion, he lived in Egypt and Turkey before arriving in Safed in
1536/7. A towering figure in matters of halachah, Karo studied Kabbalah with
his younger colleague, Solomon Alqabetz, and was also associated with Cordovero.39 His kabbalistic ideas about wine and the afterworld are contained in
Maggid Meisharim [Mentor of Uprightness], a mystical diary Karo apparently
kept for most of his life.
From this work we learn that the author was visited by a maggid, a spiritual being who inspired him to lead a morally pure and ascetic life. Karo’s maggid would appear at nighttime, when he would study the Mishnah, and require
that the kabbalist divorce himself from ordinary life and all material sensations
in order to focus his thought exclusively on Torah and commandments. The
appearance of the maggid was contingent upon Karo’s engagement in practices
of self-mortification, which included sleep deprivation and, especially relevant
for our purposes, abstention from eating and drinking to satiation.
Much like the Zohar, which suggests that in order to reach the olam
ha-ba one should imbibe Torah instead of wine, Karo’s maggid states:
What you have done is not good, as you drank a lot tonight. And
even if it was diluted, indeed by drinking much you weaken your
body. . . . But if you will always beware from wine, you will be
happy in this world, and the world to come will be good for you,
for you will be a dwelling and a nest for Torah: always cleave to it
without pause so as not to give room to the impure side to rule over
you at all.40

Going against Jewish (and non-Jewish) medical tradition, which maintained
that wine is by and large beneficial to the human body, here Karo argues that
this beverage actually weakens the body. In this sense, renouncing wine is
good for man’s existence in the olam ha-zeh, insofar as its avoidance serves as
a medical recipe for happiness. Moreover, the author of this passage suggests
that abstention from wine allows man to be filled with Torah, a condition that
earns him a place in the world to come.
The fact that in this passage the “room” one makes in one’s being through
self-denial can then be filled by Torah presents us with yet another variation on
the correspondence between wine and Torah already encountered in rabbinic
and Zoharic materials. Instead of expressing the coincidence between the two
entities, as was the case in the examples mentioned above, here the equivalence
between wine and Torah is employed to suggest that they are in fact mutually
exclusive. As a result, while in most cases this association results in a positive
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connotation for wine, here the correspondence functions as an opposition.
While in the Zohar the effects that wine produces on its drinkers could still
serve as positive descriptors for the experience of “filling up” on Torah, for
Karo even as literary metaphor this beverage can function only as a negative
equivalent to Torah.
Wine appears to be incompatible with Torah because of its connection
with the side of impurity and, as we learn elsewhere in Karo’s text,41 with man’s
malevolent instinct. Accordingly, alongside other ascetic practices, avoiding
wine helps man to subdue evil while making one’s self fit for the divine. In
this sense, our kabbalist’s acts of self-denial for the sake of undermining his
evil instinct constitute both a means of purification and an offering to God.
Here it should be noted that, according to Karo, it is this malevolent urge
that drives mankind toward the satisfaction of their everyday needs, the fulfillment of their earthly desires, and the pursuit of material pleasures. Therefore,
inasmuch as he views all objects (wine being an example) of these this-worldly
needs, desires, and pleasures as receptacles for the forces of evil, Karo’s perspective on the olam ha-zeh and on human existence therein appears decidedly
negative. Moreover, his recommendations for earning one’s portion in the
olam ha-ba, which involve an intensely ascetic regimen intended to negate the
material and human in favor of the spiritual and divine, toward ultimate self-
sacrifice, can be seen as an example of Jewish response to the Spanish expulsion.
As scholars have argued,42 Karo’s life in Safed as a penitent longing for
martyrdom must have been inspired by an overwhelming sense of guilt and a
desire to make atonement to the point of self-sacrifice. As an exile from Spain
himself, this kabbalist seems to have believed that the collective sins presumably committed by the Iberian Jews caused this catastrophe. Even more, he
seems to have internalized his community’s supposed responsibility for the
expulsion to the point that he understood it as his own, a responsibility for
which he had to atone.
A WINE THAT GLADDENS WITHOUT INTOXICATING
Despite the fact that, like Karo himself, Cordovero’s family was almost certainly part of the Iberian Jewish diaspora, and even though the two studied
together in Safed for many years, the latter’s treatment of wine in connection
to the world to come differs quite markedly from his older associate’s. It is an
indication, as will be demonstrated, of a different sort of response to the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula.
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Unlike Karo, in his commentary on the Zohar, Or Yaqar [The Precious
Light], Moses Cordovero (Ramak, 1522–1570 c.e.) does not recommend
avoiding wine altogether in order to merit one’s spot in the afterworld. Rather,
in a lengthy section of this major work, the Ramak sets to schematize and
organize the different views on this beverage in earlier Kabbalah.43 He begins
by distinguishing between a wine that, having been touched by Gentiles,
intoxicates, and a gladdening wine that is untouched by non-Jews. In addition
to bringing joy to man and the divine realm alike, the latter wine benefits the
human limbs by strengthening them. From this point of view, Cordovero’s
attitude appears quite different from Karo’s ascetic position. In fact, the author
of Or Yaqar recognizes the positive medical effects that wine may have on the
human body and appreciates especially its heating and arousing power, which
stimulates coupling both in the olam ha-zeh and in the world above.44
However, for all these positive effects to occur, wine has to be preserved
from Gentile contact—it has to be made holy by being kept separate. As a
consequence, Cordovero emphasizes the importance of preserving wine from
goyim [non-Jews]. In fact, being a material, this-worldly product, real wine
is particularly prone to impurity and sin, since it can be touched by Jews
and non-Jews alike. At the same time, this earthly beverage is connected to
the divine realm of the sefirot [divine powers], which can thus be negatively
impacted by “externals”—that is, non-Jews—touching kosher wine.
As a result, one’s stringency and attention in preserving wine from Gentile contact determines, according to Cordovero, one’s state of purity or sinfulness in this world, as well as her portion in the world to come.45 In particular,
those who keep kosher wine away from non-Jews increase holiness in the olam
ha-zeh and are themselves preserved from evil and sin, thereby deserving—so
to speak—an express lane pass to the olam ha-ba with no stops in gehenna [the
Jewish version of hell]. In contrast, those who do not guard this beverage with
enough care, and defile it, are subjected to the power of the evil inclination
and put their portion in the world to come at risk.
On the face of it, Cordovero’s attribution of tremendous consequences
to the practices related to the preservation and defilement of kosher wine
leaves us with the impression that yayn nesekh [prohibited libation wine] is
an urgent and extremely serious issue in his mind. However, when one considers the socio-religious context in which the Ramak is operating—Islamic-
ruled Safed—one may wonder whether he is reflecting an actual concern of
his time and place or not. How likely were Jews to produce, consume, and/
or trade wine with Gentiles (who would most likely be Muslims) in such an
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environment? Is Cordovero perhaps reflecting here the concerns of the societal realities represented in his sources—that is, thirteenth century Christian
Spain—rather than his own? While I doubt that the latter question can be
answered with any degree of certainty, one could still ask why the Ramak is
charging with so much significance behaviors related to wine that were probably occurring sporadically at best in sixteenth century Safed.
If one continues to follow Cordovero’s discussion of yayn nesekh, one
gets the impression that, while his acknowledgment of the relationship of
wine with evil inclination brings him close to Karo’s negative stance about
this beverage, his attitude in this matter is actually quite different from his
senior associate’s—being much more optimistic and constructive. In fact, in
another passage, the Ramak specifies that, although wine kindles the forces
of judgment embodied by the angel Samael, if it is preserved from Gentile
contact, this beverage does not intoxicate and therefore does not arouse anger
and sternness.46 In this sense, as has been argued above, the act of keeping
wine separate sanctifies it, thus nullifying its potentially negative effects.
Furthermore, within a section in which he schematizes and orders the issues
regarding the preservation of kosher wine, Cordovero emphasizes the exceedingly beneficial effects of keeping this beverage from non-Jews, while limiting
the extremely negative consequences of failure to preserve it—defilement in
this world and banishment from the world to come—only to those who actually drink Gentile wine. Drinking kosher wine in the company of non-Jews or
even drinking Jewish wine defiled by Gentiles only delays, so to speak, one’s
journey to the world to come, making a pit stop in gehenna necessary for the
sake of purification.47
As opposed to Karo’s sole preoccupation with the negative qualities of
wine, which can be minimized and redirected only through severe asceticism (and provided that the beverage is kosher), Cordovero’s attitude seems
more ambivalent with regard to the drink in general—including non-Jewish
wine—and becomes an outright appraisal of preserved wine. In particular,
according to the Ramak, it is the practice of keeping this beverage from non-
Jews that has a highly positive, “sanctifying” function—rendering beneficial
even the otherwise potentially dangerous effects of wine48—regardless of the
limited consequences of dealing with Gentile wine and despite the (probably
scarce) likelihood of interreligious wine exchanges in sixteenth century Safed.
Cordovero seems to motivate his insistence on this matter by affirming that
preserving kosher wine, even in cases when there is no risk of it being defiled
by Gentiles, “adds holiness to the world below.”49
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In other words, by guarding Jewish wine from goyim, one keeps it separate and thus makes the beverage holy, increasing the amount of holiness in
this world as a result. It is very possible that, by emphasizing the positive consequences of keeping kosher wine away from non-Jews, the Ramak is encouraging his coreligionists to uphold with stringency a certain set of halachic rules
in a societal situation in which this can be done with relative ease. By magnifying the significance of Jewish legislation regarding wine, which demands
separation from Gentiles, in a context where the overwhelming majority of
non-Jews would not make use of this beverage anyway, Cordovero seeks to
reinforce the religious identity of Safedian Jews by means of a traditional and
fairly palatable tool.
If this interpretation is correct, then the Ramak’s treatment of the issue
of yayn nesekh may be inscribed within his project to consolidate Jewish life
in the new center of Safed. As Moshe Idel has suggested,50 Cordovero’s basic
goal is to “structure life in terms of mystical and religious meaning,” seeking
to “secure stability, to celebrate the mystical life as part of the traditional Jewish way of life.” In this sense, the Ramak’s call for engagement in the practice
of preserving wine from Gentile contamination goes against ascetic tendencies
(such as those manifested by Karo), which would suggest a retreat from the
world and thereby constitute a potential threat to communal life and ritual.
Moreover, if, as Shaul Magid has suggested,51 the majority of the audience for Safedian Kabbalah was made up of Iberian conversos [Jewish converts
to Christianity] and/or their families, then the idea of a redeeming and soteric
power that wine would symbolically possess would likely strike a familiar
chord with “returning” Jews who must have been conversant with the Christian ritual of the Eucharist. By evoking a symbolic understanding of wine that
would especially resound with conversos and reconfiguring its performance as
a major expression of Jewish identity with salvific consequences, Cordovero
could provide his followers with a significant yet manageable pathway into
teshuvah [return to Judaism]. In light of these considerations, the Ramak’s
treatment of the topic of yayn nesekh may also be seen in terms of strategic
use of a symbolic conception of wine for the sake of mobilizing and reshaping
Jewish identities in an inebriating and convenient way.
In conclusion, Cordovero’s peculiar perspective on the relationships
between kosher wine and the world to come provides us with a window into
his perception of the olam ha-zeh and of the task of a Jew’s existence in it.
Unlike Karo, for whom this world is irredeemably sinful, so that human life
should be geared only toward the olam ha-ba through ascetic purification and
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ultimate self-sacrifice, Cordovero views the world he is living in as one that
can and should be bettered and sanctified through man’s positive action within
it. Furthermore, for the Ramak one’s bodily existence and active engagement
in the material world provide the opportunity for securing a portion in the
hereafter. While Karo’s outlook on life in this world and the world to come, as
it is expressed through his attitudes toward wine, betrays his experience of the
expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula as a catastrophe that could be
atoned for only with extreme sacrifices, Cordovero’s perspective on the same
issues may be viewed as a different response to this historical event—one that
centers on the opportunities that this-worldly existence in the land of Israel
offered for penitents to return to a Jewish life, to expiate their sins, and to
mend the olam ha-zeh.
To sum up the findings of our short survey, it appears that, unlike Italian
popular culture hanging on restaurant walls, a number of rabbinic and kabbalistic traditions envision an afterworld in which wine—however intended—
flows abundantly. On a more sobering note, medieval and early modern Jewish
kabbalists urge human drinkers eager to secure a table at this intoxicating,
out-of-this-worldly banquet either to imbibe exclusively kosher wine in their
earthly lifetime or to avoid the beverage altogether and substitute it with
Torah. Exemplifying cultural enology, our analysis of these varied Jewish views
on wine in its relation to the world to come, however limited, has afforded us a
window into their exponents’ vision for the (ultimate) future, along with their
outlook on the present. In this regard, the perspectives offered by the Zoharic
author(s), Karo, and Cordovero in particular resonate especially well with the
specific socio-historical conditions (i.e., thirteenth century Christian Spain or
post-Spanish expulsion Safed) in which these kabbalists were operating.
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existence indirectly confirms my argument for a cultural enology and calls for
an anthropology of beer in America.
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Worlds to Come Between East and West:
Immortality and the Rise
of Modern Jewish Thought
Elias Sacks
There are many ways to describe the intellectual agenda of modern Jewish
thought. We might tell a story about a growing emphasis on ethics, focusing
on ways in which modern philosophers often grant morality a more central
role in religious life than did premodern thinkers.1 We might also tell a story
about a newfound interest in history, arguing that many modern Jews stress
themes such as the unceasing development of ideas and societies, the links
between Jewish and non-Jewish history, and the importance of deriving Judaism’s beliefs and relevance from the historical-critical study of Jewish sources.2
Yet another option would be to focus on the classification of Judaism itself,
exploring debates about “whether Judaism and Jewishness are matters of religion, culture, or nationality.”3 And there are still other possibilities, as well.4
In this article, I wish to recover the importance of another issue for the
emergence of Jewish intellectual modernity: immortality. While it is clear that
the notion of a messianic future is a central concern for many modern thinkers,5 there is considerable disagreement about whether the idea of olam ha-ba
or “world to come” in the sense of personal immortality—in the sense of the
survival of the soul or some other aspect of the individual after the body’s
death6—plays a significant role in modern Jewish thought. A group of publications in the early 1960s suggested that debates about Jewish and non-Jewish
access to the afterlife allowed philosophers to explore the role of reason and
tolerance in the Jewish tradition,7 and a number of studies have argued that
nineteenth-and twentieth-century denominational literature, most notably
works of liturgy, emphasizes personal immortality over themes such as bodily
resurrection.8
By contrast, a starkly different view appears in the work of the historian
and philosopher Hans Jonas, who famously began a 1961 lecture at Harvard
Divinity School by invoking what he termed the “undeniable fact . . . that
the modern temper is uncongenial to the idea of immortality,” especially
to the “really substantive concept of immortality: survival of the person in
a hereafter.”9 This position would reappear almost three decades later in the
influential collection Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought, whose entry on
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“immortality”—written by Allan Arkush—argued that since the eighteenth
century there has been no “major Jewish thinker . . . for whom the doctrine of
a life after death was a consolation and not a source of some embarrassment.”10
A middle position of sorts appears in a recent essay by Leora Batnitzky.
Like the first group of interpreters, Batnitzky argues that “a commitment to
immortality is central to modern Jewish thought” and that modern Jewish
philosophers have largely rejected (or at least downplayed) bodily resurrection. But Batnitzky indicates that she is concerned less with immortality in
the sense of the survival of the individual self and more with what she terms
a “loose conception of immortality” or “immortality in a very general sense,”
namely, “the idea that the meaning of human life transcends human finitude
or mortality.” She focuses on what she describes as attempts “to refute materialist conceptions of human existence without committing to any particularly
theological or traditionally metaphysical notion of immortality,” and most
of the thinkers she discusses are concerned with topics other than personal
immortality—with the Jewish people’s eternal survival, for example, or with
the eternity of humanity’s moral tasks.11
My goal is to show that what Jonas terms the “really substantive concept
of immortality” does, in fact, play a key role in modern Jewish thought—
indeed, that the survival of the soul after death is crucial to works well beyond
denominational documents and liturgical texts. I will do so by exploring the
Hebrew writings of two thinkers who are widely invoked but too little understood: the German-Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786)
and the Eastern European thinker Nachman Krochmal (1785–1840). Frequently portrayed as a leading figure in the late Enlightenment and as the
founder of modern Jewish thought, Mendelssohn is known for his German
writings on topics ranging from aesthetics to politics to metaphysics. Yet
while these German works have long occupied scholars of philosophy and
Judaism, Mendelssohn’s extensive body of Hebrew writings is only starting
to become an object of sustained study, and 2011 marked the first time that
a broad selection appeared in English translation.12 Krochmal has received
even less attention, especially among English-speaking audiences. A teacher,
businessman, and communal leader born in what is now Ukraine, he is
remembered as one of modernity’s most significant Eastern European Jewish
philosophers, and his unfinished Hebrew magnum opus—The Guide of the
Perplexed of the Time [Moreh Nevukhei Hazeman]—is an early Jewish attempt
to wrestle with developments such as biblical criticism and historicist thinking. However, despite some signs of renewed interest, his philosophy has
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rarely been subject to scrutiny in North America, and his Guide is still largely
unavailable in English.13
This essay will draw on these neglected Hebrew works to reassess the role
of personal immortality in the rise of Jewish modernity. More specifically, I
will argue that the emergence of modern Jewish thought involves a high-stakes
soteriological debate between East and West—that one of modern Jewish
philosophy’s early episodes is a debate between Krochmal and Mendelssohn
about immortality and the nature of Judaism. I will begin with Krochmal,
showing that he casts Judaism’s affirmation of an afterlife as the product of
long-standing debates among postbiblical Jews who disagreed about whether
the soul is immortal. I will then suggest that Krochmal’s view is best read as
a critique of a type of position that he associates with Mendelssohn, whose
Hebrew writings are concerned less with showing that immortality was contested among postbiblical Jews and more with establishing that this doctrine is
affirmed by the Bible itself. I will conclude by arguing that the Mendelssohn-
Krochmal clash is, in part, a dispute about the nature of the Jewish tradition.
Whereas Mendelssohn’s claims are part of a broader project of presenting
Judaism as a vehicle of rationally accessible eternal truths affirmed by the
Bible, Krochmal’s position helps ground a different vision of this tradition—a
vision of Judaism as a phenomenon whose doctrinal content emerges through
the efforts of postbiblical human beings. For these foundational philosophical
voices in Jewish modernity, the world to come serves as a crucial terrain for
formulating—and contesting—theories of Jewish existence.
A preliminary remark is in order. Readers familiar with Mendelssohn’s
thought will not be surprised to find him invoked in an essay on immortality. His fame in his own era was due, in part, to a celebrated 1767 treatise—a
rewriting of Plato’s Phaedo—that defends the demonstrability of immortality
and was quickly translated into five languages.14 Nevertheless, for many commentators, Mendelssohn’s work signals the end of a concern with personal
immortality among modern Jewish philosophers. When Arkush suggests that
after the eighteenth century “the doctrine of a life after death was . . . a source
of some embarrassment,” he takes Mendelssohn to be the “last major Jewish
thinker” for whom this was not the case.15
Similarly, Neil Gillman, one of the readers who focuses on the role of
immortality in modern denominational literature, moves from his treatment
of Mendelssohn not to a survey of other philosophical perspectives but rather
to topics such as “modern liturgical reforms,” returning to philosophical voices
primarily when discussing renewed interest in bodily resurrection among late
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twentieth-century Jews.16 By contrast, I seek to complicate this picture and
recover a trajectory of philosophical thinking about immortality as a significant element in the emergence of Jewish intellectual modernity. Rather than
signaling the end of a philosophical embrace of the survival of the soul, Mendelssohn’s writings constitute the first stage in a debate, extending from Germany to Eastern Europe, that treats this belief as an opportunity to construct
visions of the Jewish tradition.
KROCHMAL
Krochmal’s Guide is a wide-
ranging text, dealing with topics including
metaphysics, Jewish law, and biblical criticism as part of an effort to address
“perplexities” plaguing nineteenth-century Jews. Unfinished at the time of
its author’s death in 1840, the manuscript was edited by a leading German
scholar, Leopold Zunz, and eventually published in 1851.17 The key section
for us is the Guide’s discussion of Ecclesiastes, a biblical book that presents
itself as the words of “Koheleth, son of David, king in Jerusalem,” traditionally identified as King Solomon.18 This insistence on Solomonic authorship
was challenged by eighteenth-and nineteenth-century biblical critics such as
Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, and Krochmal devotes a section of the Guide to
defending this critical perspective. Ecclesiastes, he argues, was written long
after Solomon’s reign by a Jewish nobleman who oversaw a group of scholars,
and the book’s post-Solomonic provenance was already well known to the rabbis of late antiquity.19
Krochmal’s initial comments explore Ecclesiastes’ concluding verses:
A further word: Because Koheleth was a sage, he continued to
instruct the people. He listened to and tested the soundness of many
maxims. Koheleth sought to discover useful sayings and recorded
genuinely truthful sayings. The sayings of the wise are like goads,
like nails fixed in prodding sticks. They were given by one Shepherd.
A further word: Against them, my son, be warned! The making of
many books is without limit and much study is a wearying of the
flesh. The sum of the matter, when all is said and done: Revere God
and observe His commandments! For this applies to all mankind:
that God will call every creature to account for everything unknown,
be it good or bad. (Eccl 12:9–14)

Commentators have long noted that these words read more as an epilogue
appended to Ecclesiastes than as an integral part of the book. Krochmal
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suggests that the opening of this passage was written by the book’s post-
Solomonic author,20 but he argues that the final lines were written not by that
individual, but rather by a later group of scholars involved in the process of
compiling the biblical canon. It is worth quoting Krochmal’s words at length:
Behold, it seems to us that those verses at the end of the book of
Ecclesiastes—“the sayings of the wise are like goads,” etc., until the
end of the book—are verses of sealing and completion not for this
book (for what would be the reason for and sense in Solomon, or
whoever wrote this book, warning against producing further books
beyond this book of his?), but rather for the collection of the books
of the Writings [the third section of the Hebrew Bible] as a whole.
It seems that the men of the Holy Assembly of that time—which
was closer to the time of the initial arrival of the Greeks and the
priest Jaddua or Simon I—sealed and closed the compilation of the
third part of the Holy Scriptures with these verses. . . . They further
completed their words of sealing with ethical teaching: “The sum of
the matter, when all is said and done,” etc. They did this in order
to remind [readers] that the purpose of all the study and reading of
books is reverence for the Lord and observing His commandments,
in accordance with the verse: “The beginning of wisdom is reverence
for the Lord” [Ps 111:10].21 And with the statement “God will call
every creature to account,” etc., they were affirming the final judgment in the world to come, since many denied this at that time, as
is known from the Sadducees.22

According to Krochmal, the final verses quoted above were written by the compilers of the canon not as a conclusion to the book of Ecclesiastes, but rather
as an epilogue to the entire third section of the Hebrew Bible—as “verses of
sealing and completion not for this book . . . but rather for the collection of
the books of the Writings as a whole.” The idea here is that Ecclesiastes was
originally the concluding book of the final division of the Bible23 and that
these lines were intended to serve as the closing words of that section—and,
by extension, the canon as a whole.
I am interested less in the historical accuracy of this claim and more
in the argument Krochmal builds on its basis. Consider his declaration that
“with the statement ‘God will call every creature to account,’” the compilers of the canon “were affirming the final judgment in the world to come,
since many denied this at that time, as is known from the Sadducees.” He
is suggesting that this epilogue to the Bible was composed, in part, as an
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intervention in debates in antiquity. On this interpretation, many ancient
groups denied “the final judgment in the world to come,” and the compilers
of the canon responded by placing a reference to this judgment in olam ha-ba
at the end of the Bible as a whole, reminding readers that God “will call every
creature to account.”
If we read this comment against the backdrop of earlier sections of the
Guide, it becomes clear that the reference to “the world to come” is crucial—
that Krochmal sees these lines as an intervention not simply in debates about
a “final judgment,” but rather in debates about the very existence of a “world
to come” in which such a judgment can occur. More precisely, he takes these
lines to be an intervention in debates about whether the soul endures after the
death of the body. He suggests that the tensions he has in mind are similar to
those involving the ancient sect known as the Sadducees, and he stresses earlier in the Guide that this group clashed with another sect, the Pharisees, over
whether the soul survives death.
According to Krochmal, the Pharisees “believe that there exists within
souls the power of eternal life, and that beneath the earth there is reward and
judgement for everyone who proceeds through life to righteousness or wickedness: the lot of the latter is eternal imprisonment, whereas the former are given
the power to live and return to life.”24 Drawn from the historian Josephus, the
picture here is of a sect that affirms the survival of souls after the death of bodies: for Krochmal’s Pharisees, the souls of the wicked survive and are subjected
to “eternal imprisonment,” while the souls of the righteous also endure but are
returned to resurrected bodies. Krochmal repeats this point less than a page
later, writing that the Pharisees hold that “the soul does not fall under the sway
of death: the souls of the righteous return to their bodies, and the souls of the
wicked are afflicted with torment without end.”25
By contrast, he continues, the Sadducees “deny the eternity of the soul,”
“teach that souls disappear with bodies,” and clash with the Pharisees “on the
principle that is the main one of them all: the belief in the eternity of the soul
and the resurrection of the dead being found in the Torah.”26 Krochmal again
emphasizes the survival of souls after death: whereas the Pharisees affirm this
principle, the Sadducees deny this idea, along with the idea that the Bible takes
at least some of those immortal souls to return to resurrected bodies. For the
Guide, this issue stands at the very heart of the Pharisee-Sadducee controversy,
serving not as a peripheral concern but rather as “the principle that is the main
one of them all.” When Krochmal links the final lines of Ecclesiastes to the disputes involving the Sadducees about a “world to come,” then, he is presenting
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these verses as an intervention in debates about personal immortality, suggesting that the compilers of the biblical canon were so troubled by widespread
denials of this doctrine that they inserted an affirmation of the soul’s survival
into the closing words of Scripture.
Krochmal casts these final lines not simply as an intervention in ancient
debates, but as part of a string of ultimately successful interventions in those
debates—as part of a constellation of efforts that eventually established belief
in the afterlife as an accepted element of the Jewish tradition. Consider, again,
his claim that the compilers of the canon “were affirming the final judgment
in the world to come, since many denied this at that time [bazeman hahu], as
is known from the Sadducees.” Elsewhere in his writings, Krochmal stresses
that the Sadducees did not prevail in their debates with the Pharisees. He
introduces these clashes by stating that in most cases “the approach of the
early Pharisees to belief and deeds . . . is in its substance and appearance the
approach of our sages, may their memories be for a blessing, in all the works
of the Oral Torah that we possess,” suggesting that it was this sect, rather than
its Sadducean rival, that shaped the subsequent development of Jewish life.27
Krochmal repeats this point later in his discussion, insisting that many of
“the words of the Pharisees are words of our tradition” and that key “beliefs
and practices . . . were supported in the hands of individuals among their
men”28—that the Pharisees played an important role in securing the place of
various principles in the Jewish tradition. Moreover, he identifies the notion
of an afterlife as one of the Pharisaic ideas accepted by later Jewish thinkers,
referring in his correspondence to the rabbis’ insistence in the Mishnah that
“all Israel has a share in the world to come”29 and to treatments of immortality by medieval Jewish philosophers such as Maimonides.30 Krochmal’s view
is thus that immortality eventually became an accepted part of the Jewish
tradition despite opposition from groups such as the Sadducees. When he discusses the composition of Ecclesiastes’ final verses by suggesting that “many
denied” immortality “at that time,” then, the phrase “at that time” seems significant. Krochmal seems to be alluding to the idea that denials of immortality were eventually overcome—to be suggesting that although “many denied”
this belief at that time, this was not the case in later times, since the efforts
undertaken by groups such as the compilers of the biblical canon and the
Pharisees were ultimately successful.
Finally, while Krochmal alludes to the idea that denials of immortality were eventually overcome, his comments regarding Ecclesiastes indicate
that, on his interpretation, this result was not achieved until well after the
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emergence of the Bible. The key, once again, is his use of the Sadducees as an
example of how “many denied” immortality in the ancient world. Discussing this sect earlier in the Guide, he states that it did not emerge until “after
the final sealing of the Holy Writings.”31 By invoking this group immediately after describing the efforts of the compilers of the biblical canon to
affirm immortality, then, he is indicating to his readers that those efforts
did not prevent future disputes about life after death—that groups such as
the Sadducees would still emerge and “deny the eternity of the soul.” He
is indicating, that is, that the status of immortality as an accepted element
of the Jewish tradition is a decidedly postbiblical achievement—that the
production of the biblical canon failed to firmly embed the notion of olam
ha-ba into the fabric of Jewish life and that it was therefore the efforts of
postbiblical groups, such as the Pharisees, that ultimately secured the place
of this doctrine in Judaism.
Indeed, Krochmal seems to carefully avoid clarifying the degree to which
the Bible should be read as endorsing the eternity of the soul. Although he
states that verses quoted above—the epilogue appended to Ecclesiastes and the
biblical canon—affirm “the final judgment in the world to come,” he rejects
the idea that the body of Ecclesiastes itself advances this doctrine,32 and his
account of the Sadducee-Pharisee clash suggests that the rest of the Bible does
not address this topic with sufficient clarity to forestall theological uncertainty.
After all, he claims, this exegetical point figured prominently in the controversies between these sects, who disagreed on “the eternity of the soul and the
resurrection of the dead being found in the Torah.”
The issues at stake in Krochmal’s treatment of Ecclesiastes now begin
to emerge. Invoking the existence of debates in ancient Judaism about the
immortality of the soul, he suggests that it was the efforts of groups involved
in these debates that secured the place of this belief in Jewish life, and
he emphasizes that this result was not achieved until long after the Bible
emerged. The Guide’s discussion of Ecclesiastes thus provides readers with
a history of immortality in the Jewish tradition. Krochmal casts Judaism’s
affirmation of an afterlife as the product of long-standing debates among
postbiblical Jews who disagreed about whether the soul is immortal. He
argues that the notion of a world to come continued to be contested even
after the biblical canon took shape and that it was only the efforts of later,
postbiblical groups that established this doctrine as an accepted element of
the Jewish tradition.
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KROCHMAL AND MENDELSSOHN
Krochmal soon turns to other Jewish interpretations of Ecclesiastes, invoking
“our early sages who labored to interpret” this book as well as later figures who
struggled with its plain sense:
May blessings rest upon the heads of the interpreters focused on
the plain sense of Scripture who preceded us—among them, in
particular, the master Moses the son of Menahem, may his memory
be for a blessing—who made every effort to elucidate and interpret
[Ecclesiastes] internally so that it does not contradict true belief. . . .
But was this, in fact, the opinion and desire of the book? This is a
question that earlier generations never asked. In the present time,
however, the path of inquiry drives us to this question.33

The reference to “Moses the son of Menahem” attempting to “elucidate”
Ecclesiastes is a reference to Mendelssohn and his Hebrew commentary on that
book. Published in 1770, this work includes a verse-by-verse commentary on
the text of Ecclesiastes, along with an introduction that discusses the nature of
this biblical book and of scriptural exegesis more generally.34 Krochmal offers a
critical evaluation of Mendelssohn’s exegetical work, citing him as an example
of a thinker who “made every effort to elucidate and interpret” Ecclesiastes
“so that it does not contradict true belief,” but who failed to ask a question to
which “the path of inquiry drives us” in “the present time”: namely, “was this,
in fact, the opinion and desire of the book?” What is Krochmal claiming?
Consider the description of Mendelssohn as attempting to show that
Ecclesiastes “does not contradict true belief.” His commentary expresses concern that Ecclesiastes’ early chapters contain “difficult words that seem, heaven
forfend, as if they are opposed to belief in providence and immortality, which
are fundamental principles of the true religion,” and he declares that he is even
more troubled by later sections that “seem, at first glance, to be even more difficult and further from the fundamental principles of the true religion.”35 His
worries revolve around lines such as these:
And, indeed, I have observed under the sun: Alongside justice there
is wickedness, alongside righteousness there is wickedness. I mused:
“God will doom both righteous and wicked, for there is a time for
every experience and for every happening.” So I decided, as regards
men, to dissociate them [from] the divine beings and to face the fact
that they are beasts. For in respect of the fate of man and the fate
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of beast, they have one and the same fate: as the one dies so dies
the other, and both have the same lifebreath; man has no superiority over beast, since both amount to nothing. Both go to the same
place; both came from dust and both return to dust. Who knows if
a man’s lifebreath does rise upward and if a beast’s breath does sink
down into the earth? I saw that there is nothing better for man than
to enjoy his possessions, since that is his portion. For who can enable
him to see what will happen afterward? I further observed all the
oppression that goes on under the sun: the tears of the oppressed,
with none to comfort them; and the power of their oppressors—
with none to comfort them. (Eccl 3:16–4:1)

However we might understand these verses today, it is not difficult to see how
a reader such as Mendelssohn could interpret them as denials of doctrines such
as immortality. These lines declare that “there is nothing better for man than
to enjoy his possessions” because we “return to dust” and material life is our
only “portion,” a statement that could be read as a rejection of the idea that
there is some incorporeal substance that endures after the body’s death.
Another passage that is troubling for Mendelssohn reads as follows:
For he who is reckoned among the living has something to look
forward to—even a live dog is better than a dead lion—since the
living know they will die. But the dead know nothing; they have
no more recompense, for even the memory of them has died. Their
loves, their hates, their jealousies have long since perished; and they
have no more share till the end of time in all that goes on under the
sun. Go, eat your bread in gladness, and drink your wine in joy. . . .
Enjoy happiness with a woman you love all the fleeting days of
life that have been granted to you under the sun—all your fleeting
days. For that alone is what you can get out of life and out of the
means you acquire under the sun. Whatever it is in your power to
do, do with all your might. For there is no action, no reasoning, no
learning, no wisdom in Sheol, where you are going. I have further
observed under the sun that the race is not won by the swift, nor
the battle by the valiant; nor is bread won by the wise, nor wealth by
the intelligent, nor favor by the learned. For the time of mischance
comes to all. (Eccl 9:4–11)

These lines suggest that even the lowliest living animal (“a live dog”) enjoys
an advantage over the noblest deceased creature (“a dead lion”), for while
“the living know they will die . . . the dead know nothing.” These lines might
be interpreted as a claim that while living creatures possess some degree of
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awareness (albeit awareness of their impending doom), death marks the end
of all awareness and a passage into nonexistence.36
One of the central claims in Mendelssohn’s commentary is that he has
discovered a way to show, contrary to appearances, that Ecclesiastes affirms
doctrines such as immortality:
Not all that is said in [Ecclesiastes] is, in truth, the opinion of King
Solomon, may peace be upon him. Rather, he sometimes speaks
as one engaged in give-and-take regarding a matter, asking and
responding in the manner of syllogistic thinkers who search for the
truth by means of the intellect. These thinkers arrive at what they
seek only if they attend to contradictory arguments, raise all sorts of
doubts, straighten out the matter with proper scales and balances,
and carefully consider and approach the lines of reasoning, one after
another, until they separate the true from the false, and the correct
from the doubtful. . . . We see that the author of this book wrote in
the manner of searching and give-and-take.37

Mendelssohn casts Ecclesiastes as a philosophical dialogue, as a book written
“in the manner of syllogistic thinkers who search for the truth” by engaging
“contradictory arguments.” On this view, Ecclesiastes presents arguments in
favor of various doctrines as well as arguments against those doctrines, leading readers to ascribe “truth” to whichever set of arguments seems stronger.
Applied to immortality, this means that “not all that is said . . . is, in truth,
the opinion of King Solomon”—that verses such as the ones quoted above,
which seem to deny this doctrine, do not reflect the opinions of Ecclesiastes’
author, but rather function as hypothetical arguments against this belief that
set the stage for its ultimate affirmation. Indeed, lest readers miss Mendelssohn’s focus, he emphasizes his concern with personal immortality, stating that
he addresses “the immortality of the soul” and the idea “that souls remain after
death,”38 along with perspectives that posit the “destruction” and “annihilation
of the soul.”39
Some examples will prove helpful. On various occasions, Mendelssohn
suggests that the author of Ecclesiastes issues statements that seem to reject
immortality not in order to undermine this doctrine, but rather in order to
reveal the problematic consequences that follow from its denial and to thereby
provide readers with a reason to avoid such a posture and instead affirm the
eternity of the soul. Consider Mendelssohn’s discussion of Ecclesiastes 3–4:
After I reflected on this entire section from beginning to end, it
seemed to me that the significance of the verses is that the most
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correct and powerful proof for the immortality of the soul and
reward in the world to come is the one on the basis of injustice
in this world. [Consider the verses from] “Alongside justice there
is wickedness,” etc., [to] “the tears of the oppressed, with none to
comfort them,” etc. [Eccl 3:16–4:1]. For one who believes in the
existence of God and His providence cannot escape one of these two
options: either he will believe that souls remain after death, and that
afterwards there is a time of judgement for every deed, either good
or evil; or he will ascribe, heaven forefend, iniquity and injustice to
the holy God.40

According to Mendelssohn, Ecclesiastes 3–4 may seem to deny immortality,
but it does so in order to highlight a “proof for the immortality of the soul
and reward in the world to come . . . on the basis of injustice in this world.”
By stating that we “return to dust” while repeatedly invoking the “wickedness”
and “oppression” we see around us,41 this text reminds us that someone who
denies immortality will have to come to grips with the pervasiveness of evil
in this world and that such an individual will ultimately be forced to “ascribe,
heaven forefend, iniquity and injustice to the holy God.” While those who
“believe that souls remain after death” can affirm that perpetrators of evil are
punished (and the victims of evil compensated) in an afterlife, someone who
denies immortality will be forced to conclude that God has created nothing
other than a world riddled with evil and suffering, choosing to produce a
cosmos in which wickedness goes unpunished and righteousness unrewarded.
Unless we are prepared to ascribe this sort of behavior to the deity, then, our
only option is to reject denials of immortality and embrace this doctrine.
Unless we are willing, that is, to cast God as a cruel entity unconcerned with
the well-being of creatures and values such as justice, we must take the deity
to have created not only a universe replete with evil and suffering, but also a
compensatory afterlife for immortal souls.
Mendelssohn adopts a similar strategy when discussing material such
as Ecclesiastes 9, declaring that “with the help of God, may He be Blessed,
I have also arrived at and found a way . . . to resolve every difficulty in
those sections and interpret the words of the wise king in a manner that
does not contradict, heaven forfend, but rather strengthens the fundamental
principle[s] of the true religion.”42 For example, juxtaposing the statement
in Ecclesiastes 9:4 that “a live dog is better than a dead lion” with the claim
in Ecclesiastes 4:2 that we should count “those who died long since more
fortunate than those who are still living,”43 Mendelssohn suggests that these
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verses are supposed to illuminate another problematic consequence that follows from denying immortality:
The distinctive mark of this worthless opinion is that it distorts
the ways of the intellect and inquiry and brings those who affirm
it, in great perplexity, to a point where they do not know whether
to prefer life or death. For if the one who denies immortality sees
the evil deed performed under the sun, it is possible that he will
abhor life. . . . For many evils and sorrows trouble him, but nothing
offers comfort. . . . But if he responds to himself that there is no evil
greater than the complete absence and destruction [of the soul], then
the ways of the intellect will compel him to prefer a life of suffering
and grief over death and the destruction of the soul.44

On this reading, Ecclesiastes includes lines that valorize life (such as 9:4)
alongside verses that praise death (such as 4:2) in order to indicate that individuals who deny immortality cannot coherently decide which option to prefer. While such individuals might conclude that life should be preserved at all
costs because the only other option is “death and the destruction of the soul,”
they might also conclude that injustice and suffering are so pervasive, and the
absence of divine justice so glaring, that nonexistence is preferable to remaining in a world of “evils and sorrows.”
Moreover, Mendelssohn continues, this is not the only perplexity that
will plague someone who denies immortality:
Sometimes he will say to himself “do whatever it is in your power to
do, for there is neither justice nor accounting” [based on Eccl 9:10];
at other times, he will despair of doing anything great or small, and
he will say “the race is not won by the swift,” etc. [Eccl 9:11], as is
explained in the ninth section of this book. Therefore, his thoughts
will frighten him and, as an instrument of torture, cast his soul
from panic to fear: there will always be strife in his heart. . . . An
individual will be rescued from this perplexity only by the belief in
immortality and in reward in the world to come.45

On this reading, verses such as Ecclesiastes 9:10 and 9:11 are supposed to
show that individuals who deny immortality cannot coherently make decisions about how to behave. After all, such individuals will be unable to decide
whether they should “do whatever it is in [their] power to do” and disregard
moral norms on the grounds that there is no final judgment, or whether they
should “despair of doing anything great or small” and avoid participation
in worldly affairs on the grounds that human life is transitory and human
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accomplishments fleeting. Unless we are prepared to live with these forms of
incoherence, then, the only solution is to reject attacks on immortality and
affirm this doctrine.
Krochmal’s argument now takes shape. When the Guide invokes Mendelssohn’s attempt to interpret Ecclesiastes “so that it does not contradict true
belief,” the reference is to the types of arguments outlined above—to Mendelssohn’s attempt to show that this biblical book affirms rather than rejects doctrines such as immortality. Krochmal goes further, however, and claims that
while Mendelssohn is a type of thinker who failed to ask whether “this [was],
in fact, the opinion and desire of the book . . . the path of inquiry drives us
to this question” in “the present time.” The reason that Mendelssohn strives
to show how Ecclesiastes “does not contradict true belief,” the Guide charges,
is that he never seriously contemplates the genuine possibility of such a contradiction, assuming instead that biblical books must affirm doctrines such
as immortality. By contrast, Krochmal claims to avoid that assumption and
ask what the available evidence actually shows. He indicates, in other words,
that his treatment of Ecclesiastes and immortality should be understood as a
critique of Mendelssohn. He casts his position as an attempt to avoid the type
of approach adopted by his German-Jewish predecessor: while Mendelssohn
seeks to show that immortality is affirmed by a biblical book such as Ecclesiastes, Krochmal contends that an honest assessment of the evidence points in
a different direction, revealing that the Bible does not address this topic with
sufficient clarity to forestall theological uncertainty, that this doctrine continued to be contested long after the canon took shape, and that it was the efforts
of groups such as the Pharisees that firmly embedded the soul’s eternity into
the landscape of Jewish belief.
This confrontation with Mendelssohn seems to so occupy Krochmal’s
attention, in fact, that he implicitly takes aim at his predecessor on multiple
occasions, repeatedly targeting the type of position associated with Mendelssohn (albeit without mentioning him again by name). As the Guide’s treatment of Ecclesiastes proceeds, Krochmal not only declares that this biblical
book “does not engage in philosophy,”46 but also denies that “the book’s
style of inquiry points to its composition at a time when the philosophy of
the Greeks had already been disseminated among us in the land of Israel.”47
Indeed, he suggests in an earlier paragraph, “even if we concede that the book’s
opinion does not accord with all the sayings mentioned therein, and that its
words follow the approach of human investigation exclusively, proceeding by
offering all parts of a contradiction for the sake of ultimately leading to the
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opinion of faith—behold, we do not know how and by what means that good
opinion is established and affirmed by [the author], and he mentions nothing
regarding this in his book.”48
THE RISE OF MODERN JEWISH THOUGHT
It might be tempting to dismiss Krochmal’s critique of Mendelssohn as a relatively insignificant episode in the history of Jewish philosophy. After all, the
argument might run, what we have here is little more than a dispute about the
interpretation of one biblical text and the history of one theological doctrine.
Consider, however, the element of Mendelssohn’s argument singled out
in Krochmal’s Guide: the insistence that Ecclesiastes affirms rather than rejects
immortality. One of the claims that recurs throughout Mendelssohn’s writings
is the idea that immortality is an “eternal truth”—an eternally valid principle
accessible through rational reflection.49 As noted above, his 1767 rewriting
of the Phaedo defends the demonstrability of this doctrine, seeking to “adapt
the metaphysical proofs” for immortality offered by Plato “to the taste of our
time.”50 Similarly, Mendelssohn’s best known treatment of Judaism—his 1783
treatise Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism—suggests that we encounter eternal truths in the statement that God is “the necessary, independent
being, omnipotent and omniscient, that recompenses men in a future life”51 or
that God “rules the entire universe . . . and discerns men’s most secret thoughts
in order to reward their deeds . . . if not here, then in the hereafter.”52 When
Mendelssohn insists that Ecclesiastes affirms immortality, then, he is arguing
that a key eternal truth is present in the Bible.
This is not a trivial claim for the German-Jewish thinker. Jerusalem places
rationally accessible eternal truths such as immortality, as well as God’s existence and providence,53 at the heart of Jewish life, famously claiming to “recognize no eternal truths other than those that are not merely comprehensible to
human reason but can also be demonstrated and verified by human powers,”
and to “consider this an essential point of the Jewish religion.”54 He elaborates:
Although the divine book that we received through Moses is, strictly
speaking, meant to be a book of laws containing ordinances, rules
of life and prescriptions, it also includes, as is well known, an inexhaustible treasure of rational truths and religious doctrines which
are so intimately connected with the laws that they form but one
entity. All laws refer to, or are based upon, eternal truths of reason,
or remind us of them, and rouse us to ponder them.55
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Judaism is presented here as a tradition whose “divine book . . . includes . . .
an inexhaustible treasure of rational truths” and whose laws “refer to . . . eternal truths of reason, or remind us of them, and rouse us to ponder them.”
That is, Mendelssohnian Judaism is a vehicle of rationally accessible eternal
truths affirmed by the Bible, a tradition whose laws lead adherents to reflect
on principles that can be discovered through reason but are also articulated
in the biblical text56—a tradition that requires practices, such as prayer or the
celebration of holidays, that remind adherents of rationally accessible and biblically expressed ideas such as God’s existence and providence. The idea here
seems to be, at least in part, that much of Jewish law can be traced to biblical
provisions (or, at least, to rabbinic interpretations of biblical provisions), that
the Bible also affirms rationally derivable principles such as God’s existence,
and that this connection between norms and a textual “treasure” of eternal
principles results in the former calling attention to the latter. Put more simply, if adherents trace laws to a biblical text that invokes eternal truths, these
individuals are likely to associate these norms with those principles, and the
performance of actions required by one is likely to bring to mind the other.57
It is important to be clear about Mendelssohn’s position here. He is
neither uninterested in changes in Jewish life over time nor unconcerned with
the activities of postbiblical Jews. On the contrary, I have argued elsewhere
that history is one of the central concerns animating his thought. While he
takes Jewish law to generate reflection on rationally accessible eternal truths
affirmed by the Bible, he also holds that these principles have been understood
in different ways at different points in time. For instance, while he claims that
Judaism’s adherents find themselves reflecting on principles such as divine
providence, he also insists that shifts in philosophical and scientific models
have led these individuals to understand the nature of this divine governance
in different ways in different eras, with medieval Jews influenced by Aristotelianism taking God to be concerned only with the fates of species and modern Jews influenced by other philosophical frameworks taking God’s care to
extend to the fates of individual creatures.58 Similarly, Mendelssohn is deeply
interested in postbiblical groups such as the rabbis of antiquity, taking rabbinic
exegesis to play a crucial role in securing the authoritative grounding of much
of Jewish law—to establish that many norms governing Jewish life are rooted
in the text of the Bible.
Nevertheless, despite this interest in historical change and in postbiblical groups such as the rabbis, it remains the case that, from Mendelssohn’s
perspective, the core doctrinal content of Judaism is already affirmed by the
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Bible. Postbiblical Jews may play an important role in Judaism and understand
principles such as providence in different ways at different points in history,
but according to Jerusalem it is the presence of these principles in Scripture—
the existence of “an inexhaustible treasure of rational truths and religious doctrines” in “the divine book that we received through Moses,” and the resulting
link between these truths and the norms governing Jewish practice—that leads
individuals to reflect on such content, taking up biblical ideas such as the
notion that God governs the cosmos and attempting to understand what that
governance involves.59
The crucial point for our purposes is that the position outlined in
Jerusalem relies on precisely the type of claim Mendelssohn advances in his
Ecclesiastes commentary. If he wishes to present Judaism as a vehicle of eternal
truths affirmed by the Bible, it will be crucial for him to show that such truths
are, in fact, present in that work. That is, it will be crucial for him to show
that biblical books such as Ecclesiastes endorse principles such as immortality, strengthening rather than contradicting “the fundamental principles of
the true religion.” It will be particularly important to advance this claim with
respect to the eternity of the soul, for one of the recurring attacks on Judaism
advanced by Mendelssohn’s Enlightenment contemporaries was the claim that
this notion is absent from the Hebrew Bible. According to this accusation,
while texts such as the New Testament accept the concept of an afterlife, the
Hebrew Bible lacks any such notion, and Judaism—a tradition built on the
Hebrew Bible, rather than the New Testament—is therefore either (at best)
an inferior religion or (at worst) no religion at all.60 Mendelssohn’s treatment
of immortality in his Ecclesiastes commentary thus plays an important role in
his thought, providing evidence for a presupposition on which his portrayal
of Judaism depends: he takes Judaism to be a vehicle of eternal truths affirmed
by the Bible, and his commentary helps establish that such truths are actually
endorsed by the biblical text.
Strikingly, Krochmal’s claims about Ecclesiastes and immortality play a
similar role in his philosophy. The Guide, we will recall, casts Judaism’s affirmation of an afterlife as the product of debates among postbiblical Jews who
disagreed about whether the soul is eternal. The implication is that Judaism
is a phenomenon whose doctrinal content emerges through the efforts of
postbiblical human beings—that Judaism’s beliefs develop over time because
of the activities of the tradition’s adherents. While Krochmal acknowledges
that groups such as the compilers of the canon affirmed immortality, he
emphasizes that such voices have not always been dominant: according to
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the Guide, immortality was a contested doctrine, and it was only the efforts
of postbiblical groups that established this belief as an integral element of the
Jewish tradition. Indeed, we saw him claim that various “beliefs and practices
. . . were supported” not simply by the biblical text, but rather “in the hands
of individuals among” the Pharisees.
Far from constituting a peripheral element of Krochmal’s thought, this
vision of Judaism as a tradition that develops over time by means of human
efforts appears elsewhere in the Guide. One of this book’s primary concepts is
the “spiritual” or ruhani, understood as a dimension of existence distinct from
(albeit discernable in) the physical world and manifest with particular clarity
in human beings and cultures. For example, a nation’s “spiritual inheritances”
include elements such as its “laws, ethical teachings, linguistic concepts, [and]
books of science.”61 Drawing on this conception of the ruhani, Krochmal
argues that Judaism’s central metaphysical claim is that God should be understood as “the absolute spiritual,” as the source and totality of spiritual manifestations such as human cognition and culture. What Judaism treats as divine is
the totality of spiritual phenomena: while other nations accord supremacy to
entities such as a god of war or a god of beauty and thus each emphasize one
subset of spiritual manifestations, Judaism takes God to in some sense encompass all such phenomena, from art to ethics.62
Nevertheless, Krochmal denies that this view of God was always a widely
accepted element of the Jewish tradition. After introducing this understanding of the divine, he offers the following account of its history within Jewish
life: “Even the Israelites who stood at Mount Sinai and heard [this conception of God] did not attain it, in the purity of its truth, in their multitude
and totality until around the time that the exiles returned from Babylonia,
that is to say, until the passage of one thousand years from the giving of the
Torah.”63 Krochmal’s claim is that even if the events at Mount Sinai involved
some exposure to a key understanding of God, this view of the divine neither
enjoyed widespread acceptance, nor was fully grasped, until the return from
the Babylonian exile and “the passage of one thousand years from the giving
of the Torah.”
In fact, he stresses, it was the actions of later generations of Jews that
established this conception of God as an integral part of Jewish life:
The time would come when the spiritual orientation of the nation
would be strengthened until it arrived at a point that had not been
achieved by the prophets of old. All of this occurred in every place
of exile, not in the way of signs and wonders by means of revealed
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miracles, and not even by means of the force of arms or the strength
of the sword . . . but rather exclusively by means of quiet well-being
and spiritual arousal among the elders and the people.64

On Krochmal’s interpretation, it was not “signs and wonders by means of
revealed miracles,” but rather the efforts of “the elders and the people,” that
ensured that “the spiritual orientation of the nation would be strengthened”
by the time following the Babylonian exile—that enabled the understanding
of God as the absolute spiritual to become more firmly rooted and widely disseminated over time. For example, members of the Jewish community would
“reflect” on and seek to “comprehend” religious matters, arriving at a deeper
understanding of the divine and thereby leading their nation to “arriv[e] at a
point that had not been achieved” in earlier times.65
This account of Jewish views on God resonates strongly with the Guide’s
account of Jewish views on immortality. In both cases, an idea that initially
enjoys only limited affirmation eventually becomes an accepted part of the
Jewish tradition due to human efforts. Krochmal’s claims about immortality
thus constitute an element of a broader argument about the nature of Judaism,
providing further evidence for, or another example of, the idea that this tradition’s doctrinal content has developed over time through human efforts. Just
as Mendelssohn’s treatment of immortality helps secure his vision of Judaism,
so too do Krochmal’s arguments about immortality help ground his portrayal
of this tradition.
The significance of the Krochmal-
Mendelssohn dispute should now
be clear. Earlier, we saw that Krochmal’s reading of Ecclesiastes offers an
account of the place of immortality in the Jewish tradition and that he casts
this account as a critique of a type of position associated with Mendelssohn.
While the German-Jewish thinker attempts to show that the eternity of the
soul is already affirmed by the Hebrew Bible, his Eastern European successor
insists that the Bible does not address this topic with sufficient clarity to prevent future conflict and that this doctrine achieved acceptance only as a result
of debates among postbiblical Jews. We have now seen that these accounts of
immortality are crucial to broader philosophical projects that animate these
thinkers. Whereas Mendelssohn’s reading of Ecclesiastes as a philosophical
defense of this doctrine helps ground his picture of Judaism as a vehicle of
rationally accessible eternal truths affirmed by the Bible, Krochmal’s narrative
of biblical uncertainty and communal debate strengthens his own image of
this tradition as a phenomenon whose content emerges through the efforts of
postbiblical human beings.
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When Krochmal engages Mendelssohn, then, what we have is not simply a
debate about the afterlife, but a debate about the very nature of Judaism. Krochmal is presenting an account of immortality that helps establish the conception
of Judaism that he wishes to advance, and he is criticizing a Mendelssohnian
account of immortality that is crucial to a competing vision of this tradition.
When he criticizes Mendelssohn for taking immortality to be affirmed by Ecclesiastes and highlights the existence of ongoing debates about this doctrine, Krochmal is rejecting a key building block in the Mendelssohnian construction of
Judaism and highlighting a piece of evidence for his own understanding of this
tradition. For these foundational philosophical voices, then, olam ha-ba becomes
a crucial terrain for formulating—and contesting—theories of Jewish existence.
Immortality provides an arena in which the German-Jewish founder of modern
Jewish thought and one of Eastern Europe’s most significant Jewish philosophers
generate competing understandings of the Jewish tradition.
Jonas may be correct that for some thinkers, “the modern temper is
uncongenial to the idea of . . . the survival of the person in a hereafter.” Yet
this judgment offers only a partial picture of the concerns that shape modern
Jewish philosophy. An exploration of Hebrew texts such as Mendelssohn’s
Ecclesiastes commentary and Krochmal’s Guide suggests that immortality
should figure prominently in the stories we tell about the emergence of Jewish intellectual modernity, for one of the early episodes in modern Jewish
thought turns out to be a high-stakes soteriological debate between East and
West. When it comes to Jewish philosophy, we might say, “the modern temper” emerges among thinkers who, operating in very different settings across
Europe, embrace the eternity of the soul and treat it as a starting point for
delving into the nature of Judaism itself. Wrestling with the status of immortality in the past, Mendelssohn and Krochmal seek to forge visions of the Jewish tradition for the present.
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Emmanuel Levinas’s Messianism and the World
to Come: A Gnostic-Philosophical Reading
of Tractate Sanhedrin 96b–99a
Federico Dal Bo
In this essay I address Emmanuel Levinas’s1 notion of “messianism,” as it is
presented in his long commentary on six pages from Tractate Sanhedrin of the
Babylonian Talmud: bSanh 96b–99a.2 I maintain that Levinas commented
on these talmudic pages for a specific purpose: to complete his critique of the
phenomenological notion of “world,” substituting for it a religious notion of
the “world to come” by which we can determine the ethical parameter to live
“in this world.” I assume that Levinas’s reading has been heavily influenced by
gnostic-philosophical notions derived from his previous monumental philosophical monograph, Totality and Infinity.3 As a consequence, I also assume
that Levinas’s reading might have succeeded in addressing, in religious terms,
the question of a “difficult freedom,” just as the title of his commentary anticipates. Instead, he produced a hermeneutically imbalanced commentary on
some very famous talmudic pages. More specifically, I maintain that Levinas
provides a strict selection of the talmudic portions to comment on, whereas he
neglects important, specific theological-political presuppositions and eventually imposes a normalized—if not generic—notion of “religion” that is finally
“supplemented,” in Derrida’s sense, by a set of metaphysical notions.4
In order to prove this, my paper is divided in four sections, as follows:
a first exposition of Levinas’s gnostic-philosophical presuppositions, a general
appreciation of his commentary on the Talmud, the examination of a specific
portion of his commentary on “messianism,” and finally the exposition of the
“supplementary” nature of Levinas’s argumentation.
LEVINAS’S “GNOSTIC”-PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE
TO HUSSERL’S NOTION OF “WORLD”
Levinas’s reading of Tractate Sanhedrin follows shortly after the publication
of his monumental philosophical monograph Totality and Infinity, eloquently
subtitled An Essay on Exteriority. This monograph was written in 1961, more
than thirteen years after Levinas’s post-phenomenological inquiries on time.5
Its aim was to criticize Husserl’s as well as Heidegger’s phenomenological
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notions of “world” and “horizon.” Levinas founded his critique on a number
of premises: (1) the rejection of Continental and specifically post-Romantic
German ontology, (2) the evaluation of the notion of “infinite,” (3) the exaltation of the notion of “ethics,” and (4) the conception of “justice” as the most
fundamental ontological attitude.6 With respect to this set of assumptions,
Levinas designated with the term “exteriority” exactly a dimension of “reality” that would exceed the boundaries of German ontology and lay claim
to a “righteous”—or “ethically” and “juridically” based—confrontation with
“the Other,” whether the latter would be identified with “the others” as fellow
human beings [autrui] or with God Himself [Autre], “the absolutely other is
the Other [l’absolument Autre, c’est Autrui].”7
Levinas assumes that the “alterity” of “the Other” [Autre] should be
understood both as the alterity of “the others” [autrui] and as “alterity” of the
Most High. Under this premise, he evidently measures the degree of “alterity” in terms of everyone’s “familiarity” with the “world,” which he inhabits
in the midst of “things” that are held out to the grasp of the hand. The grade
of “estrangement” is then measured upon the “intimacy” of “dwelling”: “To
exist [exister] henceforth means to dwell [demeurer]. To dwell is not the simple
fact of the anonymous reality of being cast into existence as a stone one casts
behind oneself; it is a recollection, a coming to oneself, a retreat home with
oneself as in a land of refuge, which answers to hospitality, an expectancy, a
human welcome.”8
In the present circumstance, it is not possible to catalogue Levinas’s quite
problematic use of spatial metaphors—such as “dwelling,” “habitation,” and
“exteriority”—that render his efforts at “escaping” metaphysics problematic
if not only tentative. It is sufficient to turn our attention to the ambiguous
nature of “dwelling” in a “world”: on the one hand, the act of “dwelling” in a
“world” constrains the individual within a “horizon” and fundamentally alienates him, by preventing him from ethically committing with “the others”; on
the other hand, the act of “dwelling” permits everyone to possess the sufficient,
minimal degree of intimacy and interiority that is needed for “escaping” the
boundaries of the “horizon” and for ethically connecting with “the others.”9
Levinas here resolves this paradox by introducing an eschatological tone that
emerges at the end of Totality and Infinity and opposes the “logic of violence
that dominates the present.”10
This notion of “logic” is to be understood here in its strongest sense as
a reference to Hegelian “science of logic,” which in turn is conceived as a sort
of philosophical commentary on the Gospel of John and its assumption that
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“history” eminently is the development of God’s “Word” [Logos] in space and
time.11 In concert with Hegel, Levinas also exhibits in Totality and Infinity
similar tones and argumentations. More specifically, he constantly maintains
a theological undertone when playing with the keystones of the Hebrew
Scripture: God’s revelation as “Word,” the Revelation of God’s “Visage,” the
commandment “Do not murder,” and so on. There is little doubt that Totality
and Infinity is a philosophical paraphrase of Hebrew Scripture, especially the
books of Genesis and Exodus, where the divine enters impetuously into the
human “world” and fundamentally dismisses its authorities and anthropological boundaries.
Levinas here assumes a genuinely “gnostic” attitude and maintains that
the “world”—together with its tools, finalities, and horizons—is deeply alien
to the ethical-juridical dimension of the “divine”; therefore, Levinas concludes
that the world’s normative validity shall be “suspended,” or “put into brackets,”
by the transcendent impetuousness of the divine. This act of “suspension” is
obviously reminiscent of Husserl’s notion of epoché, but is produced again by
emphasizing the act of “dwelling” in someone’s “own” home, where one retires
from the anonymity of the “world,” its horrifying “neutrality,” or its indifference to the divine sense for justice. Therefore, the individual who decides to
“dwell” in his “own” home enters his interiority and suspends—or delays—his
“enjoyment” of the “world.”12
This important variation of Husserl’s phenomenological notion of “suspension” determines, in Levinas’s eyes, the discovery of the existence of “consciousness” as the most intimate and retired dimension of the self. And yet
this also involves the suspension of “violence”—inherently connected to the
commitment with the world, its ontological injustice, and ethical ambiguity.
In this regard, the “introversion” into the self at the expense of someone’s commitment into the world truly is a messianic act. Exactly how, Levinas himself
will not fail to emphasize, a few years after publishing Totality and Infinity, in
his commentary on Tractate Sanhedrin. And yet Levinas’s ethical metaphysics
neither adheres to neoplatonic assumptions nor rejects the “inner logic” of late
post-Romantic German philosophy in principle. The assumptions of Totality
and Infinity are rather more refined. Levinas mobilizes a large set of “Hebrew”
concepts against unethical “desolation”—a blank vacuity void from human
presence—which would be the ultimate outcome from a strict ontological
thought: “the Being of the existent is a Logos that is the word of no one.”13
The introduction of these “Hebrew” concepts involves Husserl’s notion
of “world” as well as Heidegger’s notion of “ontology.” More specifically,
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Levinas rejects the phenomenological assumption of “world,” in so far as it
claims that the given “horizon” is epistemologically exhaustive and maintains
that there is “nothing” beyond the events by which phenomena appear in the
world. At the same time, Levinas rejects Heidegger’s onto-theology that is
implicit in his translucent event of “truth”—either aletheia or Unverborgenheit—and maintains that the “nothingness” beyond the “horizon” is not “the
Being” [Sein] veiled by the realm of “the beings” [die Seinende]; this “nothingness” rather is the emergence of the “Visage”—an event that is ontologically
and ethically challenging: “the Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height
in which God is revealed.14”
The emergence of the “Face” [Visage] calls the individual to a number
of ethical and ontological challenges that Levinas enumerates in Totality and
Infinity in terms of a specific “philosophical anthropology”: eros, love, friendship, family bounds, and so on. The dimension of “justice” is frequently
evoked as a sort of “metaphysical quality,” but it is not really appreciated in
its social and political specificities. These are indeed much more taken into
account in Levinas’s later commentary on Tractate Sanhedrin. Its speculative
relevance had already been anticipated in a short quotation in Totality and
Infinity, while mentioning the importance of “feeding” anyone, regardless of
his ethical, juridical, and social affiliation.15 It is this sense for justice that Levinas attributes to Tractate Sanhedrin and that might have fascinated him while
finishing Totality and Infinity and persuaded him of the necessity of writing a
commentary on this text.
Is it possible that Tractate Sanhedrin might offer an insight into a “world-
to-come” essentially different and distant from the many flaws of “this world”?
What was then “messianism” for Levinas?
LEVINAS’S READING OF TRACTICE SANHEDRIN 99b–99a
Levinas’s interest in Tractate Sanhedrin had never been occasional. Over a
period of years Levinas commented four times on it on four different occasions
and in four different contexts.16
It is difficult to determine the reasons for such an interest with respect to
other talmudic tractates. At first, one could maintain that Tractate Sanhedrin
is a famous and well-studied talmudic text, and it would then be surprising if
Levinas had not studied it intensively together with “Monsieur Chouchani”
(a mysterious, still unidentified talmudic genius, who used to live as a tramp
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and who introduced Levinas to Talmud in a series of private lessons, from
1947 to 1951).17 Besides, Tractate Sanhedrin speaks about “justice” both in
abstract and practical terms; indeed, it prescribes what crimes have to be punished with the death penalty but it also examines the ways by which to deliver
it upon wrongdoers. Finally, Tractate Sanhedrin also includes a famous section on “messianism” that is not to be found elsewhere in rabbinic literature.
Before examining the congruence of these pages with Levinas’s philosophical
investigations, it is necessary to provide readers with a brief description of the
talmudic section examined in his “messianic” texts.”
From a formal point of view, the talmudic section from Tractate Sanhedrin 96b–99a is a long nonjuridical, narrative appendix (haggadah) that
is annexed to the previous discussion on the institution of prophecy, on the
correct punishment for a false prophet, and specifically on the opinion that
the son of the wicked Haman might teach Scripture.18 These six pages are
written exclusively in Hebrew—with the exception of the first two lines written in Aramaic (bSanh 96b)—and therefore should be accounted as an early,
possibly Palestinian external source [baraita] that had been discarded from
the Palestinian Talmud for probable reasons of “political prudence” toward
the Roman government, whereas it was included in the Babylonian Talmud
due to the relatively more relaxed religious policy in the Sassanid Persia.19
Therefore, these six pages devoted to messianism are an exceptional document that has possibly been redacted in several layers and finally organized
into a discrete number of topics: (1) the generation of the Messiah (bSanh
97a), (2) the notion of “truth” (bSanh 97a), (3) a first investigation on the
time of the messianic advent (bSanh 97a–b), (4) the notion of the “righteous ones” in every generation (bSanh 97b), (5) the notion of “repentance”
(bSanh 97b–98a), (6) a second investigation on the time of the messianic
advent (bSanh 98a), (7) the times before the messianic advent (bSanh 98b),
(8) the identity of the Messiah (bSanh 98b), and (9) the duration of messianic times (bSanh 99a).
Levinas’s reading of these very complex pages is quite selective. Levinas
completely neglected the historical reasons for redacting these pages, their
linguistic and theoretical nature as well as most of the topics already reported
above. Levinas has rather focused his attention especially on four themes:
(1) the duration of messianic times (bSanh 99a), (2) the notion of “repentance” (bSanh 97b–98a), (3) the time before the messianic advent (bSanh
98b), and (4) the identity of the Messiah (bSanh 98b), as it can be summarized
in the following chart.
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Topics of the sugya

Levinas’s commentary

(1) the generation of the Messiah (bSanh 97a)
(2) the notion of “truth” (bSanh 97a)
(3) the time of the messianic advent I (bSanh 97a–b)
(4) the notion of the “righteous ones” (bSanh 97b)
(5) the notion of “repentance” (bSanh 97b–98a)

✓

(6) the time of the messianic advent II (bSanh 98a)
(7) the times before the messianic advent (bSanh 98b)

✓

(8) the identity of the Messiah (bSanh 98b)

✓

(9) the duration of messianic times (bSanh 99a)

✓

Levinas expounds these four selected topics more than once in a nonlinear perspective and appears to discourse several times on the same issue, as if he
were digging deeper in search of an ethical-philosophical meaning of the text.
In particular, Levinas proposes a different segmentation of the text according
to six paragraphs that rearrange the whole narrative section: (1) the notion of
messianism, (2) the ethical conditions for the messianic advent, (3) the contradictions of messianism, (4) the overcoming of messianism, (5) the question
about the identity of the Messiah, and (6) the correlation between messianism
and universalism.
It is evident that Levinas’s rearrangement of the textual material does
not follow the thematic sequence of the original text. At first one could object
that a nonjuridical, narrative text can easily be dismounted and rearranged differently; thus, one could even maintain that Levinas has indeed clarified the
thematic consistency of a long talmudic section that would hardly have been
expounded otherwise.
On the contrary, my argument is that Levinas has deliberately imposed
a philosophical reading with a specific purpose: mobilizing a supposedly
“Hebrew” concept of “world” over against a phenomenological-ontological
one. In other terms, Levinas intended to employ the talmudic notion of “the
world to come” as a correction to the phenomenological notion of “world.”
More specifically, my assumption is that Levinas is interested in Tractate
Sanhedrin especially because of his need for a speculative alternative to post-
Romantic German phenomenology. The break of the phenomenological
notion of “world” in Totality and Infinity had implied the necessity of coming
to terms with the eschatological notion of “the world to come” because the
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latter would oppose the former in many respects: (1) the nature of an eschatological event would oppose the ontological uniformity of the ordinary “world,”
(2) the messianic claim for absolute justice would oppose Western, ethically
neutral societies, and finally (3) the emergence of a personal intimacy with
“ethics” would oppose the contemporary anonymity of social and political
practices.
For brevity’s sake it is not possible to review each of these very important oppositions between “this world” and “the world to come” in Levinas’s
commentary. Therefore it would be sufficient to take into account the most
decisive one: the opposition between the anonymity of “this world” and the
intimacy of “the world to come.” Levinas makes the notion of “messianism”
coincidental with a specific condition of the self due to a particular interpretation of a short talmudic inquiry about the identity of the Messiah:
What is his [the Messiah’s] name? The House of Rabbi Shila said:
His name is Shilo, since it is written: “until Shiloh will come” (Gen
49:10). The House of Rabbi Yannai said: His name is Yinnon,
since it is written: “his name will endure for ever . . . his name is
Yinnon” (Ps 72:17). The House of Rabbi Hanina said: His name is
Hanina, since it is written: “where I will not give you Haninah [i.e.,
mercy]” (Jer 16:13). (bSanh 98b)

At first, Levinas admits that the question of the identity of the Messiah clearly has specific historical and cultural anti-Christian inclinations. Yet
Levinas dismisses quite easily these historical implications and emphasizes
that these answers imply that “the pupil-teacher relationship” has a messianic
value.20 Accordingly, he comments on them and comes to this surprising
conclusion:
I venture to propose an interpretation of this text that is less special. . . . The Messiah is the Prince who governs in a way that no
longer alienates the sovereignty of Israel. He is the absolute interiority of government. Is there a more radical interiority that the one in
which the Self [moi] commends itself? Non-strangeness, par excellence is ipseity. The Messiah is the King who no longer commands
form outside. . . . The Messiah is Myself [moi]; to be Myself is to be
the Messiah.21

This is probably one of the most eloquent passages that gives evidence
of Levinas’s practical use of talmudic literature for philosophical purposes.
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On the one hand, Levinas clearly intends to propose an “ethical” vision of the
“world to come” that is inherently different from the ordinary “world,” which
is circumscribed by anonymity and negligence. On the other hand, Levinas
here manipulates the talmudic source—whose intentions probably are ironical with respect to Christianity and apologetical with respect to the rabbinic
establishment—and rephrases it in strict philosophical-
phenomenological
terms. What is here relevant is that Levinas indulges in this “egocentric” interpretation of the messianic condition and at the same time ignores the obvious
theological-political setting of this text, which is easily demonstrated by the
first lines, written in Aramaic, from the talmudic passage:
Rav Nachman said to Rabbi Itzhaq: Have you heard when “the son
of the fallen” [bar nafley] will come? Whence is [the expression]
“the son of the fallen”? He said to him: Messiah. Do you call him,
the Messiah, “the son of the fallen”? He said to him: isn’t it written:
“Today I will raise up the tabernacle of David that has fallen [ha-
nofelet]” (Amos 9:11)? (bSanh 96b–97a)

These few words in Aramaic do not only introduce the extraordinary talmudic discussion in Hebrew on “messianism,” but also provide the
interpretative key to it by alluding to a number of theological presuppositions through a complex word play. Scholars usually agree that the Aramaic
expression bar nafley [the son of the fallen] is indeed both a translation and
an interpretation of the Greek expression uios nefelon [the son of clouds]
that would allude to the cosmological advent of the eschatological figure of
the “son of man” in the book of Daniel as well as to its rephrasing in the
gospel of Matthew.22 Rabbi Nachman might have been making a pun on
the Greek description of Jesus as the Messiah and claiming for the intrinsic “Jewishness” of the Messiah himself: a descendent from the House of
David who will restore the “tabernacle of David” or restore the theological-
political prominence of Israel. And yet Levinas ignores these very important
connotations.
As a consequence, the claim to be the Messiah in Levinas’s interpretation
is deprived of its theological-political significance and is rather forced into a
philosophical perspective: the “individualism” by which each prominent rabbi
calls himself a Messiah and therefore exalts the ideals of rabbinic education is
reinterpreted if not rephrased in terms of phenomenological “ipseity.”
What are the consequences of this method by which nonphilosophical
material is rephrased in philosophical terms?
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LEVINAS’S TALMUDIC HERMENEUTICS AND HIS
PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT
Levinas’s talmudic hermeneutics seems to reflect the interpretative method that
he was probably taught by “Monsieur Chouchani.” This implied a sort of thematic conflation of “legal” and “nonlegal” texts under the assumption that both
juridical and narrative texts should be examined from the same points of view: as
texts susceptible of being interpreted in “ethical”-“metaphysical” terms. In order
to appreciate the impact of this hermeneutical method on the thematic and
textual integrity of the Talmud, I will specifically focus on Levinas’s treatment of
the notion of “repentance.” Levinas’s argumentation is very complex. For clarity’s
sake I will first report the essential points of his interpretation. Only later do I
analyze it in detail and expose its metaphysical and “supplementary” character.
First, Levinas describes the debate between two talmudic authorities,
Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Johanan, on the notion
of “repentance” and only then takes side with one of them (bSanh 99a):
For Samuel, on the other hand, something foreign to the moral individual exists, something which must first be suppressed before the
messianic era can come. The Messiah is, first and foremost, this break.
For the lucid conscience in control of its intentions, the coming of
the Messiah carries an irrational element or at least something which
does not depends on man, which comes from outside: the outcome of
political contradictions. . . . It matters little whether this outside is the
action of God or a political revolution that is distinct form morality.23

From the glosses on the importance of “ethics” and “self-commitment”
with justice, it is quite evident that Levinas is hiding behind the words of Samuel and offering a specific critique, in talmudic terms, to the phenomenological notion of “world.” Levinas is maintaining here that the ordinary “world”
cannot be the true source for “messianism” in so far as the latter implies a deep
reconfiguration of morals and ethics. The “world” can provide only a sort of
“socialist utopia,” as expressed in the words of Rav Hiyya bar Abba, but it
cannot really launch an epoch-changing event like the messianic one. This is
impossible for an essential reason: “messianism” implies an ethical as well as
metaphysical break into the ontological “horizon” of the ordinary “world,”
whereas any political utopia implies the belief that salvation can eventually
originate from within the “world” itself.
Yet Levinas is not satisfied with this first examination of the dispute
between Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Johanan.
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Therefore, he examines also a similar discussion that takes place between Samuel
and Rav, his usual opponent in the Talmud, on the notion of “repentance.” After
examining several alternatives in identifying who is the individual who is said
to be mourning for Israel (bSanh 97b–98a), Levinas summarizes the terms of
this dispute as follows: “The two theses propounded by Rab and Samuel seem
clearer: . . . either morality . . . will save the world or else what is needed is an
objective event that surpasses morality and the individual’s good intentions.”24
Levinas’s argumentation goes further by resuming an earlier discussion
on “repentance” between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Jehoshua (bSanh 97b) in
order to support his main assumption that messianism intrinsically involves
an extramundane irruption of the divine into the human history. Therefore,
Levinas assimilates the discussion between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Jehoshua
to the two previous ones.
For now we can stop at this point of the discussion and proceed with a
first evaluation of Levinas’s interpretation. As far as Levinas’s reading is fascinating, it imposes a subtle manipulation of the talmudic text, regardless of its
original aims and composition. In the original text of Tractate Sanhedrin, the
discussion on the notion of “repentance” is introduced in the middle of two
larger textual sections on the time when the Messiah is going to come. The
discussion on the notion of “repentance” (bSanh 97b–98a) specifically divides
the first investigation on the time of the messianic advent (bSanh 97a–b) from
the second one (bSanh 98a). The apparent reasons for this redactional choice
are quite obvious: providing a two-step discussion on the same issue of the
time of the messianic advent by inserting a new parameter—the moral quality
of the individuals who will be living at the time of the messianic advent itself.
Yet Levinas’s treatment of these two discussions is much less philologically and hermeneutically accurate than would at first appear. My assumption
is that Levinas manipulated the talmudic source and “supplemented” it with
a specific “ethical” argumentation with particular consequences that imposed
specific theological-political costs to his interpretation of the text. In order to
appreciate this, it is necessary to resume Levinas’s interpretation and to compare it with the original talmudic source.
LEVINAS’S SUPPLEMENTING THE TALMUD
The most important difference between the original page and Levinas’s arrangement of this text is the segmentation of the textual material. The original
passage from Tractate Sanhedrin offers a very specific sequence of the textual
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portions on which Levinas comments: at first, the debate between Rabbi
Eliezer and Rabbi Joshuah (bSanh 97b) that anticipates the debate between
Samuel and Rav (bSanh 97b–98a), and then—after a long cosmological section on the secular cycles of the messianic times (bSanh 98a–99a)—the debate
between Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yohanan
(bSanh 99a). This disposition follows both chronological and thematic criteria: on the one hand, it is clear that the Amoraic debate between Samuel and
Rav (bSanh 97b–98a) resumes the Tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer
and Rabbi Jehosuha (bSanh 97b); on the other hand, it is clear that the debate
between Samuel and Rav (bSanh 99a) concludes the long narrative talmudic
section on messianism (bSanh 96b–99a) and, more specifically, resumes the
previous discussion on the notion of “repentance,” after a parenthetical discussion on the cosmological evidence of messianic times (bSanh 98a–99a).
Levinas apparently pays attention neither to the complex texture of these
talmudic passages nor to the progression from the Tannaitic to the late Amoraic times. On the contrary, he deeply changes the order for reading in two
ways: first, he analyzes the debate between Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba
(bSanh 99a) before the debate between Samuel and Rav (bSanh 97b–98a); he
then encapsulates the early debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Jehoshua
(bSanh 97b) within the larger frame of the two debates between Samuel and
Rav Hiyya bar Abba, on the one hand, and between Samuel and Rav, on the
other hand. The inversion of the talmudic material in Levinas’s commentary
can easily be displayed in the following chart.
Development of the sugya

Levinas’s sequence

debate Rabbi Eliezer/Rabbi Jehoshua
(bSanh 97b)

debate Samuel/Rav Hiyya bar Abba
(bSanh 99a)

debate Samuel/Rav (bSanh 97b–98a)

debate Samuel/Rav (bSanh 97b–98a)

debate Samuel/Rav Hiyya bar Abba
(bSanh 99a)

debate Rabbi Eliezer/Rabbi Jehoshua
(bSanh 97b)

It is precisely this “dislocation” of the early Tannaitic debate that plays
a very specific role in Levinas’s exegesis. Levinas moves aside the early debate
between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Johoshua with a specific purpose: supplementing his argument about the indisputable extramundane nature of the messianic
event. I emphasize here Derrida’s notion of “supplement” that designates, in
deconstructive terms, an “inessential extra added to something complete in
itself.”25 Accordingly, Levinas at first ignores, then dislocates, and finally resumes
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the debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Jehoshua in order to reiterate an
exegetical point—the value of “repentance”—on which he had already commented twice: once while reviewing the debate between Samuel and Rav Hiyya
bar Abba (bSanh 99a) and once while reviewing the debate between Samuel and
Rav (bSanh 97b–98a). What is relevant here is not the simple different disposition of textual material, rather the effect that Levinas intended to produce by
offering a different segmentation of the text. Levinas is not simply reading the
original text in reverse order; he is also imposing a hermeneutical dynamics into
it so that he can support his own reading of the notion of “repentance” as well as
prevent a specific accusation against his main assumption that messianism would
be the “outbreak”—if not an “evasion”—from the ordinary “world.”
This passage is very subtle. Let us view once again the structure of the
original talmudic text, Levinas’s commentary, and the “supplement” that he
finds for his interpretation.
At first, the original talmudic text offers a progressive line of thoughts
that goes as follows in three fundamental steps:
(1) the Tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshuah (bSanh
97b) introduces the alternative between a conditioned and unconditioned salvation by the Messiah: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that salvation will depend on an economical exchange of good deeds, a sort of
metaphysical do ut des; on the contrary, Rabbi Johoshua believes in a
sort of divine “grace” that will save everyone, regardless of his crimes.
(2) These opinions are then expanded into the later Amoraic debate
between Samuel and Rav (bSanh 97b–98a), who respectively argue
for an unconditioned messianic advent as an “external event” and for
a conditioned event that fundamentally depends on a specific moral,
social, and political commitment of the individuals.
(3) After a digression on the cosmological cycles of messianic times
(bSanh 98a–99a), the previous discussions culminate in the debate
between Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba (bSanh 99a) on the very
nature of the messianic advent: Samuel thinks of the messianic
advent as the irruption of “the Other,” whereas Rav insists on the
moral, social, and political presuppositions to this event. A short
sacerdotal coda to the discussion ends the six pages on messianism
with an eloquent invocation to Paradise and the Garden of Eden.
Levinas rejects this original arrangement of the text, as already remarked.
He starts his commentary from the very last lines of the text on the
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metaphysical mystery of the end of times, but he is mostly troubled by the
possibility that these “messianic texts” might resemble some form of Christianity: “The commentator [the Maharsha]26 was probably shocked by the idea
of redemption which is obtained by the sole effect of suffering and without
any positive virtue being required, something that reeks of Christianity [a un
fort relent chrétien].”27
Therefore, he inverts the order of reading the long talmudic text and
begins with the discussion between Samuel and Rav Hiyya bar Abba (bSanh
99a), passing then to the discussion between Samuel and Rav (bSanh 97b–
98a), and finally ending with the Tannaitic debate between Rabbi Eliezer and
Rabbi Jehoshua (bSanh 97b).
It is exactly at this point that Levinas exhibits the logic of the “supplement.” This fundamentally consists of holding two contradictory assumptions
at the same time and yet maintaining that the one actually sustains, or supplements, the other one.
On the one hand, Levinas claims that the debate between Rabbi Eliezer
and Rabbi Jehoshua should not be interpret in terms of a divine “grace”: “Precisely, because evil is not simply a ‘backsliding,’ but a profound illness in being, it
is the sick person who is first and principal worker of his own healing. This is a
unique logic [singulière logique], and the opposite of the logic of grace. I can
save you on condition that you return unto me.”28
On the other hand, Levinas claims that the debate between Rabbi Eliezer
and Rabbi Jehoshua does actually support a “gracious” form of salvation
although this divine intervention is rather described as “brutal”—somehow
spelled out in “uncivilized terms”: “Rabbi Joshua’s final argument consists in
brutally [brutalement] affirming the deliverance of the world by a fixed date,
whether or not men deserve such deliverance.”29
This little linguistic detail is particularly relevant because it actually
exposes the logic of “supplement” at work here. Levinas intends to keep
away from any interpretation of the text that might suggest some theological
congruity between Judaism and Christianity, but he cannot help remarking
twice—on the basis of two simultaneous discussions—that the messianic
advent breaks up the ordinary “horizon” of the “world.” The logic of “supplement” can be seen at work especially when Levinas implicitly applies to these
texts his notion of “religion,” as he elaborated on it in his Totality and Infinity:
“We propose to call ‘religion’ the bond [lien] that is established between the
same [Même] and the other [Autre] without constituting a totality. . . . For the
relation between the being here below and the transcendent being that results
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in no community of concept or totality—a relation without relation [relation
sans relation]—we reserve the term religion.”30
The logic of “supplement” exactly intervenes in order to prevent the
reader from understanding this phenomenologically neutral definition of
“religion” in Christian terms. Levinas intends to avoid the suspicion that
this powerful vision of “grace” might be misunderstood as a Christian belief.
Particularly eloquent is the empirical, almost trivial expression that he uses:
“something that reeks of Christianity [a un fort relent chrétien].”31 This little
slip of the pen lowers the religious debate to the level of dispute between Judaism and Christianity, betraying the suspicion that Levinas’s notion of “religion”
intends to be not only “phenomenologically” but also “morally” if not even
“physiologically” pure from contaminations—from something that actually
“reeks” as a popular form of religion.
What are the consequences of this kind of reading? The particular segmentation that Levinas imposes on the talmudic text and especially his interest
in avoiding any “contamination” with a popular understanding of the notion
of “repentance” have specific costs: the suppression of theological-political
nuances in favor of a “metaphysical” appreciation of the notion of “messianism.” This “philosophical reduction” is not infrequent in Levinas’s commentaries on the Talmud and reflects both the hermeneutical method taught by
“Monsieur Chouchani” and his own commitment to reviewing phenomenology. Just as his Totality and Infinity appears as a philosophical rephrasing of
the biblical books of Genesis and Exodus, so does his commentary on Tractate
Sanhedrin appear as a “philosophical reduction” of traditionally Jewish literature and specifically of the religious doctrine of messianism. Levinas’s neglect
of the theological-political connotations of this text might then appear inadequate if not paradoxical, but it is rather the consequence of philosophical and
phenomenological approach to the text.
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represented by “phenomenological” commentaries on Totality and Infinity; (2) a “deconstructive” one, mostly represented by Derrida’s reception of Levinas’s Totality and Infinity
and its followers; (3) a sociopolitical one, represented by most recent scholarship. On this,
see P. Atterton and M. Calarco, eds., Radicalizing Levinas (New York: SUNY Press, 2010).
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